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Abstract 
 
This special issue of Perspectives on Federalism offers a multidisciplinary collection of 
pieces dealing with some (selected) issues in the field of citizenship studies. 
In order to investigate how citizenship has been reconceived over the years, we 
decided to propose a multidisciplinary itinerary where scholars interested in political and 
legal theory, EU, international and constitutional law produced a contribution to defining 
the new boundaries of this concept. 
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1. Why an issue devoted to EU citizenship? 
 
This special issue of Perspectives on Federalism offers a multidisciplinary collection of 
pieces dealing with some (selected) issues in the field of citizenship studiesI. 
Despite the heterogeneity of their subjects and perspectives, the fil conducteur of 
these works is given by the impact of European Union on the classic (national) conception 
of citizenship. 
In order to investigate how citizenship has been reconceived over the years, we 
decided to propose a multidisciplinary itinerary where scholars interested in political and 
legal theory, EU, international and constitutional law produced a contribution to defining 
the new boundaries of this concept. 
The EU is often considered as a laboratory of new forms of multi-level 
government, which overcomes and challenges traditional notions of modern politics 
associated with the nation-state. Indeed, the EU has been considered as the laboratory of a 
new federalism, precisely for being made up of nation-states with centuries old stories and 
identities, unlike most other federations around the world. This forces the EU to identify 
new institutional avenues, which to a certain extent are more coherent with federalist 
principles, and in particular respectful of subsidiarity. 
We believe that within the EU a new kind of federal system is emerging. This 
requires a significant revision of many old concepts and notions with regards to citizenship, 
sovereignty, democracy, and other key categories of modern political thought. To express 
in a nutshell the challenge ahead we could say that modern political thought offers 
essentially monistic versions of all those concepts, adequate for the centralised nation-state, 
characterised by one dominant level of government, demanding absolute loyalty and 
identification by the citizens. Federalism and the European unification process demand 
new pluralistic visions of all these concepts, to reflect a multi-level system of government 
in a world of multiple and complex interdependence. 
While scholars of federalism have focused mainly on the innovative institutional 
features of the EU, carefully analysing its historic development and highlighting a 
substantial trend in the increase of competences and/or powers of the EU, relatively little 
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attention has been paid to the development of a new concept of multi-level citizenship and 
its implications. With this issue Perspectives on Federalism intends to contribute to this debate.  
Frequently EU citizenship has been described as a sort of “Cinderella” which does 
not add anything “substantive” to the “real” citizenship represented by the national one. 
This approach was suggested by the wording of the former Treaty on the European 
Community, whose Art. 17 read: “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. 
The nationality of a Member State is thus a prerequisite in order to obtain EU citizenship 
and it is for each Member State to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of 
nationality. 
The Lisbon Treaty seems to change slightly the situation, since its Art. 20 Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) says that: “Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship”. The adjective used is different from that 
employed in Art. 17 TEC (“complementary” from the verb “to complement”) and gives 
the idea of a relative autonomy of EU citizenship from the national one. 
This suggestion has been, in a way, endorsed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in some recent judgments and indeed 2011 will remain in the 
history of the European integration as the year of the delivery of the landmark Zambrano 
decisionII which represents, in the words of many commentators, a revolution. 
 
2. A Revolution in few pages: Zambrano 
 
Since Zambrano will be the subject of another contribution included in the same 
issue of this journalIII, we will limit ourselves to summing up the contents of the decision 
and present some considerations about the impact of this judgment. 
The question originates from a preliminary reference raised ex 267 TFEU by the 
Tribunal du travail de Bruxelles. 
This case concerns two Colombian citizens, Mr Zambrano and his wife, who 
moved from Colombia to Belgium with their first child. Belgian authorities rejected their 
application for asylum but because of the local situation in Colombia also decided not to 
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send them back there. Mr Zambrano and his family continued living in Belgium and in the 
following years applied for residence permits. 
Their applications were rejected by the Belgian authorities. Nevertheless Mr 
Zambrano found a job in 2001 and from that year he worked and regularly contributed to 
the social security system. Mr Zambrano and his wife had other two children, both with 
Belgian citizenship. The children- and this is an important detail in the economy of the 
case- had never left Belgium.  
When the Belgian authorities realized that Mr Zambrano was working without a 
work permit, they claimed that he did not have right of residence and consequently no 
right to work in Belgium.  
Mr Zambrano went before a national court arguing he had right of residence and 
right to work in Belgium since his two children were Belgian and thus EU citizens. The 
non acknowledgement of such a right would have implied the necessity for all the 
components of the family (including the two children with EU citizenship) to leave 
Belgium. 
The central question is whether the child of non-Union citizens but who has Union 
citizenship has the right of residence under Union law when the child has not exercised any 
right of free movementIV. 
The Court delivered a revolutionary judgment in a few pages, characterized by a 
poor and obscure legal reasoning and by a certain degree of disregard for the wording of 
Treaties, which refer to secondary legislation when evoking the limitations and conditions 
laid upon the freedom of movement (Hailbronner-D.Thym , 2011, 1259).  
The Court did not rely on Art. 18 and 21 TFEUV but relied rather on Art. 20 
TFEUVI saying that this provision “precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving 
citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status 
as citizens of the Union” [para. 42 of the judgment].  
The CJEU inferred from this that the situation of the two children was relevant for 
EU law (it did not constitute a mere international situation). As a consequence, the CJEU 
extended the right of residence of the children to their parents following the scheme 
employed in ChenVII. Moreover, the Court inferred from the right of residence of the 
children a right to work for their parents.  
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Zambrano is revolutionary because it seems to abandon the distinction between static and 
dynamic citizens and the necessity of the of an intra-EU cross-border component to its 
decision. 
The evident result of this decision was the extension of the scope of citizenship: 
does Zambrano represent an extraordinary decision? Probably yes. The risk of rendering the 
status of EU citizens of the two young people (who did not have Colombian citizenship 
and who would have been forced to move to Colombia with their parents otherwise) 
ineffective induced the Luxembourg Court to take this decision. In any case, after 
Zambrano, the CJEU took the chance to return to the issue with other judgementsVIII but 
there are still many question marks to be clarified. We will see what the CJEU will say in 
the future and how Member States will react to this judicial trend. 
 
3. An overview of  this issue 
 
The opening piece of this issue by David Ragazzoni highlights the changing nature 
(the “evolution” as he says at the beginning of the paper) of the concept of EU citizenship, 
beginning with the work by Thomas Marshall (Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950), and identifying three “sources” for such a 
transformation: the necessity to rethink the citizenship/identity nexus; the new concept of 
political representation emerging in the contemporary global democracies and the 
emergence of the EU. In order to appreciate the impact of these three different factors, 
Ragazzoni goes back to the classic debate between two giants of political and legal theory: 
Kelsen and Schmitt, offering thoughtful reflections on the theoretical implications of the 
concept of citizenship. 
After this conceptual introduction to the idea of citizenship, we move to the 
contemporary European reality in order to appreciate the impact of the already mentioned 
Zambrano judgment on classical notions of citizenship: in his piece Loïc Azoulai investigates 
the rationale and the implication of what he defines a decision inspired by a “genuine 
European integration” touch. The argument developed by Azoulai is that, with Zambrano, 
the CJEU moved away from a concept of transnational integration in order to foster a new 
vision, based on the existence of bonds that encompass the whole Union. However 
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Zambrano is just one of the latest links of the jurisprudential chain that have led the CJEU 
to such a conclusion, as the author shows by contextualizing the decision. 
Despite the richness of contributions in this area very few contributions have been 
devoted to the “external” dimension of the EU citizenship which is instead “explored” in 
this issue by Madalina Moraru and Joris Larik  
In her piece Madalina Moraru deals with the issue of the protection of EU citizens 
“abroad”, governed by Art. 20 (2) of the TFEU, studying the new role acquired by the EU 
in the ambit of diplomatic and consular protection. Although the number of studies on EU 
citizenship is massive, the issue of the protection of EU citizens abroad has been 
traditionally neglected by scholars. The 2006 and 2008 Euro-barometer surveys show how 
EU citizens are unaware of the existence of a right to protection abroad. 
In his brilliant contribution Joris Larik explores another intriguing side of the 
external dimension of the citizenship, showing how this dimension is still underdeveloped 
and arguing that it extends to the field of Common Foreign and Security and Common 
Defence and Security Policies. Starting from the analysis of the mandate of the Atalanta- 
the EU’s anti-piracy operation- the Author demonstrates the unexpressed potential that the 
EU citizenship presents in this field and demonstrates the existence of “a widening gap 
between the powerful notion of Union citizenship within the Union and its present weakness outside of it. 
Internally, the development of Union law makes it increasingly difficult to construe nationals from different 
Member States as proper ‘foreigners’”. 
Eventually, in a very sophisticated and enjoyable article Dimitry Kochenov offers a 
lucid analysis of the premises shaping the policies of cultural integration in some liberal 
democracies, by starting from his “own first-hand experience of naturalisation in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the pioneering jurisdiction with regards to the introduction of ‘cultural integration’, marked by 
‘politics divided from society’” and then contextualizing this story in the general debate on 
citizenship, since the “situation of newly naturalised Member State nationals is a perfect illustration of 
the logical disharmony between the two legal orders in the EU, affecting the same individuals 
simultaneously. This duality of statuses which governs the life of every single EU citizen exemplifies the 
archaic logic behind naturalisation, which is never questioned by politicians and is only rarely seriously 
criticised by scholars”. 
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Together, these pieces constitute a productive mixture of ideas which aims to foster 
the debate on the necessity to rethink the idea of citizenship and its connection with the 
nature of EU integration. 
 
                                                 
I This issue has been made possible thanks to the intense and fruitful cooperation between the Sant’Anna 
Legal Studies Programme (STALS, www.stals.sssup.it) hosted by the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa and the 
Centre for Studies on Federalism in Turin and thanks to many people who have played an important role in 
the organization of an initiative held at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna on January 23 2011 precisely on 
“Rethinking citizenship”. Although many of the papers presented in that occasion have not been published, all 
the participants rendered that workshop an invaluable opportunity for a debate which led to this issue of the 
journal. 
II C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, www.curia.europa.eu 
III See the article by Azoulai included in the same issue, http://www.on-federalism.eu/index.php/articles/97-
euro-bonds-the-ruiz-zambrano-judgment-or-the-real-invention-of-eu-citizenship. 
IV Over the years the CJEU has used the concept of citizenship for eliminating discriminations based on 
nationality even in ambits that are not characterized by European competence. 
This way the CJEU made Art. 12 TECIV a fundamental tool of its case law in this field, that is why the Lisbon 
Treaty inserted Art. 18 TFEUIV (corresponding to Art. 12 TEC) the section devoted to citizenship while 
under the previous Treaties the principle of non discrimination was disciplined outside such a section. 
Another fundamental instrument in the judicial toolbox of the CJEU has been represented by Art. 18 TECIV 
which disciplines the freedom of movement of the European citizens. 
It is conceived the most important right contained in the status of citizens, moreover, according to the case 
law of the CJEU, in order to “activate” the rights connected to the EU citizenship is necessary to exercise the 
freedom of movement. As we will see this point was contested by Advocate General Sharpston in the 
Zambrano case since it could pave the way to discriminations between “static” and “dynamic” citizens. 
V Art. 21 TFEU: “1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them 
effect. 
2. If action by the Union should prove necessary to attain this objective and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, 
the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt provisions with 
a view to facilitating the exercise of the rights referred to in paragraph 1. 
3. For the same purposes as those referred to in paragraph 1 and if the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt measures concerning social security or social 
protection. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament”. 
VI Art. 20 TFEU: “1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter 
alia: 
(a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; 
(b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their 
Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; 
(c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, 
the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that 
State; 
(d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and 
advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. 
These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted 
thereunder”. 
VII C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, ECR 2004 p. I-9925 
VIII For instance McCarthy: C- 434-09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
www.curia.europa.eu 
 
 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License  
 
IX 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
References 
 
• Bauböck Rainer, 2011, “ECJ decides that third country national parents of an EU citizen child have 
rights to residence and access to employment in the child’s country of nationality”, EUDO 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/447-ecj-decides-that-third-country-national-parents-
of-an-eu-citizen-child-have-rights-to-residence-and-access-to-employment-in-the-childs-country-of-
nationality  
• Hailbronner Kay -D.Thym Daniel, 2011, “ Casenote”, Common Market Law Review, 1253-1270;  
• A.Hinarejos Alicia, 2011,:“Extending Citizenship and the Scope of EU Law”, The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 309-312. 
• Wiesbrock Anja, 2011, “The Zambrano case: Relying on Union citizenship rights in ‘internal 
situations’”, EUDO http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/449-the-zambrano-case-relying-
on-union-citizenship-rights-in-internal-situations.  
 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
1 
ISSN: 2036-5438 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity vs. representation: what makes ‘the people’? 
Rethinking democratic citizenship through (and 
beyond)  
Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen  
by  
David Ragazzoni* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 3, issue 2, 2011 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The concept of ‘citizenship’ has significantly evolved since the work by Thomas 
Marshall in 1950: the emergence of various kinds of ‘identity/difference’ politics, the 
transformation of political representation within our ‘glocal’ democracies and the 
theoretical challenges posed by the EU (especially about pivotal notions such as 
sovereignty, constituent power and peoplehood) questioned the traditional account of 
liberal democratic citizenship (sect. 0). Combining political history and theory, the present 
paper looks backwards to the debate between Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen in 1920s 
Weimar over the fate of parliamentary democracy to distill useful insights for rethinking 
citizenship via representation. Mapping their topography of democratic governments and 
their diverging understanding of what keeps a community of citizens together (sects. 1-2) 
will help developing a more sophisticated notion of ‘the people’ beyond standard 
dichotomies in democratic theory: namely, those of identity (Schmitt)/representation 
(Kelsen), constituent (Schmittian)/constituted (Kelsenian) power, substantial 
(Schmittian)/procedural (Kelsenian) democracy also recurring in the normative 
understanding of the Union (sect. 3). 
 
Key-words:  
 Democratic citizenship; political identity; political representation; parliamentary 
democracy; the people; Kelsen Hans; Schmitt Carl  
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0. Looking backwards from 2010s ‘glocal’ post-democracies to 1920s 
Weimar: why the standard account of  democratic representation is not 
enough for fulfilling the promise of  citizenship?  
   Since the pioneering work by T. H. MarshallI in 1950, the concept of ‘citizenship’ 
has undergone significant changes. What Marshall had in mind at the time was a threefold 
classification of the wide range of subjective rights (civil, political and social) and a precise 
historical account of the way they had been achieved in Great Britain. Within his 
hermeneutic perspective, the eighteenth century embodied the realization of civil 
citizenship and individual freedom (liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and 
faith, the right to own property and conclude contracts, the right to justice). The extension 
of the suffrage throughout the nineteenth century subsequently led to political citizenship 
(i.e., the right to participate in the exercise of political power), even though the principle of 
universal political citizenship in England was not recognized until 1918. The twentieth 
century finally discovered and explored the social dimension of being citizens (from 
economic welfare and security to the right to live a decent life according to the standards of 
society). In turn, each kind of citizenship developed its specific institutional forums. From 
courts of justice to Parliaments and councils of local government, up to the educational 
system and social services typical of the twentieth century welfare State. Since the shift 
from feudal to modern society and its competitive market economy, citizenship had been 
by definition a ‘developing institution’, evolving along the path ‘from Status to Contract’ 
and beyond.  
However, as Maurice Roche pointed out already in 1992II, a variety of structural 
and ideological challenges have been posed to the often taken-for-granted notion of 
citizenship and to the model of democracy it designs. Such a claim becomes even stronger 
when the empirical and theoretical transformations occurring at the end of the Cold War 
are taken into account. Three in particular have to be mentioned.  
On the one hand, as a result of the fragmentation of multinational States (e.g., the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after 1989), political theorists have been dealing with the 
need for a more sophisticated exploration of the citizenship/identity nexus. The emerging 
tension among ethnic groups (as in 1994 Rwandian genocide) proved that the normative 
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definition of ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’ oversteps the boundaries of theory. The global trend 
towards democratization has developed together with the resurgence of various kinds of 
‘identity/difference’ politicsIII. From such a perspective, the fragile negotiation between 
claims for equal treatment and those for the preservation of differences has become the 
political problem within our post-Fukuyama ageIV. From nationalist and ethnic revivals in 
the countries of East and Central Europe to the former Soviet Union, from the politics of 
cultural separatism in Canada to social movement politics in liberal Western democracies, 
questioning the capacity of liberal democratic citizenshipV to accommodate differences has 
been the main challenge to the Westphalian, traditional relation between States and 
individualsVI. Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism (1992) and Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural 
Citizenship (1995) stand as paradigmatic examples of such debates on the background of the 
liberals/communitarians querelle throughout the last decade of the twentieth centuryVII.      
The second macro-level transformation pertains to the concept of political 
representation in our contemporary ‘glocal’ democracies. Until the beginning of the 1990s, 
political scientists paid very little attention to the interaction between representative 
institutions and civil society: they were satisfied with a neo-Schumpeterian conception of 
democratic government as selection and organization of political elites. However, as a 
consequence of emerging new forms of both inclusion and exclusion (especially in the case 
of ethnic and ‘moral’ minorities), a radical change has occurred. As David Plotke foresaw 
in 1987, «the opposite of representation is not participation but exclusion»VIII. The merely 
electoral conception of both the democratic game and the community of citizens nurtured 
at the time by political theory needed to be expanded towards a wider (and wiser) 
understanding of the dynamic process of ‘continuity and rupture’IX representative 
democracy should imply. Such a goal has been only partly accomplished so far. 
The third and final development has to do with the theoretical and institutional 
challenges posed by the emerging European UnionX. Although most scholars and 
observers agree that the European Community has developed into a sort of Rechtsstaat 
through some process of constitutionalization, the question about what kind of polity the 
Union actually is has not found any definitive answer: permanently suspended between a 
federal state and a federation of States (as argued by German constitutional lawyers), 
sometimes it has resembled more a neo-feudal puzzle of multiple sovereignties, constantly 
affected by its original constitutional and democratic deficits. It stands as a matter of fact 
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that the traditional understanding of national State sovereignty and constitution-making, 
together with the standard notion of ‘the people’ – i.e., the conceptual triangle ‘people-
State-sovereignty’ – has been deeply impacted by the lack of a clear conceptualization of 
popular sovereignty at the communitarian level both above and within the Constitution. 
Against a technocratic Europe founded on an «existential legitimation»XI, political and State 
theorists have tried, from different perspectives, to understand whether it is even possible 
or desirable to speak of a ‘European demos’; whether the notion of the ‘constituent power’ 
traditionally embedded within the Constitution-foundational moment has to be 
circumnavigated and understood either as a plural constellation of constituent (State) 
agencies enacting a process of intergovernmental enterprise and elite bargaining (‘the 
peoples of Europe’ through their respective representative institutions) or as a teleological 
entity to be progressively achieved through an open process of constitution making and 
remakingXII transcending member States (thus post-étatist featured)XIII, designed to lead in 
the end to a European, post-national and constitutional patriotism-based peopleXIV. The 
ambiguous institutional physiognomy of the Union, consisting of inter-governmental, 
super-national and infra-national elements and mixing elements of representative 
government with the executive efficiency orientation typical of 
‘confederal’/‘consociational’ democracyXV, makes the overall picture even more difficult to 
grasp. Without a step further than the traditional understanding of representation, popular 
sovereignty and peoplehood, Jan Muller’s claim would prove correct: «a normative political 
theory of the Union cannot proceed»XVI.        
Political theory, though, cannot say much without questioning political history. As 
Pietro CostaXVII argues throughout his superb work, intra-World War Europe and, 
specifically, the Republic of Weimar represent an extraordinary historical and political 
laboratory for grasping cleavages and continuities between two diverging notions of 
citizenship. The optimistic persuasion of 1789 that political order stems naturally from 
individual autonomy and liberty was replaced by consistent apprehension over the 
conditions for social stability. The Soviet Revolution in October 1917 had made conflict an 
indispensable feature of XX century citizenship and proved that the creation of political 
Einheit was far more complex than imagined throughout the previous decades. From such a 
perspective, the birth of Weimar and the confrontation in the mid 1920s between Carl 
Schmitt and Hans Kelsen over the anatomy of parliamentary democracy and the identity of 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
6 
the democratic people offers a dark but useful paradigm for rethinking the notion of liberal 
democratic citizenship beyond dangerous and unilateral understandings.  
Schmitt was theoretically obsessed by the systematic fragmentation of political unity due to 
the variety of economic and social powers permeating German society in the aftermath of 
the First World War and urged the political and State theorists of his time to re-examine 
the domain of citizenship through the link between modern States, liberal 
parliamentarianism and democracy. On the other hand, Hans Kelsen strongly defended the 
value of political indirectness and the role of party-system as the beating heart of 
contemporary mass democracies, and suggested a set of institutional reforms specifically 
aimed at providing democratic citizenship with a stronger ex parte populi (bottom-up) 
capacity to influence policy- and decision-making processes. While Schmitt did not admit 
any form of dissent within his ‘democracy of the equals’, Kelsen regarded the preservation 
of individual freedom and the protection of minorities as the main ‘essence and value’ 
(Wesen und Wert) of modern democracy. 
Such two diverging interpretations result from a complex interaction between 
political transformation and theoretical break-ups with the Obrigkeitstaat (authoritarian 
State) in the transition from the late Wilhelmine to the new democratic GermanyXVIII. 
From the beginning of the 1920s a wide struggle over methods and aims forced an entire 
generation of jurists and political theorists to subject their thinking on democracy and on 
the presuppositions for political and social citizenship to fresh examination. In particular, 
the new Constitution released in August 1919 under the direction of Hugo Preuss differed 
from the 1871 Constitution of the Empire on several levels. Not only it was the result of 
the German defeat in the First World War; nor was it simply authored by a State law 
theorist (Preuss) rather than by a politician (Bismarck). Most significantly, the constitution-
making emerged as a compromise among three main political traditions: the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum) and the German Democratic 
Party (DDP). Although within a federal framework, the Republic of Weimar derived its 
legitimacy from the German people as a whole rather than from the governments of the 
individual States (art. 1). However, the Weimar party system never produced stable 
parliamentary majorities, despite the election of the Reichstag on the basis of general 
suffrage (including women) and according to the principle of proportional voting. The 
party structure inherited from the Empire proved a constellation of «communities of 
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conviction and struggle», embodying a wide range of regional, social and religious 
interestsXIX. Therefore, against a Reichstag constantly weakened by party splintering, the new 
Constitution enacted specific strategies for enforcing both representation and decision-
makingXX.  
Weimar parliamentary democracy witnessed an intense debate also on the 
normative definition of citizenship and on the subjective rights that were implied. Kelsen, 
together with many State and political theorists of his time, challenged the traditional, 
organicistic Volk-based hypostatization of State order pursued by Gerber and Laband’s 
Staatslehre. Such a mythical and anthropomorphic conception of the State was of no help in 
rethinking citizenship vìs-a-vìs the endogenous transformations of society and the 
simultaneous socialization and democratization of politicsXXI. While de-constructing the 
conventional notion of Volk, he demanded that foreigners living in a country for work’s 
purposes be granted equal political rights. The National Assembly indeed intensively 
debated the second major part of the Constitution, titled ‘Basic Rights and Duties of the 
Germans’. As Friedrich Naumann argued in his speech at the Assembly on 31 March 1919, 
the Grundgedanken of the new constitutional text emerge lie in a wide set of Grundrechte 
capable of developing an alternative approach in the conceptualization of the rights agenda, 
an approach which stands between the liberal Rechtsstaat and the socialistic emphasis on 
class conflicts.  
As a result of the progressive expansion of the suffrage, Parliament became under 
Weimar the primary locus where citizens could be provided with their own political 
representation. Through the medium of parliamentary arenas, democratic citizenship was 
enabled to mirror the multiple groups of social and economic interests permeating civil 
society. 1920s political theory was then called upon to confront the following questions: are 
democracy and representation mutually compatible? Is political representation 
substantiated either by univocal acclamation or dynamic and pluralistic judgement? Was de 
Maistre – the Catholic Counter-Revolutionary conservative so much praised by Schmitt – 
making a correct claim when arguing that the people are a sovereign which cannot exercise 
sovereigntyXXII or, rather, the realization of political autonomy by the people under 
representative democracy involves something more beyond both constitutional-founding 
and normal, institutionalized politics? These prove still extremely relevant issues for any 
attempt to rethink democratic citizenship today. 
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Drawing on Castiglione and Warren’s empirical studiesXXIII, contemporary 
democratic theory has assumed a standard paradigm of representation defined by four 
normative criteria:  
a) it lies on a ‘principal/agent’, asymmetric relation between territorial constituencies 
and their representatives; 
b) it is territorially based as it inscribes popular sovereignty and State power within a 
precise portion of territory;  
c) through the medium of electoral mechanisms, it calls for a certain degree of 
political responsiveness and accountability from both institutions and elected agents; 
d) universal suffrage introduces the crucial idea of political equality within the 
framework of representative governments. 
 
However, we believe that features a) and b) no longer help interpreting the 
evolution of political representation within contemporary ‘glocal’ democracies. At the same 
time, features c) and d) have been progressively weakened by new challenges deriving from 
the evolution of political parties and from the emerging of new forms of public spheres. It 
is a matter of fact that «the changing political landscape of democratic representation»XXIV 
has come to include a variety of transnational, extra- and non-territorial actors (from the 
UN and the World Bank to the EU itself), as well as a wide range of social movements and 
untraditional civil society institutions. Maurizio Fioravanti and, most recently, Nadia 
Urbinati have proposed a threefold classification of representational paradigms (juridical, 
institutional and political), respectively leading to three different models of democracyXXV, 
i.e. direct, electoral and representativeXXVI. Throughout the following pages we will 
specifically focus on representative democracy and question the way it shapes citizenship 
through a comparative analysis of the arguments developed by Schmitt and Kelsen on the 
fate of parliamentary institutions and democratic societies in 1920s Weimar. More than a 
clash of theoretical and institutional attempts to analyse the emerging mass party-State, 
their confrontation provided twentieth century constitutionalism and democratic theory 
with an intricate question concerning the way citizenship is imagined, shaped and 
practicedXXVII: does the democratic Constitution of Weimar involve a corporatist or an 
individual kind of representation? What is representative (parliamentary) democracy really 
about in the end: individuals or corporate interests?   
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The following two sections will respectively examine the two authors’ topography 
of democratic governments, together with their diverging understanding of what keeps a 
community of democratic citizens together. Alongside the paths developed mainly by 
Rosanvallon, Urbinati and CanovanXXVIII, the concluding remarks will then try to elaborate 
some suggestions for rethinking democratic citizenship via representation and to develop a 
more sophisticated notion of ‘the people’ beyond the constituent (Schmittian)/constituted 
(Kelsenian) power dichotomy.  
 
1. Re-politicizing democracy: Volksdemokratie and substantial 
homogeneity towards an existential conception of  citizenship 
  
Are we citizens only when we periodically cast our ballot and elect our institutional 
representatives? Or does active democratic citizenship involve something more? 
 
Democracy – Schmitt claims – rests logically on a series of identities. In this series belong the identity of 
governed and governing, sovereign and subject, the identity of the subject and object of State authority, the 
identity of the people with their representatives in parliament, the identity of the state and the current voting 
population, the identity of the state and the law, and finally an identity of the quantitative (the numerical 
majority or unanimity) with the qualitative (the justice of the laws)XXIX. 
 
When imagined as an overlap between political will and the rule of law, normative 
democracy raises in turn two crucial questions:  
1) Where and how does the political will-formation occur? Are both institutional and 
civil society procedures involved?  
2) How does the emergence of a majoritarian consent over policy options deal with 
dissent? Does pluralism per se constitute a mortal threat to the ‘identity’ of a political 
community? How inclusive should a democratic people be in the attempt to accommodate 
diversity while, at the same time, promoting their widely shared values and traditions?XXX 
Both sets of questions, respectively pertaining to the domains of political will and 
political identity, are framed by Schmitt within the threefold crisis (involving democracy, 
parliamentarianism and the modern State) highlighted in the 1926 preface to 
ParlamentarismusXXXI.  
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As for the first question, Schmitt, together with Kaufmann and Smend, argues 
against the «undemocratic conception»XXXII so widely spread in political and State theory at 
the beginning of the 1920s (e.g., Weber, Jellinek and Kelsen). Conceiving the democratic 
citizen as a Privatmann expressing his/her will through a system of secret ballots is both a 
cultural misunderstanding and a political mystification. The concept of citizenship pertains 
to the domain of public, not private law: only when talking and (inter)acting in the sphere 
of publicity, are political atoms turned into democratic individuals.  
 
 “The people” is a concept in public law. The people exists only in the sphere of publicity. The unanimous 
opinion of one hundred million private persons is neither the will of the people nor public opinion. The will 
of the people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better through acclamation, through something taken 
for granted, an obvious and unchallenged presence, than through the statistical apparatus that has been 
constructed with such meticulousness in the last fifty yearsXXXIII.  
 
Against the outdated heritage of 1860s and 1870s liberalism, the twentieth century 
– Schmitt claims – has witnessed the severance between liberal individualism and 
democratic trends, together with the consolidation of mass democracy. In the age when 
«old truths have got lost», concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘rationalism’, all 
connected with the tradition of parliamentarianism as government by discussion, must be 
radically re-examined. This applies especially to the multidimensional concept of 
citizenship. If ‘the people’ can live and act only au grand jour, overcoming the proto-liberal 
(Hobbesian) distinction between forum interni and forum externi, then the principle of political 
indirectness embodied by Parliaments means per se the death of democracy in its ‘vital’ 
meaning. Parliamentary arenas prove the grave of democratic politics as far as they replace 
open and effective deliberation among deputies with party bargaining. The political 
representation of citizens in turn degenerates into a ‘polycratic’ (mis)representation of 
economic interestsXXXIV. According to Schmitt, the death of ‘the political’ within the 
domain of democratic citizenship – i.e., the erosion of the Freund/Feind distinctionXXXV – 
derives from the ‘Romantic’, liberal passion for headless and endless discussion typical of 
the bourgeoisie (‘clase discutidora’, as Donoso Cortés names it). Democracy must instead 
re-found and preserve the existential unity of the people. How? By eradicating democratic 
citizenship from the soil of ‘a-political’ liberalism and substantially re-politicizing it. The 
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simultaneous flows running through the veins of mass democracies at the beginning of the 
XX century – i.e., the expansion of the suffrage and the eruption of social conflict – have 
unveiled the degeneration of Parliaments into artificial machineries theoretically supported 
by «moldy greats» (Bentham, Mill and Guizot). 
Schmitt’s critique of 1860s-1890s liberalism in the face of acclamation also emerges 
from the provocative, yet often ignored, 1927 treatise on Volksbegehren und Volksentscheidung. 
The third and last section of the treatise is specifically devoted to explaining the 
juxtaposition between acclamatio, an «eternal phenomenon of every political community», 
and secret ballot, typical of parliamentary liberalism. One year later, in Die Verfassungslehre 
(1928), Schmitt emphasizes once again what he considers the paradox of political 
representation. For he believes that a democratic people cannot be represented: they must 
be present, as they can acclaim only when physically assembled in one place at the same 
time.  
 
People and public exist together: no people without public and no public without the people. By its presence, 
specifically, the people initiate the public. Only the present, truly assembled people are the people and produce the public. 
[…] They cannot be represented, because they must be present, and only something absent, not something present, may 
be represented. As a present, genuinely assembled people, they exist in the pure democracy with the greatest possible degree of 
identity. […] only the genuinely assembled people […] can acclaim in that they express their consent or 
disapproval by a simple calling out, calling higher or lower, celebrating a leader or a suggestion, honoring the 
king or some other person, or denying the acclamation by silence or complaining.XXXVI  
 
Moving from 1926 Erik Peterson’s monograph on the development of acclamatio 
throughout the history of Christianity, Schmitt dates the birth of democracy back to the 
«scientific discovery of acclamation». Through the institutional formulas of representative 
democracy, the indirect procedures of secret ballots and the atomization of citizenship, ‘the 
people’ as a monolithic entity becomes dissolved. Schmitt argues that democratic citizens 
do not need technical expertise for expressing their consent or disapproval: as «crucial 
bearers of political life», fed with «bold political instincts», they only need to manifest their 
«vital immediateness». Against the logic of liberal universalism, supporting a deliberative 
(parliamentary) vision of democracy as a government based upon representation and 
discussion, Schmitt calls for a decision-based democracy. Citizens of any authentically 
political community are those able to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ through an immediate act of 
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Entscheidung and ready physically to eliminate (vernichten) dissent when perceived as a threat 
to their homogeneity. Can this be labeled ‘democratic citizenship’? We do not believe so. 
Rather, the claim we make is that Schmittian acclamatio cannot involve at the same time a 
politics of both presence and ideasXXXVII. Civic dialogue and the art of democratic 
confrontation (John Dewey), the dynamic interaction between politics and memory, laws 
and culture that can provide democratic citizens at the same time with individual liberty 
and the preservation of pluralismXXXVIII: all this is missing from Schmitt’s topography of 
democratic citizenship. The term ‘citizen’ is not part of his political vocabulary: he thinks 
of democracy as the domain of ‘the people’. From such a perspective, he is not that far 
from the democratic skepticism running through 1920s North-American political theory. 
As Walter Lippmann vividly argues in 1922 Public OpinionXXXIX, «genuinely assembled 
people» just say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a limited spectrum of options. They do not think nor 
deliberate: they just acclaim. Precisely at the beginning of the second preface of 
Parlamentarismus, he claims that every actual democratic form of government requires, «first, 
homogeneity and, second – if the need arises –, elimination or eradication of 
heterogeneity»XL. As an identitarian Gemeinshaft, Schmittian democracy lives through the 
perpetual acclamations of an ethnos-founded demos kept together by univocal decisions. 
According to Schmitt, the concept of ‘the foreigner’ reacquires its proper meaning when 
read beyond the color-blind, universalistic veil of liberalism and rooted back again in the 
domain of ‘the political’. What liberal theorists, in line with the 1789 principles, imagine as 
a ‘democracy of mankind’ proves just an ideological fictio: 
 
[…] the “current usage” of “universal suffrage” implies [that] every adult person, simply as a person, should 
eo ipso be politically equal to every other person. This is a liberal, not a democratic, idea; it replaces formerly existing 
democracies, based on a substantial equality and homogeneity, with a democracy of mankind. This democracy of mankind does 
not exists anywhere in the world today. If for no other reason than because the earth is divided into states, and indeed mostly into 
nationally homogeneous states, which try to develop democracy internally on the basis of national homogeneity and which, besides 
that, in no way treat every person as an equally entitled citizen. Even a democratic state, let us say the United States of 
America, is far from allowing foreigners to share in its power or its wealth. Until now there has never been a 
democracy that did not recognize the concept “foreign” and that could have realized the equality of all 
men.XLI 
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‘Volksdemokratie’ is the term used by Habermas for defining such an «existentialist 
conception of the democratic decision-making process»XLII. As the famous commentary on 
these pages by Leo Strauss (1932) explains, the emphasis on the individual as a terminus 
both a quo and ad quem within the liberal understanding of citizenship has led to the agony 
of ‘the political’ as a series of Friend/Foe distinctions along the sequence of specific 
Zentralgebieten. In the domain of ‘the political’, people do not face each other as 
abstractions, but as politically interested and determined entities: as citizens, governors or 
governed, politically allied or opponents: «in any case, in political categories». When 
political theorists stand for the equality of all persons as such, they are not arguing for 
democracy but for a certain kind of liberalism, not for a State form but for an 
individualistic-humanitarian ethic.  
We now move to the second set of questions raised at the beginning of this section: 
the issue of pluralism and the protection of minority rights, i.e., the flexibility of the legal 
and political borders of liberal democratic citizenship. Does the recognition of pluralism 
irremediably lead to relativism? How can we recognize group and minority differences 
without jeopardizing the unity of our political, Constitution-based communities? These are 
crucial normative questions for any political theory aiming at either strengthening or 
weakening the liberal side of liberal democratic citizenship. They challenge the feasibility of 
a democratic liberal space in combining the quest for equality and the preservation of 
differences. We believe that democratic society is no Newtonian space. Rather, it is an 
historical, dynamic and perpetually evolving creation, «layered with the sediments of 
time»XLIII and open to both external (ethnic, linguistic) and internal (ideological, cultural, 
religious…) diversity. Testing the quality of a liberal democratic definition of citizenship 
means to challenge it through the experience both of foreigners (those who are not (yet) 
citizens) and of dissenters (those, within the demos, sharing a different set of values or 
opinions). At the beginning of the 1920s Schmitt calls upon German jurisprudence and 
political theory to rethink the internal and external dimension of contemporary mass 
democracies, together with the Westphalian configuration of the international landscape. 
Der Begriff der modernen Demokratie in seinem Verhältnis zum Staatsbegriff (1924) begins precisely 
with contesting the classical tripartition of polities proposed by Aristotle in Politics V (i.e., 
monarchy, aristocracy, democracy and their specific degenerations). The consolidation of 
mass parties, the irruption of social conflict at the institutional level, the configuration of 
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ideological pluralism in terms of parliamentary conflicts, together with the progressive 
expansion of the suffrage, stand as macro-signals of the multiple changes occurring in the 
underground of European democracies throughout the 1910s and 1920s. Within this 
framework, Schmitt emphasizes the shift from the nineteenth century State, ascribing 
political representation on the basis of Besitz und Bildung (property and education), to the 
twentieth century totaler Staat. Within this new configuration of power, the State/society 
antinomy at the heart of any bourgeois Constitution has collapsed: the disintegration of 
society into a constellation of economic interests affects the institutional arenas and 
significantly weakens the Einheit of the German people. How to rethink, then, the political 
unity of multi-class democratic StatesXLIV and their highly fragmented public spaces? Are 
the British pluralists (G. D. H. Cole and H. Laski) right when claiming that contemporary 
democratic citizens are trapped by a «plurality of loyalties»? How to make pluralism a 
positive resource for, rather than a threat to, contemporary mass-party democracies? Both 
Schmitt and Kelsen believe that these are basic questions for any renewed theory of 
citizenship in the aftermath of the First World War. 
Schmitt touches on such issues in the second preface to Parlamentarismus (1926) 
when elaborating on the concept of ‘substantial equality’ vis-à-vis the progressive expansion 
of the suffrageXLV. Two years later Die Verfassungslehre, while providing a more sophisticated 
definition of democracy as a ‘mixed constitution’ based on the principles of both identity 
and political representation, still emphasizes national homogeneity as the peculiar feature of 
democratic citizenship. The reference to a common language, shared historical destiny, 
traditions, goals and hopes are crucial factors for preserving the ‘equality of the equals’ 
within national bordersXLVI. This is the reason – Schmitt claims – why the Weimar 
Constitution states that «all Germans» (rather than all ‘persons’) «are equal before the law» 
(art. 109 RV), in line with the formulation provided by the Swiss Federal Constitution in 
1874, the Japanese Constitution in 1889 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen in 1789 when discussing political rights in connection with those of the 
State (articles 6 and 13).  
However, many scholars (particularly William Scheuerman and David 
DyzenhausXLVII) have stressed the theoretical flaws of such an interpretation of political (as 
opposed to liberal) democracy. A broad consensus has developed among Schmitt’s 
interpreters in downplaying his attempt to reify citizenship and to bypass the ontological 
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pluralism of any liberal-constitutional democratic government in the name of an existential 
conception of politics. When no form of dissent is tolerated within the demos, then – as 
Kelsen points out – political philosophy faces significant problems from a normative 
perspective. For the univocal ‘we’ animating Schmittian democracy proves incompatible 
with the idea of a self-critical citizen partaking in politics and its processes of both political 
will- and public opinion-formationXLVIII. When designed as monolithic, static wholes 
banishing pluralism from their own boundaries, democracies cease to be liberal. Rethinking 
democratic citizenship means to develop normative criteria – e.g., egalitarian reciprocity, 
voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exit and of associationXLIX – ensuring positive 
cultural contestation together with the flourishing of individual autonomy and individuality. 
How does Kelsen’s understanding of representative democracies contribute to this task? 
 
2. Minority rights and majority rule: Kelsen and the three P’s of  
democratic indirectness (people, Parliament, parties) 
 
Hans Kelsen wrote about the nature and the limits of modern democracies from the 
1920s to the mid 1950s. After his departure from Prague in 1940, he taught firstly at 
Harvard and later at Berkeley. By combining the Austrian neo-Kantian tradition with the 
empiristic and neo-Positivistic trends animating North-American culture in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, he developed a unique methodological approach. As the 1955 
essay Foundations of democracy proves, Kelsen always believed that a strong correlation existed 
between power configurations and world views within human societies. While democracy 
stricto sensu relies upon ideological pluralism and the valorization of difference, autocracy 
presupposes a monistic kind of WeltanschauungL. In Forms of governments and conceptions of the 
world (1933) he claims: «the fight in which democracy wins over autocracy is essentially a 
fight in the name of critical reason against ideologies, which are founded on the irrational 
instincts of human soul»LI. If it is true that any theory of democracy plays with three 
variables – i.e., popular sovereignty, political equality and political libertyLII –, then Kelsen’s 
understanding of democratic citizenship faces two macro-questions:  
1) Who is the people deliberating and critically acting within the public-political 
sphere? How inclusive should the democratic space be in order to preserve a shared set of 
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values while, at the same time, allowing cultural contestation and individual self-
determination? What can Kelsenian democracy tell us about the civil and political rights of 
those not ex ante belonging to the citizenry either jure soli or jure sanguinis but entering into a 
specific community at an advanced moment of their own lives? These are crucial questions 
for understanding how ‘democratic’ a liberal democratic citizenship should be in Kelsen’s 
opinion and whether he succeeds in making the two phases of representation and 
deliberation dynamically interact; 
2) if the Kelsenian demos does not presuppose any kind of ethnic homogeneity and it 
does not speak the language of hard nationalism, how does its physiological pluralism 
affect the political will-formation? This question addresses the role and efficiency of party 
systems in connecting political representation with intra- and extra-parliamentary 
deliberation and decision-making. It pertains to the political means modern democracies 
should be endowed with for educating democratic individuals into active and self-critical 
citizens.  
Such issues constantly emerge throughout Kelsen’s democratic theory writings 
from the 1920s to the 1960s. Contrary to Schmitt, he acknowledges that liberal 
parliamentarianism and modern mass democracy share a common destiny: «the failure of 
the former is ipso facto the failure of the latter»LIII. The parliamentarian framework stands as 
the only possible form the idea of democracy can have within the contemporary social 
context. Political representation and indirectness are thus conceived by Kelsen not as 
vulnera, but as essential features in the plot of modern democratic citizenship. For 
Parliaments not only ensure that relevant political issues are expeditiously discussed and 
resolved, in accordance with a «structural logic of social bodies»LIV. Far beyond, they 
constitute the only possible ‘compromise’ (a key-word in Kelsen’s analysis of parliamentary 
democracy) between the notion of political liberty and the principle of labor differentiation 
imposed by modern nation States. 
This leads to the third basic premise of Kelsen’s democratic theory. Contrary to the 
Schmittian one, Kelsenian democracy is a liberty-, not an homogeneity-based kind of 
democracy. In the fight against the «torture of heteronomy», in the combination of the 
quest for liberty with the «anti-heroic» notion of equality, Kelsen discovers the ‘essence and 
value’ of modern democracyLV. Following the path disclosed by Constant and Condorcet, 
Kelsen recalls that the idea of liberty has undergone a crucial «semantic transformation» 
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throughout the centuries. Freedom conceived as the political self-determination of the 
citizen, as his direct participation to the emergence and expression of the general will (the 
ancients’ ‘positive’ conception of liberty), has been eroded and substituted by a ‘negative’ 
understanding of the individual/community relation. Contrary to the Athenian agora, 
modern democracies are built upon liberty, not upon freedom. They have further 
developed the Hobbesian separation between forum interni and forum externiLVI and the liberal 
need to preserve the value of individuality in the age of mass democracy. The shift from 
«liberty within anarchy» to «liberty within democracy» – i.e., from natural to civil liberty – 
is, for Kelsen, together with Kant and Rousseau, the positive contribution to democracy 
provided by modern contractualism. In the attempt to achieve equality within liberty – a 
difficult compromise when referred to the dynamic sphere of citizenship – Kelsen argues 
against the principle of unanimity in the name of the majoritarian principle. The latter is the 
closest approximation to the idea of freedom that can be imagined within the framework 
of contemporary mass-party democratic States. 
The very essence of liberal democratic citizenship precisely lies in the chance 
different groups are given to confront each other and to compete for power. Contrary to 
Schmitt’s Freund/Feind politics, no entified, monolithic truths are admitted in Kelsen’s 
democratic theory. Appreciating and preserving the invaluable contribution of dissent to 
the flourishing of each and every citizen is what makes Kelsenian democracy work. 
Democratic men and women are called to the practice of compromise in their everyday 
life, not only as deputies and representatives in the institutional arenas but also as members 
of an ontologically pluralistic civil society. From this point of view, every exchange, every 
cont(r)act stands as a compromise: ‘compromising’ means «putting aside what divides in 
favor of that which unites». Kelsenian liberal democratic citizenship does not imply any 
substantial homogeneity nor the artificial quest for a community of Blut und Boden (blood 
and land). On the contrary, constraints on majority actions and the defense of individual 
liberty and equality become indispensable normative requirements within and outside 
democratic institutions. While Schmitt portrays Parliaments as places of bargaining among 
socio-economic interests, Kelsen appreciates their multi-vocal composition. As «collective 
organisms democratically elected by the people on the basis of a universal, equal right of 
suffrage», they pursue political will-formation through decisions taken by majority rule. The 
majority principle differs indeed from the tyranny of the majority as far as it allows the 
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development of opinions and counter-opinions through a dialectical method. Kelsen 
properly recalls what Rudolf Smend argued in two short articles published in 1919 and 
1923LVII when tracing the genealogy of parliamentary deliberation back to the Medieval civil 
trial. Already at the time – Smend argues – there was the rationalistic belief that only 
through dialectical confrontation among different opinions, «particles of reasons that are 
strewn unequally among human beings gather themselves and bring public power under 
their control»LVIII. When properly applied, parliamentary procedures, based on 
philosophical relativism, create the guarantees that the different groups of interests 
represented in Parliament can raise their voice and mirror the ‘dynamic/dialectic’ structure 
of authentically democratic civil societies. Parliaments and wider public arenas thus share 
mutual recognition, protection of minority rights and dialectic, compromise-oriented 
procedures as normative and methodological features of any deliberation they host. Only 
when the representative and the deliberative moments of politics are connected in a 
perpetual interaction, can liberal democratic citizenship be enactedLIX. 
Of course, to be effectively applied, the principle of the majority presupposes a 
certain degree of agreement between the parts involved in the (political, civil, religious, 
cultural etc.) confrontation. How pluralistic, then, should democratic pluralism be? In 
revisiting Kant’s international theory (specifically his conceptualization of national units as 
the main actors of inter-State relations) Kelsen points to cultural and linguistic 
commonness as the necessary foundation of a (relatively) homogeneous citizenship. It is 
noteworthy that, throughout the same years, Herman Heller argues for the creation of a 
welfare state precisely in order to contain social heterogeneity. From the Kelsenian 
perspective, though, socio-economic inequalities, pointed out by Marx’s critique as the 
main tool for political oppression in the hands of ‘bourgeois democracy’, can never 
downgrade democracy vis-à-vis dictatorship (be it by a class or by the Führer): 
 
If, as precisely the Marxist critique of so-called bourgeois democracy underlines, what matters is the real 
distribution of power, then the system of parliamentary democracy, with its two essential groups, according 
to the majority-minority 
principle, is the ‘true’ expression of the current society’s division in two classes. And if there is any form that 
offers the chance not to lead this strong opposition, which one can lament, but not deny, into a catastrophe 
by way of bloody revolution,  but to balance it out peacefully and slowly, it is this form of parliamentary 
democracy [...].LX 
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In particular, Kelsen rethinks the notion of citizenship by unveiling the structural 
link between the demos, political associations and parliamentary system in contemporary 
mass democracies. People, parties and Parliaments (the ‘three Ps’) are strictly connected in 
the way Kelsen revisits the notion of democracy against the background of European 
public lawLXI. What does he exactly have in mind, though, when speaking of ‘the people’? 
Together with the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ (replacing individual liberty as a 
consequence of the hypostatization of the ‘State-person’), ‘the people’ is conceived as a 
juridical fiction. It is «an ethical-political postulate that political ideology assumes as real»LXII 
as far as «all its members are obedient to the same juridical State order». The “people” 
exists only from a juridical and normative perspective.  
However, when political theorists question the engagement of electors into active 
citizenship and political mobilization, they refer to a misleading and slippery notion of ‘the 
people’.  Citizens can be either subjects or objects with regards to the exercise of 
democratic power; they can be either pouvoir constituant or pouvoir constitué. Even within a 
radical kind of democracy, those endowed with political rights are just a restricted part of 
the whole population. Moreover, not everyone feels the urge to vote, even though he/she 
is a citizen entitled to exercise such a precious right and duty. Nor do those actually voting 
cast their periodic ‘paper stone’LXIII in the ballot-box all displaying the same level of 
awareness, unbiased information and critical understanding of what has been occurring 
around them. In line with the democratic disenchantment expressed throughout the same 
years in the US by Lippmann and Lowell, Kelsen calls for a more precise and realistic 
understanding of the multi-level notion of ‘democratic people’. He recalls the recent 
constitutional evolution in Soviet Russia as a particularly relevant example for political and 
State theory: by providing foreign citizens coming to Russia seeking a job with full civil and 
political equality, the Soviet Constitution has for the first time diverted the notion of 
citizenship from that of nationhood. However, as Kelsen points out again drawing on the 
Soviet context, the evolution of citizenship does not always lead to a pacific and 
constructive management of class conflict. 
This is exactly where the role of mass political parties emergesLXIV. Rethinking the 
evolution of citizenship inevitably calls into question the institutional expression of social 
conflicts within and outside Parliaments. Along with Schmitt, Kelsen claims that mass 
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democracy per se means the erosion of the State/society antinomy due to the synergic 
socialization and democratization of politics. Contrary to Schmitt, though, he believes that 
parliamentary arenas must mirror the ‘polyarchy’ of civil society in order politically and 
visually to represent its various economic and social interests. As he vividly puts it, «the 
boosts coming from political parties are like many subterranean streams feeding a river that 
comes to surface only within the popular assembly or the Parliament, where it flows within 
one single bed»LXV. Unlike Schmitt, who polemically interprets parties as the main reason 
for the fracturing of political unityLXVI, Kelsen defends the role they play in the fight for 
expanding civil, political and social rights within indirectness-based democracies. While the 
former claims: ‘no State without people, no people without acclamations’, the latter replies: 
‘no democracy without Parliament, no Parliament without parties’. A full liberal democratic 
citizenship will be finally achieved only when, through a specific set of parliamentary 
reforms, the hostility towards parties and parliamentary representation is overcomeLXVII.  
 
3. From 1920s Weimar back to 2010s post-democracies: rethinking 
citizenship via representation. Concluding (not yet conclusive) remarks 
 
What has hitherto been recalled paves the way for an overall rethinking of the 
structural transformations of liberal democratic citizenship both through and beyond 
Schmitt and Kelsen. This last section aims specifically at offering some concluding remarks 
in the attempt to revisit, from a fresh perspective, the multifaceted notion of ‘the people’ 
which has so far emerged. Moving from different interpretations of the democratic demos, 
Schmitt and Kelsen developed two widely diverging topologies of democracy.  
On the one hand, the former portrayed the democratic people mainly as pouvoir 
constituant within the exceptional, super-legal constitution-makingLXVIII; on the other, Kelsen 
emphasized more the institutionalized, procedural side of democratic citizenship when the 
demos subjects itself to laws and is turned into pouvoir constitué. In turn, he also casted light 
on the invaluable contribution of political bodies in providing the constellation of social 
and economic interests with institutional representation. We suggest that the dichotomy 
between the two approaches needs to be overcome by moving towards a more 
sophisticated understanding of democratic citizenship through a renewed notion of 
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representation founded on a dynamic and perpetual interaction between political will and 
political opinion. Not only should the idea of occasional constitution-making (a 
constitutional ‘big bang’) be replaced with that of ‘constitutional evolution’ as an 
overarching process evolving through time (an evolutionary, not a revolutionary 
happening)LXIX. Most importantly, we should get reacquainted with the idea that ‘the 
democratic Leviathan’LXX, i.e., the citizens living and acting within democracy’s universe, 
can draw on a wide spectrum of means for making their voice heard other than 
voluntaristic acclamations and/or institutional procedures. Spontaneous forms of popular 
self-mobilization also contribute to the physiognomy of democratic citizenship within our 
contemporary representative governments. In his 1928 Verfassungslehre Schmitt himself 
argues (in an ambiguous, sometimes confusing way) that the political unity of democracy, 
stemming from both the principles of identity and representation, is framed within a 
threefold relation between the democratic people and its Constitution, depending on 
whether the former exists ‘prior to’ and ‘above’, ‘within’ or ‘beside’ the latterLXXI. This third 
concept (the people “beside” the Constitution) refers to the demos neither as a pouvoir 
constituant nor as a pouvoir constitué. Rather, the people is here conceived as a non-
institutionally organized entity expressing political judgment through the multiple channels 
at its disposal in the democratic public sphereLXXII. As Kalyvas has argued (partially 
followed by MullerLXXIII), when divested from the visceral anti-liberalism Schmitt endows it 
with, his claim also helps illuminating the complex anatomy of popular sovereignty within 
our indirectness-based democracies, while at the same time disclosing unexpected hints for 
better coping with some European Union conundrums (especially on sovereignty and 
constitution-makingLXXIV). By transposing Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau’s conceptions of 
sovereign power into the language of modern constitutionalism through SieyèsLXXV, not 
only does he partially revise the idea of an ethnos-founded demos preserving its own 
homogeneity through an existential conception of politics (as stated in Parlamentarismus). He 
goes further in reminding us that, even after the democratization of the constituent power, 
the democratic sovereign and its underground presence can never be abolished in 
constitutional democracies. However, he failed to elaborate further his threefold 
democratic citizenship design: by banishing public deliberation and collective 
(self)reflection, downgrading his perception of alternative venues for the citizens to express 
themselves to a passive, shouting and useless gathering of people. Moreover, due to his 
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mythologized interpretation of liberalism, he was not able to appreciate the invaluable 
contribution of political parties to the fulfillment of citizenship. He equated democratic 
politics with speechless applause and sacrificed the political value of liberty to the 
preservation of substantive homogeneity. In turn, he dismissed the emancipative potential 
of democratic citizenship embodied by extra-institutional forms of self-representation and 
the proliferation of public spheres for political will-formation. Reading Schmitt’s 
democratic theory vis-à-vis Kelsen can contribute to disclosing some relevant hints for 
rethinking ‘the people’ beyond the identity/representation, constituent/constituted power, 
substantial/procedural democracy dichotomies, hints useful for the ‘chercher le peuple’ 
normative attempts at the European level. Getting reacquainted with the third body of the 
‘democratic Leviathan’ – i.e., with the extra-parliamentary side of politics and the set of 
social movements keeping democratic citizenship alive beyond its institutionalized 
framework – proves useful in the sense that:  
 
a) at the institutional design level, it helps to overcome the schizophrenia of a dualistic 
model of democracy: far from the simplistic alternative between a substantive (Schmittian) 
and a procedural (Kelsenian) kind of democratic government, a renewed theory of 
citizenship and popular sovereignty should also put an end to the poor image of the 
democratic people as either a primordial, ex nihilo and ‘over-politicized’ energy (outside and 
above the Constitution) or a semi-dormant actor within a ‘depoliticized’ and procedures-
intoxicated polityLXXVI;   
b) with and against Schmitt, it provides the people with self-representational means to 
express their political will alongside the constituted powers without threatening the 
democratic order; when applied to the European level, as Muller has pointed out, this 
reading would require amending the substantial and metaphysical aspects of the Schmittian 
understanding of the pouvoir constituant towards the conceptualization of the European 
peoples as an inherently plural constituent power capable of making its voice heard as a 
constellation of self-representing and self-represented publics (what Schmitt, in Die 
Verfassungslhere,  refers to as ‘apocryphal acts of sovereignty’)LXXVII;   
c) with and against Kelsen, it reminds us that popular sovereignty does not emerge 
only through party representation and regularly held elections. Contrary to a neo-
Schumpeterian conception of democracy, contemporary demoi maintain an underground, 
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extra-institutional self-conscience that can emerge when the two domains of representation 
and judgment, political will and public opinion(s) are constantly inter-connected. The 
‘continuity/rupture’ movement in the exercise of political judgment enables representative 
politics to supersede an existential and voluntaristic conception of the willLXXVIII, to fulfill 
the promise of political libertyLXXIX and to make democratic, self-critical citizens out of 
isolated electors and political atoms.  
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IMarshall 1950. For a philosophical analysis of the concept of ‘citizenship’, see also Veca 1990.  
IIRoche 1992: 1-8. 
IIIConnolly 1991. On the identity/difference nexus, see the excellent work by Benhabib 1996.  
IVWe refer to Fukuyama’s claim that the universalization of Western liberal democracy as «the final form of 
human government» after 1989 meant per se «the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution»: Fukuyama 
1989; Fukuyama 1992. 
VThroughout the paper we often refer to the notion of ‘liberal democratic citizenship’ (rather than that of 
‘democratic citizenship’) in order to emphasize the equal consideration each individual is entitled to as the 
minimal normative criterion of post-Rawlsian liberal theories of democracies. See Lehning 1997; Lehning 
1998.    
VICfr. Zolo 1994: 3-46.  
VIITaylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995. 
VIIIUrbinati-Warren 2008. 
IXI owe such an evoking expression to Urbinati 2005. 
XFor thought-provoking perspectives over the notions of European constituent-power, demos and citizenship 
within the wider and highly debated framework of the European constitution-making, see Lehning 1997; 
Muller 2000; Henry- Loretoni 2004; Riekmann-Wessels 2006; Lindhal 2007; Walker 2007; Dyzenhaus 2007. 
XIOn such an instrumental and functionalist argument at the EU level in addition to Weber’s threefold 
articulation of the concept of ‘legitimacy’, see Muller 2000: 1778. 
XIIWalker 2007 discloses four hypotheses on the concept of a European constituent power: non-constituent 
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constitutionalism (echoed in the international Treaty-based EU); constitutional skepticism (stressing the 
miscategorization, the ‘category error’ of ascribing the constitutional label to the European enterprise); 
constitutional vindication (claiming that a European constituent power is already more or less realized within 
the emergent constitutional form); finally, post-constituent constitutionalism, recognizing the initial vacuum of 
a supranational constituent power while, at the same time, defending the urgency and positive contribution of 
its subsequent development.  
XIIIOn the tension between identity and interdependence in contemporary, post-State-centered 
constitutionalism dealing with a highly fragmented, multilevel and polycentric order, see Carrozza 2007.  
XIVOn the notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’, framing citizenship within a shared sense of values rather than 
ethnic origin or common history, see Habermas 1992. 
XVSee Weiler 1999: 270-284; on the conundrums of European citizenship, see Weiler 1999, 324-357.  
XVIMuller 2000: 1777. 
XVIICosta 1999-2001. 
XVIIIAs Erich Kaufmann wrote in 1927: «The experiences that our nation, and we along with it, have had in 
war, in collapse, in revolution, and under the Versailles Treaty, domestically and in foreign policy, have 
shaken us violently awake and led to immense self-reflection» (in Jacobson-Schlink 2002: 4). 
XIXJacobson-Schlink 2002: 12. Such an «historical handicap on German parliamentarism» (infra: 12, n. 15) 
proved self-evident throughout the history of Weimar: from 1919 to 1933 no Reichstag lasted until its regular 
end term. 
XXFar beyond the initial intentions of the Constitution’s fathers, the President was given a considerable 
agglomerate of power: from the right to appoint and dismiss the Chancellor and to dissolve the Reichstag, to 
the whole set of emergency powers provided by Article 48. 
XXIAs the Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1911), Das Problem der Souveränität (1920) and the Allgemeine 
Staatslehre (1925) prove, Kelsen builds on both the epistemological concept of ‘substance’ developed by 
Cassirer, Mach and Avenarius and Vaihinger’s theory of fictions to renew the juridical and theoretical notions 
of ‘State’ and ‘democracy’ in relation to social conflict. 
XXIIDe Maistre 1965.  
XXIIICastiglione-Warren 2006, Rethinking Democratic Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues, Paper presented at the 
Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia (in Urbinati-Warren 2008: 
387-390). 
XXIVUrbinati-Warren 2008, 389.  
XXVHeld 1987.  
XXVIFioravanti 1990; Urbinati 2006 (especially 17-59); Urbinati 2009 (especially 33-47). For a classic and still 
influential account of representation, see Pitkin 1967; for a mapping of and critical elaboration on the main 
theories of political representation in recent democratic theory, see Saward 2010.  
XXVIIFor diverging opinions on the need (and theoretical utility) for contemporary democratic theory to 
critically engage with Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, see Galli 2000; Richter 2000. While the former pinpoints 
the «elements of a theory of a ‘living constitution’ and the people’s constituent power» embedded within 
Schmitt’s political thought, the latter invites contemporary political theorists to leave any Schmittian 
spectrality aside and turn to the idea of a ‘liberal republicanism’ (a third-way between communitarians and 
liberals); on both, see Urbinati 2000.  
XXVIIIPrecise references to Rosanvallon and Urbinati’s works will be made throughout the following pages. 
For an excellent re-conceptualization of ‘the people’ in representative democracy and its pathologies (with 
special emphasis on populist appeals), see Canovan 1999; Canovan 2002; Canovan 2005.   
XXIXSchmitt 1988b: 26.  
XXXThought-provoking considerations on this point in Kiss 1998. 
XXXISchmitt 1988b: 15-16 (my emphasis).  
XXXIISchmitt 1988b: 16. 
XXXIIISchmitt 1988b: 16. 
XXXIVSchmitt derives the term ‘polycraty’ from the work of Johannes Popitz, prominent financial expert in 
1920s Weimar and Prussian Minister of Finance after 1933: see Schmitt 1931a; Schmitt 1931b. For an 
overview of Popitz’s State theory, see Kennedy 2004: 26-32.  
XXXVCfr. Schmitt 1932. 
XXXVISchmitt 2008: 272. 
XXXVIIPhillips 1996. 
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XXXVIIIUrbinati Nadia, 2010b. 
XXXIXOn this point see Lippmann 1922; Lippmann 1925; Lowell 1921. Both Lippmann and Lowell are 
quoted in Schmitt’s Volksbegehren und Volksentscheidung; Schmitt refers to Lippmann’s Public Opinion also in the 
second preface of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. 
XLSchmitt 1988b: 9. 
XLISchmitt 1988b: 20-21 (my emphasis). 
XLIIHabermas 1998: 133. As Muller 2000 recalls, it is plausible that Schmitt’s connection between democracy 
and homogeneity provided a sort of sub-text to the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht decision: see 
Maastricht Decision, BVerfGE 89, 155-213 (1993). On this point see both Grimm 1995 and Habermas 1995 
(the latter reprinted also in Habermas 1998: 155-161).  
XLIIIIgnatieff 2000: 58. 
XLIVGiannini 1986: 69. See also Cassese 1994; Carrozza 2006. 
XLVSchmitt 1988b: 9-10, 16. 
XLVIOn this matter see also Schmitt 2008: 258-264. 
XLVIIAmong the most critical and acute analyses of Schmitt’s theory of democracy, see Dyzenhaus 1998; 
Kennedy 1985; Kennedy 2004; McCormick 1997; Mouffe 1999; Scheuerman 1995; Scheuerman 1999; 
Azzariti 2005. 
XLVIIIPasquino 1999: xvi argues correctly that the mere criterion of national homogeneity proves insufficient, 
both historically and theoretically, when defining democracy. After 1848 – he recalls – the major threat to 
European States has come from within their borders, specifically in the form of class- (rather than ethnic) 
conflict. The Marxist struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletarians in mid-nineteenth century Europe 
proved that groups sharing the same portion of territory and belonging to the same nationality could still face 
each others as strangers and foes . Moreover, when the developments subsequently occurred in the 
nationhood/citizenship nexus are also taken into consideration, Schmittian democracy proves ideologically 
unilateral and normatively flawed.  
XLIXBenhabib 2002. 
LKelsen emphasizes such correlation in many of his political theory writings: see in particular Kelsen 1958 
and Kelsen 1955 (especially Democrazia e concezioni della vita: 137-144, and Assolutismo e relativismo nella filosofia e 
nella politica: 441-453). 
LIKelsen 1982, 49-50 (my translation). 
LIIGavazzi 1984. 
LIIIKelsen 1984: 174, 157. 
LIVKelsen 1984: 52. 
LVKelsen 1984: 39-40. 
LVIThis juxtaposition is polemically discussed by Schmitt in his 1938 essay Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des 
Thomas Hobbes. 
LVIIWe refer to Die Verschiebung der konstitutionellen Ordnung durch die Verhältniswahl (1919) and  Die politische 
Gewalt in Verfassungsstaat und das Problem der Staatform (1923). 
LVIIISchmitt 1988b: 35. 
LIXOn this specific point see the fundamental contributions by Manin 1997; Rosanvallon 2000; Urbinati 2009; 
Urbinati 2010a; Urbinati 2010c. 
LXKelsen 1955 (my translation).  
LXIKelsen 1984: 50-51. 
LXIISee Costa 2001 (vol. IV): 21. 
LXIIIThis definition of the ballot paper, developed by Engels, has been recalled by Przeworsky 1999: 49, and, 
more recently, by Urbinati 2005: 197 and Urbinati 2009: 53. 
LXIVFor an introduction to political party system (with special reference to the Italian context), see Rossi 2007; 
see also Katz 1988. For a positive evaluation of political partisanship in contemporary political theory, see 
Rosenblum 2008 (review by Runciman 2010). 
LXVKelsen 1984: 55 (my translation). On the relevance of party representation in Kelsen’s theory of 
democracy, see Mersel 2006. 
LXVICfr. Schmitt 2008: 275-276: «There is no democracy without parties, but only because there is no 
democracy without public opinion and without the people that are always present as the people. […] The 
Weimar Constitution recognizes no parties. It mentions the word only once in a disapproving sense in Art. 
130, which reads: “Public officials are servants of the collective, not of a party”. […] Parties (factions) are not 
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recognized in the Constitution. Instead, they are recognized in the house rules of parliamentary democracies 
like the by-laws for the German Reichstag of 12 December 1922». 
LXVIIKelsen 1984: 55-57. Due to space limits, we cannot engage into a detailed account of Kelsen’s 
considerations on institutional reforms: cfr. Kelsen 1984: 80-93 (The reform of Parliament and The professional 
representation). 
LXVIIISchmitt, 1988a: 51. 
LXIXSee Peters 2006.  
LXXWe derive such powerful expression from Kalyvas 2000. 
LXXICfr. Schmitt 2008: 268-279 (ch. 18: The People and the Democratic Constitution). For a broad and acute analysis 
of this chapter, see Kalyvas 2000. 
LXXIINoteworthy in Die Verfassungslhere (ch. 18), while recalling the main scientific contributions to the existing 
literature on public opinion, Schmitt refers to F. Tönnies (Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung, 1922), J. Bryce (The 
American Commonwealth, 1888), A. Venn Dicey (Law and Public Opinion in England, 1905), L. Lowell (Public 
Opinion and Popular Government, 1913). No reference, though, is made to Lippmann’s writings, contrary to the 
attention reserved to the American journalist just one year before in Volksbegehren und Volksentscheidung and in 
1926 in the second preface to The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. 
LXXIIIMuller 2000: 1781 acknowledges that, drawing on Schmitt’s constitutional theory, «some observers have 
claimed that intellectual resources for “radical democracy” can be extracted from it»; however, he 
deconstructs the Schmittian understanding of both representation and peoplehood as innervated by 
«religious-cum-authoritarian, “substantial” modes of thought» (Muller 2000: 1788) and tries to develop a 
descriptive (and prescriptive) analysis of the Constitution of Europe with, beyond and against Schmitt 
himself.  
LXXIVSumming up the theoretical questions that can be raised when reading the EU through, beyond and 
against Schmitt, see Muller 2000: 1779-1880: «[…] does European integration in fact prove […] that 
“Schmittian sovereignty” remains caught in existentialist, concretist ways of thinking, which have long lost 
touch with the intricate “legimitimation through procedure” or the legitimation through prosperity which 
some see at the heart of the EU? […] Has Schmittian unitary and decisionist sovereignty, which always asks 
for the identification of the final arbiter, been extinguished in favor of “pooled sovereignty” and a kind of 
subtle sovereignty by “mutual recognition, continuity and consent”? […] Can one say, then, to put it crudely, 
that if Europe works, Schmitt is wrong? Or is the joke, after all, on the anti-Schmittians, who remain fixated 
on Schmitt’s Weimar writings, and overlook his predictions about the end of the nation-state, and his 
advocacy of economic Großräume (great spaces), in which case the EU would be the first Großraum realized?». 
LXXVDuncan 2004. Useful remarks on Schmitt’s appropriation (and reinterpretation) of Sieyès’ notion of the 
creative pouvoir constituant are also available in Muller 2000: 1781-1788.     
LXXVIOn the limits and clues respectively disclosed by these two images of the democratic people within 
Schmitt’s political and constitutional theory, see Kalyvas 2000: 1532-1556. According to Dyzenhaus 2007 this 
re-conceptualization would lead towards a «liberal account of the rule of law», whereby Schmitt’s ‘negative 
prescriptive political theory’ and his reading of the constituent power as das formlos Formende (‘the amorphous 
but forming entity’) is simply dismissed. I disagree with such a conclusion and rather retain the notion of a 
‘normalized’ constituent power as a powerful mean for making representative democracy work and 
represented citizens think.  
LXXVIIThis would be the case, for instance, of the mass demonstrations occurred on February 15th, 2003, in 
London, Rome, Paris, Barcelona, Berlin against the involvement of their national governments in the Iraq 
War as allies to the US: on this point see Levy et al. 2005 (especially the ‘manifesto’ co-authored by Habermas 
and Derrida, formerly published on the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Libération and arguing for a Core 
Europe with a distinctive and self-critical European public sphere).  
LXXVIIISee Urbinati 1998; Urbinati 2005. 
LXXIXThe conditions and presuppositions of political judgment throughout intra-electoral periods become 
crucial questions for representative democracies as they test the quality of representation on a double track. 
They found the (positive) liberty of democratic citizens on a substantial basis (instead of making it a comet 
that appears only «at fixed and rare intervals», as feared by Constant in 1819) and compel elected 
governments to be accountable to the entirety of those they represent. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to provide a brief analysis of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment (Case 
C-34/09). Traditionally, the EU citizenship has been mainly construed as a status of 
integration into the Member States of the Union: a status of transnational integration. The 
basic claim developed in these pages is that, with Zambrano, the EUCJ moved away from a 
concept of transnational integration to one of genuine European integration, thus fostering 
a new vision, based on the existence of Euro-bonds. 
 
Key-words:  
 
 European Court of Justice, Zambrano, citinzeship  
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
33 
 
1. EU Citizenship as a status of  integration*  
 
A genuine European integration 
Ruiz Zambrano, a judgment of the European Court of Justice of 8 March 2011 
(Case C-34/09), is an ordinary case leading to potential extraordinary consequences for the 
development of EU law. Let me say first where I see the main contribution of this 
judgment. In the case-law of the Court which gave substance to this notion, EU citizenship 
consisted essentially in offering the nationals of the member states the opportunity to act 
on a transnational plane within the Union. Nationals of member states were granted rights 
in order to circulate freely, to be admitted in other member states and to enjoy the same 
treatment as nationals of the host country. They were vested with the power to address the 
authorities of another member state and to claim admission, residence and welfare benefits 
on the same conditions as the nationals of that state. This empowerment was aimed to 
ensure the integration of EU citizens into the society of the host state. The status of EU 
citizen has been mainly construed as a status of integration into the member states of the 
Union: a status of transnational integration. According to this model, an individual is EU 
citizen by the very fact that he/she circulates within the Union and becomes a “quasi-
national” of another member state. Now, what emerges from this case is the notion of 
integration within the territory of the Union taken as a whole. We move from a transnational 
(the fact of being assimilated in another society) and plurinational (the fact of multiplying 
affiliations within the Union) integration to a genuine European integration. The European 
territory as such is the natural place of life and integration for European citizens and their 
families.  
 
‘Illegal residents’ 
Some interesting factual elements of the Zambrano case are worth noting. They 
touch upon the general issue of migration in Europe today. Mr Ruiz Zambrano is a 
Colombian national who decided to leave his country of origin with his family and to seek 
asylum in Belgium. The Belgian authorities refused his application for asylum and 
subsequent applications to have his situation regularized. Despite this refusal and the 
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absence of any resident permit, he and his wife have been registered as ‘residents’ in a 
Belgian municipality and he started to work regularly with a full-time employment contract. 
Since the rejection of his application for residence in March 2006 Mr. and Mrs. Zambrano 
have held special residence permits valid during the duration of the judicial action he has 
brought against this rejection. During this stay, Mrs Zambrano gave birth to two children, 
Diego and Jessica. They acquired Belgian nationality by the fact of being born in Belgium 
and since the parents did not take specific steps to have them recognized as Colombian 
nationals. This is the result of the application of the Belgian Nationality Code at the time of 
the case.  
Their condition is typical of the condition of many migrants in Europe, who are in 
a transitory position, but a position which is intended to persist; they are migrants who are 
recognized and partially included in the administrative and economic life of the country but 
who are not authorized to stay in the territory. Mr and Mrs Zambrano belong to this 
category of people who have been provocatively labelled as ‘illegal citizens’ (by the French 
philosopher Etienne Balibar; see also the work of Enrica Rigo). More importantly for the 
Court in its judgment, the case concerns the children whose identity from a EU law 
perspective is twofold. They are Union citizens as Belgian nationals. And they are dependent 
persons, a fragile population that cannot rely on its own resources. Arguably, the issue of 
the care is an important feature in this judgment.  
 
‘The territory of the Union’ 
Confronted with this case, the Court considers that EU citizenship law precludes 
Belgium from refusing Mr. Ruiz Zambrano a right of residence and a work permit. His 
minor children, who are EU citizens, should not be deprived of the right to stay within the 
territory of the European Union. In other words, deportation of European citizens to 
countries outside the territory of Europe is not permitted. It would amount to an 
“expatriation”. The reference to the ‘territory of the Union’ is a central reference in the 
judgment. This reference is not only the metaphor which designates the sum of the 
physical territories of the member states. It is a normative reference which refers to a new 
common space, a space of distribution of rights and common values. What the Court is 
doing here is to recognize a status to specific categories of individuals – European citizens 
and the persons connected to them as dependents or care-takers. This status is attached to 
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them wherever they happen to be, it does not depend on their physical location. It grants 
them rights to circulate and to occupy the European space. There is a strong normative 
dimension implicit in the reasoning. To reside in Europe means not only to be physically 
located in its territory but also to be granted a number of rights and ultimately to be under 
the protection of certain values of personal welfare and moral security. 
 
2. Shifts in the legal theory of  European citizenship 
 
EU citizenship and mobility 
The first and the most obvious shift lies in the disconnection of EU citizenship 
from free movement. In its first cases dealing with EU citizenship, the Court undertook to 
release the rights of citizenship from the economic considerations attached to freedom of 
movement in the realm of the internal market. The Court freed the mobility of individuals 
from the exercise of an economic activity. But the rights of citizenship were still dependent 
on mobility. This was reflected in Directive 2004/38 which codifies the jurisprudence of 
the Court and which states, in its preamble, that ‘Union citizenship is the fundamental status of 
nationals of the member states when they exercise their right of free movement’.  
Following the Zambrano judgment, one could say that part of the EU citizenship 
regime is now split in two parts. The ordinary enjoyment of EU Citizenship rights 
(residence and non-discrimination) is established on the basis of Article 21 of the treaty 
and Directive 2004/38 and still dependent on mobility. As the Court recalls in a recent 
judgment, “the residence to which [the directive refers] is linked to the exercise of the freedom of movement 
for persons” (Judgment of 12 May 2011, McCarthy, Case C-434/09). However, there are 
‘extraordinary situation’ in which the safeguard of the statute is directly concerned. EU 
citizenship can then be based on Article 20 of the treaty and be released from the mobility 
condition. In the first part of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment, the Court sets aside the 
Directive and decides to ground its decision on the basis of Article 20 TFEU (concealing 
the fact that this provision explicitly refers to the conditions defined by the EU legislator in 
the Directive). On this basis, the Court is able to state that the sole presence of a Union 
citizen in a member state, even if this member state is his/her country of origin, is liable to 
trigger ‘European’ protection. The right of residence of the children is sufficient on its own 
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to grant residence to the parents who take care of them. There is not even the need to refer 
to the fundamental rights of the children, their right to family life. The dispute is entirely 
settled on the basis of the statutory right of residence of the children. In ‘extraordinary’ 
situations, there is no need to refer to ‘fundamental’ rights; EU Citizenship works well on 
its own. 
 
The status of EU citizen 
Another important change concerns the reference to the ‘status’ of citizen of the 
Union. The Court proclaimed that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the member states” for the first time in the Grzelczyk case in 2001. This formula 
enabled the Court to broaden the scope of application of the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality. Since then, in each case where this reference 
was introduced by the Court (Baumbast, Garcia Avello, Zhu and Chen, Commission v. Austria), it 
has always had a residual and procedural function: it was used to legitimize a comparison 
between nationals and non-nationals, as an argument to say that, if they are ‘Europeans’, 
the latter should enjoy the same treatment irrespective of their nationality (Commission v. 
Austria, C-147/03).  
In that case, as already in a previous one (Rottmann, C-135/08), the reference to the 
status of those involved in the case plays a prominent role that differs somewhat from 
earlier decisions. It is presented as the real source of the rights and duties conferred on  EU 
citizens and  their family members. The consequence is that the status in itself has to be 
protected in order to protect the rights attached to it. These rights refer to the rights of 
citizenship (movement, non-discrimination, social integration) but one can also see a 
reference to the fundamental rights protected under the Charter and the ECHR. If taken 
seriously, the combination of citizenship and fundamental rights would have far-reaching 
effect in the broadening of the scope of application of EU law. 
 
Is there a right to the European territory? 
An important part of this short judgment is devoted to examining the possible 
consequences of not granting the right of residence to the parents. The Court relies on an 
‘argument from consequences’. The use of this argument is interesting and must be put 
into context. First of all, this is a response to the argument put forward by the Irish 
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government before the Court, the ‘floodgates’ argument that the granting of a right of 
residence is liable to lead to ‘unmanageable results’, to a loss of control over immigration 
flows. The Court has already responded to a similar argument in a previous case, the Metock 
case (C-127/08). It argued that “the refusal to grant a right of entry to the family members of a Union 
citizen would be such as to encourage him to leave in order to lead a family life in another member state or 
in a non-member country”. In Zambrano, the Court states similarly that “a refusal to grant a right of 
residence and a work permit to the father would lead to a situation where the children would have to leave 
the territory of the Union”. In Metock, the Union citizens involved had circulated within the 
Union. The Court recognized to the Union a competence to regulate the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals. This competence was based on the need to 
protect the freedom of movement of European citizens.  
In Zambrano, the children haven’t circulated within the Union. The EU law 
influence is therefore considerably widened to cover non-mobile citizens. In such 
reasoning, the argument from consequences in terms of individual rights prevails over the 
argument from consequences in terms of state control of immigration. The issue is no 
longer the EU competence in the field of immigration.  The real issue is to know whether 
the right of EU citizens to enjoy the European territory prevails over the state competence 
to regulate entry and access to its territory.  
 
3. The invention of  Euro-bonds ? 
 
Classifications and re-classifications 
The main consequence of the case is the transformation of the status of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano. From asylum seeker, he becomes a ‘quasi’ European citizen. From transitory 
residence and illegal status, he gets permanent and legal residence. Not only that: the Court 
enables him to be granted a work permit in Belgium, to be socially integrated in this 
country. This case illustrates the commutability of personal statuses in Europe. The Union 
has multiplied the statuses conferred to migrants. These statuses are more or less 
protective. This inevitably fosters a phenomenon of re-classifications based on EU law and 
a phenomenon of self-re-classifications by the migrants themselves. One may wonder 
about the exportability of this solution to other types of situations. Is it a case limited to 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
38 
people socially integrated in a European society, having concluded employment contracts? 
Is it a case of ‘care’ limited to situations concerning dependent persons like children? In the 
recent MCCarthy judgment of 12 May 2011, the Court rejects the transposition of this 
solution to the situation of an adult having a family member outside the territory of the 
Union. Is this a retreat of the Court? One has perhaps to distinguish, depending on the 
facts of the case. But, whatever the case, the Ruiz Zambrano judgment remains the one in 
which a new status was given to EU citizens.  
 
Union citizens as Europeans 
European citizenship has so far been presented as a means “to strengthen the protection 
of the rights and interests of the nationals of member states” (Art. 2 of the former Treaty on the 
European Union). The idea was to protect their rights against potential discrimination on 
the part of authorities of the member states. Now, this case highlights another dimension 
of European citizenship, namely the protection of the rights of Union citizens as genuine 
‘Europeans’ committed to the European Union, its territory and its common values, and 
not only to the member states. The Court justifies its solution on the ground that Article 20 
TFEU “precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union [the two 
children] of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights [circulation, residence in another 
member state] conferred by virtue of their status of the Union”. A rather weak justification. The 
strong justification lies in the fact that a deportation from the European territory would 
amount to an “expatriation”.  
It is not by chance that this case benefits mainly a non-European, Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano, a Colombian national. This shows the willingness of the Union to develop its 
own boundaries between individuals, its own notion of membership. The case challenges 
the theory of defining the European citizenship by reference to the nationals of member 
states who circulate within the EU. The theory is required to include all those individuals 
who are integrated in Europe and are willing to develop ties in this territory, including 
nationals of non-member states who contest the borders of Europe set up by the member 
states.  
 
 
From recognition to allegiance  
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In another case, concerning the access to the profession of notary in the member 
states, the advocate general Cruz-Villalón stated that “European citizenship is evolving as a 
direct bond between the citizen and the Union” (Case C-47/08). For the sake of his 
demonstration, he insisted that “the concept of loyalty as an expression of commitment to and 
solidarity with the political community cannot be regarded in itself as a distinctive, exclusive and preclusive 
characteristic of the Member States, such that it inevitably requires the bond of nationality. On the contrary, 
a European citizen is not as such unable to make a commitment of loyalty to the Union… The notary thus 
operates within a framework in which loyalty extends both to the State conferring authority and to the 
Union assuming it, as well as to the other Member States”. Under this interpretation, EU 
citizenship is a mechanism which ensures a transfer of loyalty from one member state to 
another. This model is new. It is not one of recognition of a national by the society of 
another member state, but one of allegiance to another collectivity. Notice however that, in 
this case, the Union is not the final addressee of the commitment of loyalty. It is rather the 
guarantor that assumes the genuineness of the commitments established with different 
member states.  
This mechanism comes into resonance with the new financial mechanism 
established by the Union to safeguard the stability of the euro area and to resolve the debt 
crisis. The Union authorizes the euro area member states to support a member state in 
budgetary trouble by granting financial assistance, but it does not commit itself by issuing 
Eurobonds. Now, the creation of financial Eurobonds may be economically and politically 
hard to achieve. Just in the same way, the creation of individual and symbolic Euro-bonds, 
which emerges at the margins in this singular case, will be legally vain if it is not supported 
by a political and popular mobilization akin to the consensus, was it permissive or not, that 
was at the birth of the setting up of the European Communities and which is more than 
ever imperilled. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                 
* An early and shortened version of the article was published on the EUDO Citizenship website 
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Abstract 
 
This paper critically assesses the EU’s anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the light of 
the protection of Union citizens. The main question is to which extent a Union citizen 
threatened by pirates off the coast of Somalia could rely on the promise of civis europaeus 
sum. The paper discusses the various legal aspects pertaining to the forceful protection of 
EU citizens in international law, EU constitutional law and the operational parameters of 
Atalanta. It argues that within the particular framework of the international effort to 
combat piracy, the protection of citizens by military force could be legal. Moreover, the 
protection of citizens outside the EU forms now one of the legally-binding general 
objectives of the Union. Yet, this objective is not reiterated in the operational mandate, 
which creates tension and confusion between the general objective and the CSDP 
instrument. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by focussing entirely on 
universal objectives, is constitutionally incomplete and shows that the external dimension 
of Union citizenship is still underdeveloped. 
 
Key-words:  
Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP), 
Piracy, Union citizenship, use of force, protection of nationals abroad 
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1. Introduction: The civis europaeus and the hostis humani generis 
The ancient Roman dictum ‘civis romanus sum’,I a pledge of respect for one’s rights as 
a Roman citizen, has remained a powerful concept throughout the centuries. Importantly, 
the status that it indicates was not just relevant within the Roman Empire, but also carried 
considerable weight beyond its borders, instilling fear in the ‘barbarians’ that mistreating a 
Roman would be answered with severe reprisals. It is this external dimension of citizen 
protection with which the present contribution is concerned in the context of the 
European Union, with particular regard to its Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) as exemplified through the anti-piracy operation Atalanta. 
In the modern age, the phrase resurfaced in the context of protecting a nation-
state’s citizens aboard. As one of the most (in)famous examples, Lord Palmerston evoked 
in a speech before the British House of Commons in 1850 ‘the sense of duty which has led 
us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow subjects abroad’ 
(reproduced in Francis 1852: 496). Consequently, according to Palmerston,   
‘as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis 
Romanus sum; so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident 
that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and 
wrong.’ (reproduced in Francis 1852: 496).  
Similarly, even though in more aggressive terms, in 1900 Kaiser Wilhelm II told his 
troops at Bremerhaven (in a speech that would later by known as the “Hunnenrede”), before 
sending them off to China to quell the Boxer Rebellion that ‘by its character the German 
Empire has the obligation to provide help to its citizens whenever they are oppressed 
abroad’ (my translation, original reproduced in Görtemaker 1996: 357). Consequently, in 
order to avenge the alleged breaches of international law committed by the Chinese, the 
Kaiser instructed his troops to handle their arms in such a way that ‘for a thousand years no 
Chinese will dare even to squint at a German anymore’ (my translation, original reproduced 
in Görtemaker 1996: 357; for other historical examples see Ianniello Saliceti, 2011: 91-92). 
Already here, it becomes obvious that there are two sides to the concept. Next to the as 
such laudable idea of the state extending its protection over its citizens wherever they may 
be to shield them from harm, there is also the negative connotation of disregard for other 
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countries’ sovereignty, as ‘a pretext for intervention’ (Gray 2008: 159) and generally a sign 
of ‘imperialism’, especially when the use of force is involved. 
Also in the context of the European Union the ancient adage has been drawn upon. 
Four Advocates General have used the expression ‘civis europeus [sic] sum’.II According to 
Advocate General Jacobs, who originally introduced the phrase into the vocabulary of the 
European Court of Justice, a Union citizen is ‘entitled to assume that, wherever he goes to 
earn his living in the European Community, he will be treated in accordance with a 
common code of fundamental values […]’.III However, civis europaeus sum in these cases 
concerned the invocation of fundamental rights by Union citizens within the EU. The 
protection of Union citizens abroad is a matter distinct from the legal momentum behind 
consolidation and incorporation of citizens’ rights protection inside the Union’s borders.IV  
Still, the introduction of Union citizenship into the primary law by the Maastricht Treaty 
already included an explicit external component, viz. the protection by the diplomatic or 
consular authorities of any Member State in third countries for Union citizens whose 
Member State is not represented (Art. 8c TEU (Maastricht Treaty version); for the post-
Lisbon provision, Art. 23 TFEU; see also Art. 46 Charter of Fundamental Rights). Apart 
from consular and diplomatic protection proper, an innovation by the Lisbon Treaty is the 
inclusion among the objectives of the Union to ‘uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ in its external relations (Art. 3(5) 
TEU). The failed Constitutional Treaty did not refer to the protection of citizens abroad as 
a general Union objective (Art. I-3(4) CT). This novelty was introduced by the French 
government at the Intergovernmental Conference of 2007 (de Poncins 2008: 75-76). The 
motivation behind this was, it has been argued, to underline that the Union is not a ‘Trojan 
horse’ of globalisation, but instead acts as a shield for its citizens from globalisation’s 
challenges and downsides (Sauron 2007: 30). Moreover, it could be seen as the 
constitutional concretization of the EU’s objective, introduced in Art. 2 of the Maastricht 
Treaty, ‘to assert its identity on the international scene’. One important aspect of this 
would be the external dimension of Union citizenship, i.e. also ‘to reinforce the identity of 
European citizens throughout the rest of the world’, as Ianniello Saliceti puts it, who states 
furthermore that this had been pursued already as early as 1985 by the ‘Adonnino 
Committee’ (2011: 92). 
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With the introduction and rapid development of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (formerly ESDP), the European Union has equipped itself also with 
military capabilities that can be used to pursue its foreign policy (or ‘external action’, to use 
the post-Lisbon term).V The extent to which these capabilities can also be used to pursue 
the objective of protecting Union citizens abroad will be addressed here in the context of 
Operation Atalanta, the EU’s first naval military operation. Launched on 8 December 2008 
(Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP), it will continue at least till December 2012 (Council 
Decision 2010/766/CFSP, Art. 1(5)). The academic debate surrounding Atalanta has thus 
far focussed on issues pertaining to legal aspects of the detention and prosecution of 
pirates and/or Law of the Sea issues (Fischer-Lescano and Kreck 2009; Fink and Galvin 
2009: 384-385; Naert 2010: 179-191), or the geopolitical implications of the operation 
(Germond and Smith 2009; Kamerling and van der Putten 2010; Holmes 2010; Larik and 
Weiler 2011). However, it is argued here that the issue of protection of Union citizens 
should not be neglected, especially in view of both the unique (one might even say sui 
generis) nature of the concept of Union citizenship as well as of the EU as an actor in 
matters of international security. International organisations such as NATO do not contain 
any notion of common ‘citizenship’, whereas for individual countries it is a rather 
traditional and uncontroversial issue to protect their own nationals, who are bound by a 
‘genuine link’ to their state,VI abroad. For some it is even a constitutional objective 
(Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97). Consequently, these peculiar features set the EU and 
Operation Atalanta apart from the other actors and their respective deployments in this 
theatre. Moreover, and in contrast to other CSDP/ESDP operations, Atalanta serves as a 
well-suited case study for the external protection of Union citizens. Whereas former 
missions were strictly concerned with external objectives that could only indirectly or 
incidentally affect the security of Union citizens, e.g. peace-keeping operations, police/rule 
of law missions or security sector reform programmes, Atalanta addresses pirate attacks in 
one of the most heavily-used maritime trade routes in the world, through which also large 
numbers of ships flying flags of EU Member States and EU citizens pass (Germond and 
Smith 2009: 587-589).  
It is against this backdrop that the novel civis europaeus encounters the re-surfacing 
hostis humani generis (as pirates were classically termed). Consequently, the question emerges 
whether Union citizens abroad can also trust here in the weight of the legal concept of civis 
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europaeus sum. Can they rely on the assets of Operation Atalanta, i.e. – to use Palmerston’s 
imagery – the ‘watchful eye’ and the ‘strong arm’ of the Union to protect them against the 
threat of pirate attacks? In order to approach this question, the paper will proceed as 
follows: Section 2 addresses the international law aspects of the of the external protection 
of citizens by forceful means; section 3 turns to the EU’s constitutional framework and the 
issue of using the CSDP to pursue the objective of protecting EU citizens aboard; section 4 
subsequently scrutinizes to which extent the mandate of Operation Atalanta takes this goal 
into account, observing that in spite of a constitutional objective the operation is not 
explicitly pursuing the protection of Union citizens. Section 5 points out the implications 
of this tension between the two. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by 
focussing entirely on ‘universal’ objectives and neglecting the civis europaeus, is – if not 
unconstitutional – constitutionally incomplete. 
 
2. International law aspects  
The deployment of military forces and the use of force in order to protect a 
country’s citizens abroad raise first and foremost the question of legality under 
international law. For the EU the issue to use force for that purpose arises in the context of 
Atalanta with regard to crew members and passengers with Union citizenship who are 
threatened by pirates in the operation theatre.  
In view of the general prohibition imposed on states to use force ‘in their 
international relations’ under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, we have to 
address first the general parameters of international law in terms of the use of force to 
protect one’s citizens abroad. Even though International Law Commission (ICL) Special 
Rapporteur Dugard considered ‘[t]he use of force as the ultimate means of diplomatic 
protection’ in his 2000 report (International Law Commission 2000: para. 47; see also 
Gray, 2009: 136-137), this opinion cannot be regarded as the predominant one, and was 
not even shared by the majority of the ICL members (Gray 2009: 137). The current ILC 
commentary clearly states that ‘[t]he use of force [...] is not a permissible method for the 
enforcement of the right of diplomatic protection’ (International Law Commission 2006: 
27). Beyond the realm of diplomatic protection, international legal scholarship either 
discards any notion of forceful citizen protection as an exception to the prohibition to use 
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force (Bothe 2004: 604-605), or see merely little support in state practice and legal opinion 
for it (Gray 2008: 156-160).VII  
However, in the present case, we are not dealing with intervention on the territory 
of another state and/or against foreign state agents, but with pirate attacks – that is non-
state actors – on ships within the territorial waters of Somalia or on the high seas. This is, 
in the first place, regulated by the international Law of the Sea as codified in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention provides a 
definition of piracy (Art. 101 UNCLOS), and allows any state to seize pirate ships on the 
high seas, arrest the pirates and exercise jurisdiction over them (Art. 105 UNCLOS). 
Therefore, on the high seas, a state is allowed to use force against pirates without having to 
invoke any exceptional (and controversial) ‘right’ to protect its own citizens or to exercise a 
humanitarian intervention (Ronzitti 1985: 137). 
Importantly, in this particular case, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
has passed a number of resolutions addressing the piracy surge off the Coast of Somalia, 
which supplement, and in view of the supremacy of the UN Charter to other international 
agreements partly supplant (Art. 103 UN Charter), the UNCLOS framework. This 
concerns in particular United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) of 2 June 
2008 (para. 7),VIII which authorizes states operating under this legal framework to use ‘all 
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’ (para. 7(b)), i.e. also to use 
force. Overall, in essence it makes ‘the rules of international law concerning piracy on the 
high seas applicable also to territorial waters’ of Somalia (Treves 2009: 404).IX  
The addition of the term ‘armed robbery’ to the UNCLOS-defined term ‘piracy’ is 
of some significance, as the latter notion might not always be applicable to modern forms 
of piracy (e.g. the requirement that always two ships must be involved). Treves points out 
that the former term is used in the context of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and supplements the notion of piracy, ‘inspired by the aim of including all acts 
connected with piracy (such as preparatory acts) and future possible acts involving only 
one ship’ (Treves 2009: 403). According to the IMO, ‘armed robbery’ is defined as  
‘any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
other than an act of “piracy” directed against a ship or against persons or property on 
board such a ship within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.’ (International Maritime 
Organization 2011: Annex, para. 2.2.) 
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However, even though the Security Council is acting here under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has to be notified of 
operations in its territorial waters (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008), 
para. 11),X which Naert calls ‘a simplified form of consent’ (Naert 2010: 185). While 
superfluous in view of the powers conferred upon the Security Council under Chapter VII, 
this could be seen as a supplementary invitation by Somalia for states to intervene in the 
fight against piracy in its territorial waters, which could serve to preclude illegality of the 
use of force as covered by such an invitation (Ronzitti 2007: 417). The EU has notified the 
TFG of Somalia accordingly (See Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008, 
point 4 of the grounds). 
One should distinguish here the use of force against pirates from that in a situation 
of armed conflict between states. As Treves puts it, in contrast to acts of self-defence, 
counter-piracy should ‘be assimilated to the exercise of the power to engage in police 
action on the high seas on foreign vessels which is permitted by exceptions to the rule 
affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state’ (2009: 413). Similarly, but more 
accurately, Lubell calls for a ‘law enforcement approach of the scaled use of force’, which 
recognizes that even though we face here a force level below that of armed conflict, ‘[t]he 
level of force and types of weapons employed may well rise beyond the usual domestic 
crime scenarios’ (2010: 225). 
In view of the general authorization to combat piracy by the Law of the Sea and its 
extension ratione materiæ (‘armed robbery’) and loci (Somali territorial waters) through UN 
Security Council resolutions (and affirmed by TFG notifications), a state cannot be seen as 
violating another state’s rights or territorial integrity if it uses force against pirates off the 
coast of Somalia.XI There is no reason why this conclusion should change when the act of 
repressing piracy was carried out in a situation where the state’s own citizens were under 
threat. As was pointed out earlier, states do not have to invoke an exceptional right to 
protect their citizens to employ forceful measures against pirates. Hence, they can use these 
measures also to that particular end. As states are under no obligation, but are instead 
generally authorized to combat piracy, the protection by the (proportionate) use of force of 
a state’s nationals within these legal parameters is to be considered unobjectionable under 
international law.XII  
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As regards the special nature of the EU as an international actor, it follows from 
the foregoing that in any case its Member States would be allowed to use force against 
pirates within the particular legal framework concerning Somali piracy. Only in case of 
overstepping this framework and breaching international law would the question of 
responsibility between the Member States providing military assets to Atalanta and the EU 
itself arise. After all, the relevant Joint Action states that ‘[t]he European Union (EU) shall 
conduct a military operation […] called “Atalanta”’, not the several Member States 
(Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1), emphasis added).  
Such questions of international responsibility of the EU notwithstanding (see Naert 
2010: 641-644), it seems clear that force by a Member State operating within Atalanta could 
be used to protect a Member State’s own citizens. There have been already a number of 
instances where EU Member States contemplated the use of force or actually resorted to 
forceful means to protect their citizens against pirates. According to French diplomatic 
sources, ‘[o]n three occasions French forces have had to intervene to protect French 
citizens taken hostage by pirates’. This concerned the vessels Le Ponant, Carré d’As and Tanit 
(Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York 2009). In early May 
2009, a rescue operation by German commandos of the kidnapped freighter Hansa 
Stavanger anchored in a Somali harbour was narrowly aborted for security concerns (Spiegel 
2009).  
Furthermore, and crucially, this authorization under the international legal 
framework also covers the protection of non-nationals, which obviously makes sense 
seeing the often multinational setup of merchant ship crews and the general interest of the 
international community involved. These non-nationals could therefore also come from 
other EU Member States. A fitting example here is the rescue mission conducted by Dutch 
forces from the frigate Tromp operating in the framework of Atalanta, which also saved 
German nationals from pirates that had hijacked the MS Taipan in April 2010 (EU 
NAVOR Somalia 2010). This – at least in effect – amounts to an act of an EU Member 
State’s military forces protecting EU citizens from pirates. In view of the foregoing this is 
to be deemed legal under international law. The extent to which such protection of Union 
citizens is framed by EU law will be dealt with in the next two sections.  
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3. EU constitutional law aspects 
From the perspective of EU primary law, as was stated in the introduction, the 
Lisbon Treaty introduced among the objectives of the Union to ‘uphold and promote its 
values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ (Art. 3(5) TEU). From 
the emerging literature on the Union’s objectives as a category of constitutional law,XIII it 
can be concluded that these are binding obligations that commit the Union and its 
institutions to actively pursue these objectives within their areas of competence and that 
frame the use of their discretion accordingly (Calliess 2003: 90-93; Ruffert 2011: 41-44; 
Reimer 2003: 1000-1007; Kotzur 2005: 314-315; Plecher-Hochstraßer 2006: 105-136; 
Sommermann 1997: 280-296; Ipsen 1972: 556-563). In this literature, there is general 
agreement that also the Members States are bound, albeit indirectly, by these objectives by 
virtue of the duty of cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU). Of course external relations, and in 
particular the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which the CSDP is 
a component, have certain special characteristics (intergovernmentalism and very limited of 
jurisdiction of the ECJ, see Art. 24 TEU; and Thym 2010: 330-338; van Elsuwege 2010). 
However, there are no cogent reasons to suggest that external action-related objectives 
should be treated in a fundamentally different way from internal policy-related objectives 
(Larik 2011).  
How, then, do the objectives of upholding and promoting the Union’s values and 
interests and contributing to the protection of its citizens abroad apply to the piracy surge 
off the Coast of Somalia? As far as the (economic) interests are concerned, the stakes for 
the EU are obvious. The strategic economic importance for the EU lies in the fact that the 
Gulf of Aden is a maritime chokepoint through which 90 percent of merchandise and 30 
percent of the energy resources consumed in Europe pass (French Ministry of Defence 
2010; also Larik and Weiler: 85-86). Therefore, as French vice-admiral Bruno Nielly puts it, 
‘il n'est pas question pour l'Europe de laisser ne serait-ce qu'un tronçon de cette route 
menacé par un phénomène tel que la piraterie’ and that ‘[l]'Europe, d'abord, y défend ses 
intérêts’ (French Ministry of Defence 2010). Also Germond calls Operation Atalanta ‘the 
first ever ESDP operation that primarily aims at defending Member States’ interests (that 
is, providing security to their merchant shipping)’ (2010: 53).XIV In addition, Europe’s 
fishing industry should not remain unaddressed, which has been very active in the area and 
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has been criticized frequently for taking advantage of the lack of effective state power in 
Somalia (Phillips 2009; and generally on illegal fishing Lehr and Lehmann 2007: 12-13). 
Apart from the economic, there are also wider security concerns such as the pirates 
collaborating with terrorist groups, and of course the protection of EU citizens (Germond 
and Smith 2009: 580-581), a matter to which we will return in detail. Therefore, Atalanta 
can definitely be seen as a measure in the pursuit of the Union’s interests. 
One could also argue that the EU’s approach in Atalanta is framed to safeguard and 
promote its values. Examples for this would be the integrated approach that also aims at 
improving the situation in Somalia itself (above all through the EU Training Mission in 
Somalia, Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP), even though the effectiveness of this 
‘comprehensive approach’ can be questioned (Sanchez Barrueco 2009). With particular 
regard to the treatment of captured pirates, safeguard mechanisms to protect their human 
rights stand out. A prominent illustration of this is that the EU ensures that they will not 
be subject to the death penalty when tried in third countries (Council Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP, Art. 12(2)). Also multilateral cooperation among the different actors in 
the region is to be fostered, which, too, can be seen as expressions of European values.XV 
But what about the potential contribution of Atalanta to the protection of Union 
citizens, as an objective that is stipulated explicitly next to values and interests, i.e. an 
objective in its own right? Here, first of all the question needs to be answered whether, and 
to which extent, the CFSP/CSDP can be used to this specific end. As is also generally 
agreed concerning constitutionally-codified objectives, they do not as such establish 
competence (Reimer 2003: 995-996; Calliess 2003: 89-90; Kotzur 2005: 314). Given that 
the EU remains an entity based on conferred powers (Art. 5(1) TEU), the competence to 
pursue a Union objective and the procedures to be followed ought to be specified 
elsewhere in the primary law (Art. 3(6) TEU). 
As a preliminary observation, the objective of citizen protection abroad is not 
explicitly reiterated or linked to competences and procedures in Title V of the TEU or Part 
Five of the TFEU on external action. With particular regard to the objectives of the CFSP, 
Art. 23 TEU states that the Union’s international action ‘shall be guided by the principles, 
shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions 
laid down in Chapter 1’. However, Arts. 21 and 22 TEU, which make up this chapter, do 
not include a specific reference to the protection of citizens. What is made explicit 
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elsewhere is the right of Union citizens ‘to protection by the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State’ in 
third countries in which their Member State of nationality is not represented (Art. 23 
TFEU; also Art. 46 Charter of Fundamental Rights). This provision is situated under the 
heading ‘Non-discrimination and Citizenship’ in the TFEU. This raises the question 
whether the objective of citizen protection abroad is only to be pursued through 
diplomatic or consular protection as an external aspect of citizenship and, a contrario, not 
through the CFSP/CSDP. 
This would seem too narrow an interpretation. The scope of the CFSP is very 
broad, as Art. 24(1) states that ‘[t]he Union’s competence in matters of common foreign 
and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security’.XVI Also, despite the lack of explicit reference to citizen protection there, 
the general Union objectives found in Art. 3(5) TEU are to guide our interpretation of, and 
need to be ‘read together’ with, the more specific objectives and provisions that follow in 
the Treaties (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2011: 111; Callies 2003: 91-92; Ipsen 1972: 558). 
Therefore, the protection of citizens can be regarded as implied under the Union’s 
‘fundamental interests’ and ‘security’, which are to be safeguarded under Art. 21(2)(a) 
through EU external action. Thus, the Union can be deemed generally competent to 
protect its citizens abroad, including through the CFSP. Of course, this competence, as 
part of the CFSP, would be of a strictly non-exclusive kind incapable of inhibiting Member 
States’ own respective competence to protect their nationals abroad (Art. 2(4) TFEU; 
Eeckhout 2011: 171). 
Turning now to the CSDP proper, Art. 42(1) TEU provides that ‘[t]he common 
security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security 
policy’. However, citizen protection is not explicitly mentioned here either, as civilian and 
military capabilities may be used by the Union ‘on missions outside the Union for peace-
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Art. 41(1) TEU). That would not as such seem 
to include the protection of citizens.  
However, the more precise enumeration of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ in Art. 
43(1) TEU ‘include[s]’, inter alia, ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’. Even though Union 
citizens are not mentioned, the notion of ‘rescue tasks’ can only reasonably be understood 
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as referring also to rescue efforts of one’s own citizens. This view finds confirmation when 
looking at the background of this provision. In the original 1992 Petersberg declaration of 
the Western European Union (WEU), the French version referred to ‘des missions 
humanitaires ou d'évacuation de ressortissants’ (Western European Union 1992: 7, emphasis 
added). This reference reappeared in a more recent factsheet of the now defunct WEU, 
which stated that ‘Battlegroups can be used for the full range of missions and tasks listed in 
Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union (Petersberg missions)’ including, importantly, 
‘the evacuation of EU citizens’ (European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of 
WEU 2009, emphasis added). The later omission of this reference to citizens in the 
Amsterdam Treaty has been interpreted as intending to not a priori exclude third-country 
nationals from being rescued through EU missions (von Kielmansegg 2007: 632; d’Argent 
1998: 391). Any other interpretation would seem to be at odds with the rather wide scope 
of the CSDP. According to Coelmont (2008: 6), ‘apart from collective defence, all kinds of 
military operations one can at present realistically invent in our global world can all be 
undertaken in a European context as an ESDP (or CSDP) operation.’ Moreover, given the 
prominent place of the protection of citizens among the general objectives of the Union, a 
systematic-teleological interpretation of the Treaties would favour the pursuit of this 
objective by the entire spectrum of external EU policies and capabilities, including those of 
the CSDP.  
Of course, competence to pursue this objective through the CSDP does not 
dispense of the legal limitations of EU law and international law that will have to be 
respected in doing so. For instance, a rescue operation of EU citizens from pirates, just like 
any general anti-piracy action, must respect basic legal principles such as necessity and 
proportionality, and respect the rights of third parties (e.g. the sovereign rights of third 
states into whose territorial waters/territory EU citizens may be abducted by pirates and 
the parameters set by the UN Security Council). 
Consequently, the preliminary conclusion is that the EU legal order allows the 
Union to use the CSDP and the assets of the Member States to pursue the objective of 
protecting its citizens. Furthermore, as was concluded earlier, the international legal regime 
in place also authorizes the use of force to that end (n.b. for counter-piracy in general, 
which includes but is not limited to citizen protection).  
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The additional question arises, then, whether the EU and its Member States are also 
under a stricter obligation in this regard. In particular, is there a right of EU citizens to be 
protected against pirates by the Union? What exists thus far – at most – is the right of EU 
citizens to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of EU Member States in 
case their Member State of nationality is not represented in a third country.XVII 
Legislatively, this has been elaborated upon by Decision 95/553/EC on the protection for 
citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations. But given the 
succinctness of the law in this regard it is certainly correct to say that ‘the acquis relating to 
the protection of EU citizens is not well developed’ (Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97; referring 
also to European Commission 2006). In any event, the reference to ‘third countries’ would 
imply that situations on the high seas are not included, nor would be the protection by 
naval forces as opposed to ‘diplomatic or consular authorities’. Curiously enough though, 
Ianniello Saliceti discusses in this context the example of an evacuation operation from an 
area of crisis involving ‘rescue aircraft’ (Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97). It is doubtful whether 
the notion of consular and diplomatic protection could be stretched thus far. At least the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection or the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations do not include this particular type of action,XVIII and, a 
fortiori it would appear, acts by military forces on the high seas. At best, chartered civilian 
aircraft might be considered. Therefore, it can be concluded that any rights under EU law 
in terms of the forceful protection of citizens abroad by military means do not exist. In 
addition, procedurally there is no forum to invoke such rights directly vis-à-vis the EU in 
view of the exclusion of jurisdiction of the ECJ from most of the CFSP (Art. 24(1) TEU 
and Art. 275 TFEU).XIX 
 
4. The operational mandate 
Having considered the EU’s constitutional framework, let us now turn to the 
mandate proper of Operation Atalanta, and see to which extent it lives up to the objective 
of protecting Union citizens. The mandate and operational parameters of are set out in 
Joint Action 2008/851. Art. 1(1) of the Joint Action characterizes the mission as  
‘a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in a manner consistent with action permitted 
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with respect to piracy under Article 100 et seq. of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 […] and by means, in 
particular, of commitments made with third States […].’ (Council Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1)) 
Art. 1 then proceeds to set out the operation’s basic objectives, of which there were 
initially two: First, protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering 
food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008); secondly, the protection of vulnerable vessels and 
the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1816 (2008) (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art. 1(1)). A third objective 
was introduced on 8 December 2009 by amending Art. 1 of the Joint Action, stating that 
‘[i]n addition, Atalanta shall contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast 
of Somalia.’XX This can be seen as showing awareness of the controversial fishing activities 
by European vessels and the intention to make clear that Atalanta is not there to act as a 
military shield for the illegal exploitation of Somalia’s maritime resources. 
Art. 2 of the Joint Action subsequently provides the specific objectives in the actual 
operational mandate. Essentially, Atalanta shall ‘as far as available capabilities allow’, 
provide protection to WFP vessels (including by placing armed units on board); provide 
protection of merchant vessels ‘based on a case-by-case evaluation of needs’; take the 
‘necessary measures’, i.e. also the use of force, to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery; 
detain and transfer piracy suspects for prosecution; ‘liaise and cooperate’ with other 
relevant actors in the theatre; and, at a later stage, lend assistance to Somali authorities ‘by 
making available data relating to fishing activities compiled in the course of the 
operation’.XXI 
A specific reference to the protection of Union citizens in the mandate is missing. 
It is clearly tied to the international legal framework, above all the relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolutions and the Law of the Sea. Especially the formulation of the 
mission as one ‘in support of’ UN Security Council resolutions suggests that Operation 
Atalanta functions as an executing arm of the Security Council. The EU is thereby – as the 
TEU puts it – contributing to ‘multilateral solutions to common problems’ (Art. 21(1), 
second subpara. TEU) by addressing a threat to international peace and security. 
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Consequently, it is to this universal end that it protects WFP ships, secures maritime traffic 
and pursues pirates.  
Among the ships that are to be protected, WFP vessels enjoy priority. They are not 
only mentioned first, but are also given the express possibility to have armed units put on 
board. Most important, however, is the absence of a reference to ‘a case-by-case evaluation 
of needs’, which applies to merchant vessels. Among the merchant vessels, no distinction is 
made between ships sailing under EU Member State flags or those with Union citizens on 
board and the rest. The presentation of the operation by the Council to the public further 
highlights this prioritization. Features like the ‘food count’ tables used on the factsheets 
about the operation, informing us that between the launch of the operation and the end of 
2010 about 490000 tons of food have been delivered and ‘on average, more than 1600000’ 
Somalis have been fed each day (Council of the European Union 2011: 2), foster the 
impression that this mission is of a primarily, if not exclusively, humanitarian character. A 
similar ‘EU citizens rescued’ count is nowhere to be found.  
 
5. A mismatch of  objectives? 
The question now arises as to the relationship between the operational mandate 
and its specific objectives on the one, and the constitutional objectives of the EU Treaties 
on the other hand, and how they each frame the discretion of the EU forces assigned to 
Operation Atalanta. Even though, as was concluded earlier, there exist neither court 
jurisdiction nor individual rights here, objectives are still legally binding and serve as a 
normative framework for the actors called upon to pursue them.  
At this point, it is worth drawing an analogy from Ianniello Saliceti’s example for 
the application of the principle of non-discrimination in the context of an evacuation 
operation of EU citizens (see supra section 3). He suggests that non-discrimination in such 
a case requires to ‘take onboard an equal number of distressed EU citizens of each 
nationality’ in a rescue operation by aircraft (Ianniello Saliceti 2011: 97).XXII In this example, 
it seems to be implied that first EU citizens would have to be rescued, leaving only any 
potential spare seats for third country nationals. Even though it is difficult to agree with 
such a strict application of equality among EU citizens, it reveals nonetheless the assumption 
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that the objective of citizen protection frames the discretion of the actors in a particular 
situation.  
Let us assume then a situation in which an Atalanta warship receives distress calls 
from several vessels being attacked by pirates. On one ship, there are a number of EU 
citizens present, on the others not. There are no other military capabilities available. For 
the warship, the distance to the distressed ships is about the same, and given time 
constraints, only one ship can be helped, leaving the others at the mercy of the pirates. It is 
a hypothetical example, but given the vastness of the area covered and the relatively little 
number of warships available,XXIII it is not entirely far-fetched. In such a situation, 
depending on the features of the other ships, the mandate of Atalanta and the objectives of 
Art. 3(5) TEU, in particular with regard to the protection of citizens, might be at odds.  
As was pointed out, the mandate of Joint Action 2008/851 prioritizes WFP ships, 
and provides as criterion to choose among merchant vessels a case-by-case evaluation of 
need. Thus, assuming there was a WFP ship among the distressed vessels, the operational 
mandate would unequivocally point to the WFP ship to be rescued, abandoning the EU 
citizens on the other ship to their fate. The general objectives of the Union, however, 
explicitly emphasize the protection of citizens in the EU’s external action. This shifts the 
balance, if not towards favouring the ship with EU citizens onboard, at least to a less clear-
cut priority structure. The result is a (also morally difficult) choice between either 
promoting the universal/altruistic value of ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid to the 
suffering population of Somalia or pursuing the self-interested objective of protecting one’s 
own citizens.  
What if, alternatively, the choice was between a cargo ship (with no crew members 
who are EU citizens) and a yacht with EU citizens? The mandate’s case-by-case criterion is 
of little use here, as the need is equal in this example. Consequently, the mandate gives no 
further guidance, leaving it up to the commander of the warship to decide.XXIV Art. 3(5) 
TEU, in turn, frames it as a choice between safeguarding the EU’s interest in safe maritime 
trade by helping the cargo vessel and contributing to citizen protection by helping the 
yacht. Though it is as such also an open choice, the explicit reference to citizens as 
opposed to the wide notion of ‘interest’ might tilt the balance towards EU citizens. 
Arguably, for a nation-state, the choice to give priority to its own citizens in both 
cases would not be objectionable. Universal and economic objectives are not to be 
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discounted, but in this particular case they could not be served in view of the imperative of 
protecting one’s own nationals first. Charity, so to say, begins at home. As Bowett points 
out (1986: 45), states ‘will be placed under extreme political pressure to act to protect the 
safety of their nationals abroad’ and cannot ‘lightly refuse such protection when it lies 
within [their] powers to afford it’. Hence, one could imagine the domestic political outrage 
for a case in which the national military failed to prevent the kidnapping of nationals by 
pirates when it had the chance to do so. In the EU context, however, this is a more delicate 
matter. From a Member State perspective, helping another Member State’s nationals is at 
the outset an act of altruism (e.g. the Dutch navy rescuing the German crew from the MS 
Taipan). But the fact that both of them are EU Member States with loyalty obligations 
towards the Union, and by virtue of the over-arching concept of Union citizenship, it 
becomes a self-serving act from the perspective of the outside, non-EU world.XXV 
How can this tension between the Joint Action and Art. 3(5) TEU be resolved? 
Even though CFSP/CSDP acts are not qualified as ‘legislative acts’ (Art. 24(1), second 
subpara. TEU), they are binding and the primacy of the primary law as lex superior applies 
(on the legal nature of CFSP acts and the hierarchy of norms see Wessel 1999: 198-204; 
Gosalbo Bono 2006: 341-47). The introduction of Union objectives of general application 
(Art. 3 TEU) by the Lisbon reform bolsters this conclusion. This means that in the absence 
of a clear conflict, the secondary instrument, i.e. the Joint Action here, must be interpreted 
in conformity with the primary law. Hence, the objectives of the operation as set out in the 
mandate cannot be interpreted in such a way that the pursuit of any of the constitutional 
objectives as set out in Art. 3(5) TEU is undercut. Thus, Operation Atalanta’s mandate is 
not to be construed as neglecting the protection of Union citizens altogether. Given its 
total absence from the mandate, there is in any event potential for disorientation or 
misunderstanding in critical situations where clear guidance from the legal framework 
would be highly desirable. 
One may think about plausible reasons for the conspicuous absence of citizen 
protection in the mandate. One possible explanation may be the participation of third 
countries in the operation. To date, Norway, Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro have 
contributed to Atalanta (Council of the European Union 2011: 2; see also e.g. Council 
Decision 2010/199/CFSP). Therefore, one might consider it inappropriate to mandate 
these countries to help protect EU citizens. Here, the same logic applies: It would 
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challenge the priority of protecting their own nationals (or interests) by committing 
themselves to Atalanta. Then again, it would not be inconceivable to simply add the 
protection of citizens of participating countries to the mandate as well. As we have seen, 
the ‘Petersberg task’ of rescue operations in Art. 43(1) TEU is deliberately left open to 
rescuing third-country nationals as well. 
Another reason might be the political sensitivity of European countries regarding 
the issue of using military force to save their own nationals (and, a fortiori, other EU 
citizens). Therefore, the emphasis is put on the multilateral framework and universal 
objectives. Germany would be at the forefront of such considerations. It should be recalled 
that Federal President Köhler resigned from office in mid-2010 following protracted 
criticism for a statement that for a country like Germany, it might be necessary to also 
defend its interests such as free trade routes by force (for a reproduction of the original 
quote see Mandalka 2010). Subsequently, Foreign Minister Westerwelle tried to clarify 
Germany’s stance in a speech before the Bundestag on Operation Atalanta in November 
2010. Regarding the protection of national interests (Interessenwahrnehmung) he underlined 
that the entire operation had as its rationale the guarantee of delivery of humanitarian aid, 
and only as a secondary goal there was also the protection of international maritime traffic 
(German Foreign Office 2010). As he put it, ‘foreign policy that is committed to 
humanitarian values can, may, even must also take into account one’s own interests.’XXVI 
However, he then softened this reference to the ‘own interests’ by stating that freedom of 
movement on the high seas is a common interest of the international community and that 
Germany was acting under a mandate of the UNSC (German Foreign Office 2010). While 
we see here that the pursuit of the national interest is still a contentious issue, the 
protection of citizens did not figure as controversial in the discussion. It was rather the 
tension between economic and universal humanitarian considerations. As was mentioned 
earlier, the German government had planned and only narrowly avoided carrying out an 
operation of German special forces to rescue the partly German crew of the kidnapped 
container ship Hansa Stavanger.XXVII 
In other Member States, such controversies do not seem to arise at all either. The 
Swedish foreign ministry, for instance, also puts the protection of WFP ships first, whereas 
the presence of naval forces ‘is also seen to make it easier for merchant shipping in the 
area, including vessels that fly the Swedish flag and that sail in the area’ (Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of Sweden  2010). Here, the protection of Swedish ships serves as an 
indirect motivation. More explicit is the Spanish government’s stance. The ministry of 
defence points out that ‘the problem of piracy represented not just a threat to international 
maritime security, but also to national interests in the area, represented by the fishing 
activities of the Spanish tuna fleet in the Indian Ocean.’XXVIII For the Spanish government, 
the protection of Spanish vessels and fishermen and WFP ships appear side by side as 
motivation for sending warships to that area (Spanish Ministry of Defence 2010). As was 
mentioned earlier, the French already have a history of using force to rescue their nationals 
from pirates captured by Somali pirates.  
Thus, neither third country participation nor political sensitivity seem to explain the 
absence of citizen protection from the mandate of Atalanta in a plausible way. To the 
contrary, a look at the national stances of EU Member States rather indicates that the 
forceful protection of nationals is not controversial. But this equally shows that citizen 
protection, especially in the realm of security policy, is still seen from a strictly national 
viewpoint, which remains thus far unaffected by the concept of ‘Union citizenship’. The 
elevation of the protection of EU citizens abroad to a constitutional objective of the Union 
does not seem to have altered this. Illustrative is here again the example mentioned at the 
outset, i.e. the rescue of German crew members of the hijacked MS Taipan by Dutch 
troops from the frigate HNLMS Tromp operating in the framework of Atalanta. Not even 
the Operation itself regarded this as an act of protecting EU citizens by CSDP assets. 
Instead, the press release by Atalanta on the successful rescue operation limited itself to 
stating that ‘EU NAVFOR HNLMS Tromp retakes pirated MV Taipan’, thus identifying 
the warship as part of the EU operation (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2010). Also in the 
national media of both countries it was not portrayed in a European perspective (NRC 
Handelsblad 2010; Spiegel 2010). Especially telling was the angle taken by an Associated 
Press reporter who subtitled his article on the incident: ‘Dutch marines sidestep EU 
bureaucracy to rescue German container ship from Somali pirates’ (Corder 2010). From 
this viewpoint, the EU does not appear as the actor or even facilitator for the Member 
States to act, but as an obstacle to achieving the goal of mutual protection of nationals. 
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6. Conclusion: Civis europaeus in foro interno, externo barbarus 
The discussion of this encounter between the civis europaeus and the hostis humani 
generis off the coast of Somali yields the following observations. First, in this particular 
setting, international law allows the protection by the use of force of victims of piracy by 
virtue of the Law of the Sea and the special regime imposed by the UN Security Council. 
Within this particular framework, states are allowed to use force also for the purpose of 
protecting their own citizens from pirates. Secondly, the concept of ‘Union citizenship’ 
gives us a new perspective to look at the challenge for the Member States to protect jointly 
their citizens abroad. The altruistic objective of protecting a foreigner is transformed into 
the Union’s constitutionally entrenched self-interest to protect its own citizens. Union 
citizenship has now an explicit external dimension, which goes beyond diplomatic and 
consular assistance, and indeed also extends to the CFSP/CSDP. Thirdly, the mandate of 
Operation Atalanta clearly prioritizes the pursuit of universal objectives, above all the 
protection of WFP ships, and otherwise lumps together all merchant ships, making no 
reference to Union citizens at all. Therefore, fourthly, while the notion of EU citizenship 
looms large in the primary law and in the Union’s internal sphere, it is conspicuously 
absent in the implementing acts of the operation. This creates tension which in extreme 
situations can lead to putting the protection of Union citizens in the back seat. Whereas 
this would be politically highly controversial in a national setting, the salience of this issue 
appears not to have surfaced at the Union level. 
In view of these observations, it can be concluded that there is a widening gap 
between the powerful notion of Union citizenship within the Union and its present 
weakness outside of it. Internally, the development of Union law makes it increasingly 
difficult to construe nationals from different Member States as proper ‘foreigners’. The 
phrase civis europaeus sum carries weight in foro interno. Externally, we see that the cives europaei 
might receive consular assistance in case, for instance, they get jailed, are hospitalized or 
lose their passport. However, in the face of pirate attacks in the troubled waters off the 
Somali coast, civis europaeus sum remains thus far a call that falls on deaf ears. 
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Abstract 
 
The wide range of disasters that has recently hit third countries has shown that not 
even the Member States with the widest network of consular and diplomatic representation 
can ensure on their own the protection of their nationals located in the affected areas. The 
present paper addresses the question of whether the EU citizenship confers to the citizens 
of the Member States real benefits when they find themselves in distress outside of the 
Union’s borders. It critically assesses the legal nature, content and effects in the domestic 
legal orders of the least developed right recognised to the EU citizen: the right to 
protection abroad (Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU). The paper will demonstrate that the EU citizen 
has a clear, individual and directly effective right to receive non-discriminatory protection 
in third countries abroad from any of the Member States that is represented in loco. 
Nevertheless, since for the moment, the right to protection abroad is limited to an 
application of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, the paper will show 
that in practice, the effectiveness of the EU citizen’s right to protection abroad is hindered 
by the divergent regulatory frameworks of the Member States on consular and diplomatic 
protection of nationals, frameworks which have not, so far, been harmonised by a EU 
measure. The paper concludes by describing the new roles acquired by the Union after the 
Lisbon Treaty in the field of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens abroad and 
how this change influences the role of the Member States in a traditional State-like activity. 
 
Key-words:  
EU law – public international law – Lisbon Treaty – consular and diplomatic 
protection – EU citizenship – EEAS  
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‘There are fifty-four cities on the island, all spacious and magnificent, identical in language, customs, 
institutions, and laws.’ 
Sir Thomas More, Utopia (1516) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent and devastating natural and man-made disasters which so far have 
affected all the regions of the world, from countries of North Africa to the Persian Gulf 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Barhein) and JapanI, have brought back to public attention the 
issue of aid that a EU citizen who is in difficulties in a country outside the EU can expect 
to receive when his home Member State is not represented in that non-EU country. 
In these situations of emergency and extreme difficulty, any Union citizen who 
finds himself unrepresentedII by his home Member State in a third country would 
obviously like to know whether his ‘additional’III and ‘fundamental’IV status of EU citizen 
may give him any additional benefits to those flowing from national citizenship while 
outside of the Union’s borders. Or do the rights and freedoms resulting from the EU 
citizenship stop at the borders of the Union’s internal market?  
For instance, when Haiti was hit by a tsunami in 2010, less than half of the Member 
States had a consular or diplomatic mission in loco to which their nationals could resort to 
for help. When the democratic revolution shook Libya in the spring of 2011, only 8 
Member States were represented, while a total of 6000 EU citizens were in need of 
protection.V The aforementioned crises are not isolated events, but they are part of a 
phenomenon which has developed in the last decade. More and more EU citizens travel 
outside of the Union,VI while increasingly, certain of them establish themselves in third 
countries and thus need protection abroad on a regular basis.VII While the number of EU 
citizens in need of protection abroad increases, the number of consular and diplomatic 
representations of the Member States decreases, mainly due to the financial crises that have 
recently affected each of them.VIII The result is that a number, higher that even before, of 
EU citizens cannot obtain protection in third countries from their home Member States. 
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In light of the fact that more and more EU citizens find themselves without 
protection from their home Member State, the questions that this paper seeks to answer 
are: firstly, whether the nationals of the unrepresented Member States have a right to 
protection while in third countries under the EU law, and secondly, from whom should 
they ask for this kind of help. Should the EU’s delegations be responsible for the EU 
citizens abroadIX, or should the latter turn to the consular or diplomatic representations of 
the other Member States that are represented in third countries, because the European 
Union as an international organisation is not entitled under public international law to 
exercise a State reserved competence such as consular and diplomatic protection of 
nationals?X 
The paradox is that even if the Union's citizens travel now more frequent outside 
of the Union, they are not more aware of the rights the foundational Treaties of the EU 
confer them while located in third countries. From the very beginning of the concept of 
EU citizenship, the citizens have been endowed with a Treaty based right which reads as 
follows  
‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the 
nationals of that State’.XI 
Notwithstanding, 2006 and 2008 Eurobarometer surveysXII revealed that the 
majority of EU citizens do not know they have this right, and, even if they know of its 
existence, they do not know what exactly are they entitled to receive under this right.XIII 
When the EU citizens were asked what kind of assistance would they expect to receive 
from the Member State they turn to for help, the majority of them responded that they 
expect to receive the same kind of help, regardless of which of the Member States they 
approach (Flash Eurobarometer no. 294 'EU citizenship' of March 2010). 
This paper will show (section two) that, for the moment, despite the wish of the 
majority of EU citizens, EU law does not confer them a right to uniform protection 
abroad, because the Treaty provides for a mere prohibition of discrimination based on 
nationality, and does not require the Member States to harmonise their national laws on 
consular and diplomatic protection of nationals. Section two will discuss the exact rights a 
EU citizen can claim under the Treaty based right of protection by the consular and 
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diplomatic authorities of the Member States while outside of the Union's borders and 
assesses the legal effects of these rights within the Member States’ domestic legal orders.  
After looking at the material scope of the EU citizen’s right to protection in third 
countries, the paper continues by addressing the question of the actors competent to 
ensure the EU's model of consular and diplomatic protection of the EU citizens. Under 
public international law, the question has long received a clear answer (Vattel, 1758; 
Amerasingh, 2008), which has remained mostly un-changedXIV for the last decades - it is 
only the State of nationality that has competence to exercise consular and diplomatic 
protection of its own nationals.XV However, under EU law, the State of nationality is no 
longer the sole actor entitled to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of its own 
citizens. First, the Maastricht Treaty entitled other Member States than the Member State 
of nationality to exercise consular and diplomatic protection for the EU citizens, and, now, 
the Lisbon Treaty has expressly conferred a role for the European Union, an international 
organisation, in the exercise of protection abroad of the EU citizens.XVI Section three of 
this paper assesses the way in which the Lisbon Treaty has changed the exercise of 
consular and diplomatic protection of the Union's citizens in third countries and the 
division of roles between the EU and the Member States in this field. 
 
2. The rights of  the EU citizen in distress in third countries under the 
EU law framework 
 
18 years have passed since the Maastricht Treaty conferred on the EU citizen a 
right to protection in third countries when he is not represented in loco by his home 
Member State. Despite the long existence of this right and the fact that its material scope 
has remained unchanged by the several Treaty amendments,XVII EU citizens have still 
barely exercised this right.XVIII A recent analysis of Art. 23(1) TFEU identified as the main 
cause for the low level of claims by the EU citizens the different standards of protection 
abroad of nationals existing between the Member States (Faro & Moraru, 2011). It will be 
shown in the following paragraphs that the EU Treaties have provided for a mere 
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality, which does not necessarily require 
harmonisation of the national practice and legislation.XIX Thus, the EU legal framework is 
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made up of 27 different forms of protection abroad of the EU citizens by their home 
Member States. 
In light of the discrepant national regulatory frameworks on consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens,XX it is no surprise that the EU citizen is not aware or is 
confused about the rights he enjoys while he is in distress in third countries. Ironically, 
even if the Union's citizen is aware of what the EU law confers on him, this paper argues 
that the effectiveness of the right is hindered because of the following elements: 1) the fact 
that the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality provided in Art. 23(1) TFEU 
has a very limited standardization force, thus leaving the content of the EU citizen’s right 
to protection abroad at the level of only the minimum denominator of what the Member 
States confer on their own nationals; since there is a large discrepancy between the 
domestic standards of protection abroad of nationals, the content of the EU right to 
protection abroad is close to nothing; 2) absence of domestic legal remedies available to the 
EU citizens in certain of the national judicatures against acts or refusal to provide consular 
and diplomatic protection; and 3) currently, limited legal remedies existing at the Union 
level.XXI 
In light of the problems raised above, this paper plans to shed light on the material 
scope of the EU Treaties’ Articles, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, on consular and 
diplomatic protection of the EU citizens abroad. The paper will argue that the still 
persistent confusion surrounding the area is the inevitable result of accommodating 
divergent domestic frameworks on consular and diplomatic protection of nationals under 
the EU law umbrella: ranging from matter reserved to the executive’s control to a 
fundamental right to protection abroad of the national enshrined in the Constitution. In 
light of the numerous and wide discrepancies existent between the national frameworks on 
conferral of protection abroad on nationalsXXII, the confusion surrounding the material and 
personal scope of the EU citizen’s right to protection abroad will decrease only if the 
national practices are harmonised.XXIII  
The paper will seek to identify the material scope of the EU citizen’s right to 
protection while outside the Union’s borders by analysing: 1) the legal status of the EU 
citizen’s protection in the world;  2) whether Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU confers a right or only a 
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality; 3) whether the equal treatment principle 
is applicable only to consular protection requests or also to diplomatic protection requests 
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of  EU citizens; and finally whether the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic 
protection is directly effective within the domestic legal orders.   
 
2.1. The legal status of  the EU citizen’s protection abroad by the 
consular and diplomatic officials of  the Member States - right or 
entitlement to legitimate expectations? 
 
The legal status of the EU citizen’s protection in third countries – whether a right 
or entitlement – is not entirely clearXXIV for either academicsXXV or practitioners, be they 
from the Member States,XXVI or from the EU's Institutions.XXVII 
The difference between ‘right’ and ‘entitlement to legitimate expectation’ as legal 
status of the protection the EU citizen can enjoy in third countries is of utmost importance 
for what the citizens can claim in practice. The doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ applies 
to areas perceived as matters reserved to the executive power, where the later enjoys 
discretionary powers to define the content of the policy. If the protection of the EU citizen 
in the world is considered an entitlement to legitimate expectations, then the EU citizen 
will be entitled only to having his claim properly taken into account by the administrative 
power while the latter considers his individual case.XXVIII The EU citizen will not have a 
right to receive, in practice, consular assistance. On the other hand, if the protection of the 
EU citizen in third countries is interpreted as a ‘right’, then the margin of discretion left to 
the State is significantly limited, as the citizen has the right, and the State a corresponding 
obligation to provide consular protection. In short, the difference between ‘right’ and 
‘legitimate expectations’ is to be found in the starting premise of the citizen’s claim. While 
in the case of legitimate expectations, the premise is that the citizen is not entitled to 
receive consular protection, and it is the citizen who bears the burden of proving 
otherwise, in the case of a ‘right’, the premise is that the citizen is entitled to receive 
consular protection, and the burden of proving otherwise is with the administrative 
authorities.  
Let us now turn to the wording of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU in order to establish whether 
EU law provides or not for an individual right of the EU citizen to protection abroad by 
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the represented Member States, or only an entitlement to legitimate expectations to receive 
this kind of protection, as argued by certain of the Member States.XXIX 
Under the EC Treaty framework, the unclear wording of the provision on 
protection of the EU citizens in third countries has left room for interpretation. For 
instance, the following could be seen as arguments in favour of the entitlement argument: 
1) the use of the expression ‘shall be entitled to’ in Art. 20 EC Treaty, instead of ‘shall have 
the right to’ which was the expression used for all other rights of the EU citizens provided in 
Part two on citizenship; 2) the fact that Art. 17(2) EC Treaty, even if providing in 
mandatory terms that the EU citizens ‘shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty’, did 
not include a list of these rights; 3) the fact that Art. 46 of the EU Charter, which has the 
same wording as Art. 20 EC Treaty, even if clearly entitled ‘right to consular and diplomatic 
protection’ thus indicating that Art. 20 EC Treaty established a right for the EU citizens, and 
not an entitlement, was not legally bindingXXX, thus did not have the legal force necessary to 
clarify the contention ‘right’ v ‘entitlement’ of the protection abroad of EU citizens.  
Pre-Lisbon, the EU law framework on consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens 
was drafted in ambiguous terms subject to opposing interpretation, with an obligation for 
the Member States more clearly identifiable in soft law documents (Guidelines on 
Protection of EU citizens of 2006) and international agreements (Preamble, Art.2 of 
Decision 95/553/EC) than in the founding Treaties.  
One of the innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty clarifying what are the exact 
rights of the EU citizens under EU law is the re-structuring of former Art. 17 of the EC 
Treaty in the form of a non-exhaustive list of rights clearly stated as being the rights of the 
EU citizens. Instead of having the rights spread out in different Articles, as it was under the 
EC Treaty, Art. 20 TFEU starts by putting forward the list of rights that the citizens enjoy: 
 
‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for 
in the Treaties. They shall have […] the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in 
which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of 
the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the 
nationals of that State.’ (emphases added) 
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It should be noted that current Art. 20 TFEU does not use the word ‘entitlement’ 
in relation to the protection abroad of EU citizens, nor does it make a distinction between 
the protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States in third 
countries and the other EU citizen’s rights. Consequently the FEU Treaty clarifies the 
previous debate on whether the EU citizen has or has not a right to protection while in 
third countries. This conclusion is supported also by the now legally binding EU Charter 
on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Art. 46 of the EU Charter is entitled ‘the right to 
consular and diplomatic protection’ and is part of the EU primary law (Art. 6 TEU) that binds 
the Member States in their conduct towards the Union's citizens. Since there is no legal 
hierarchy between the EU Charter and the EU Treaties, and the wording of Art. 46 of the 
EU Charter is identical with the wording of Art. 23 (1) TFEU, then, by way of 
consequence, the headline of Art. 46 – right to consular and diplomatic protection – indicates that 
Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU enshrines an individual right to consular and diplomatic protection 
conferred upon the unrepresented EU citizen.XXXI 
 
2.2. Legal content of  the right to consular and diplomatic protection – 
is it something more than the principle of  equal treatment based on 
nationality? 
 
It was mentioned in the introduction that according to a recent survey, the majority 
of the EU citizens expect to receive the same kind of help they will be given by their 
Member State of origin from the consular and diplomatic representations of any of the 
other Member States under Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU (Eurobarometer no.294, 2010). For the 
moment it is rather a utopian desire than the reality. Such a common framework for the 
exercise of consular protection for the benefit of the EU citizens presupposes either the 
existence of a Union law that establishes this binding common framework which, with the 
help of the EU Courts, will be applied and interpreted uniformly across the Union's 
territory, or that the 27 national legal frameworks on the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of nationals are almost identical. Unfortunately, neither of these 
scenarios applies. 
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At the moment of writing, the EU law framework governing the topic of 
protection abroad of EU citizens does not establish a common set of rights and procedures 
for the consular and diplomatic protection of the unrepresented Union citizens. The 
relevant EU law is made of first, general provisions found in Union primary law (the 
founding TreatiesXXXII and the EU Charter), secondly, of two international agreements 
implementing former Art. 20 EC Treaty, which substantially restrict the EU primary law 
scope (two Decisions of the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the 
CouncilXXXIII), though without harmonising the relevant national legislation and practice, 
and lastly, of an impressive range of soft law: Council Conclusions and GuidelinesXXXIV, 
and numerous papers issued by the Commission.XXXV There is no space here to engage in a 
detailed discussion of these provisions and reasons of the existent EU legal 
frameworkXXXVI, suffice it to say, at this point, that these measures do not establish, either 
separately or in combination, a uniform framework for the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of EU citizens in the world, but they rather preserve the existing 
different national standards of protection of EU citizens. 
As to the scenario that the 27 Member States might have a similar regulatory 
framework on consular and diplomatic protection of nationals, it has been pointed out at 
the beginning of this section that there are extensive discrepancies between the Member 
States’ national law and practice on protection abroad of nationals. The divergence 
between the domestic frameworks is, in fact, a natural result of the different national 
foreign policy interests, historical ties developed by each of the Member States with 
different regions of the world, different ambitions and seize of population. Thus it would 
have been almost impossible to develop a shared model of consular protection of 
nationals. The resistance of the Member States to the adoption of a common harmonised 
EU model of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens results from their 
understanding of consular and diplomatic protection of their nationals as one of the 
ultimate attributes of a sovereign State. The loss of the State’s discretionary power to 
contour the model of protection abroad of nationals is thus equated with loss of an 
important part of the State’s sovereignty. In light of the Member States’ approach to 
consular and diplomatic protection of nationals as a traditionally reserved State activity, the 
EU design of protection abroad of the EU citizens as a right uniformly exercised 
irrespective of the requested Member States is for the near future a merely utopian aim.  
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Having established what Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU does not confer to the EU citizens, we 
now turn to the question of what the provision does confer on the Union's citizens in 
distress abroad.  
The wording of the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection abroad 
has remained almost the same from its very first inception as Art. 8c of the Maastricht 
Treaty until now: 
 
‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member 
State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the 
nationals of that State.’XXXVII  
 
From the use of the ‘on the same conditions’ expression, we can legitimately 
conclude that the Article provides for the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality in the specific field of consular and diplomatic protection of EU 
citizens in the world. Certain academics (Condinanzi et al., 2009) argued that the right to 
consular and diplomatic protection as framed by the founding Treaty is not innovative as 
to its content, since it is a mere reiteration of the explicit general EU law principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality laid down in Art. 18 TFEU (former Art. 12 EC 
Treaty)applying it to the specific situation of protection of the EU citizens abroad. 
Interestingly, it has to be noted that at the moment of introducing the concept of EU 
citizenship, the scope of other citizenship rights of EU citizens was also interpreted as 
mainly an application of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, even 
though this was still seen as a major step in the European integration process (Duff, 2009).  
In the meantime, the scope of the EU citizen’s rights, especially of the freedom to 
reside and move, has been developed by the Court so as to include also mere prohibition 
of serious inconvenience without actual discrimination based on nationality.XXXVIII 
A similar evolution can be identified, though to a lesser degree, in regard to another 
EU citizenship right which shares similarities with the right to consular and diplomatic 
protection, since it is framed in the language of equal treatment, and applies also in the 
sensitive area of high politics of the Member States: the right to vote for the European 
Parliament elections enshrined in Art. 22 TFEU.XXXIX Despite the explicit equal treatment 
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wording and the high sensitiveness of the ‘political rights’ field, the Court of Justice in the 
Aruba caseXL held that EU citizens have a right to vote for the European Parliament’s 
elections as ‘a normal incident of Union citizenship’ (Shaw, 2008). 
We can thus notice a trend in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) whereby certain rights of the EU citizens as recognised by Art. 20 TFEU have 
developed a scope going beyond the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality.XLI The question is: can we identify a similar jurisprudential thread also 
in regard to the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection? In other words, 
has the Union citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection developed into 
something more than the principle of non-discrimination, so that the EU citizen enjoys 
wider protection abroad than equal treatment solely based on the fundamental status of 
Union citizenship, as happened for example in regard to the right to reside and move? 
For the moment, a similar jurisprudential evolution cannot be traced in regard to 
the right to consular and diplomatic protection, simply because the EU Courts have not so 
far specifically dealt with the EU citizens’ right to protection abroad.XLII The majority of 
the national case law that has reached the EU Courts does not concern the right to 
consular protection, but other consular affairs matters, such as: issuing of visas,XLIII 
financial obligations arisen for the Member States as a result of signing a memorandum of 
understanding between the Commission and the Member States on setting up a common 
diplomatic mission in Abuja (Nigeria),XLIV establishing a hierarchy between the methods of 
sending judicial documents by post or by consular or diplomatic agents under Union 
law,XLV and the duty of diplomatic protection of the Union in regard to vessels (not 
individuals) of the Member States.XLVI 
The fact that for the moment the legal content of the EU citizen’s right to consular 
and diplomatic protection is an expression of the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality does not mean that Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU in its initial form as Art. 8c of the 
Maastricht Treaty was not innovative, that the right will remain indefinitely at the level of 
the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality; or that the Member States can 
deny the right to consular protection to un-represented EU citizens simply because they do 
not confer a right to consular protection to their own citizens either. It what follows I will 
explain each of these foregoing conclusions. 
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If the founding Treaties had not provided for the right to consular and diplomatic 
protection, the mere existence of the general principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality laid down at the start of the citizenship part of the TreatyXLVII would not have 
been of much help to the EU citizens located outside of the Union's borders. The general 
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality applies, as Art. 18 TFEU (former Art. 
12 EC Treaty) clearly says, within the scope of EU law. It is already settled norm that the 
general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, and more generally the entire 
category of general principles of EU law do not operate in a self-standing fashion or in the 
abstract.XLVIII The Member States are bound to respect the general principles only when 
they act within the scope of EU lawXLIX. The concept of ‘scope of EU law’ is an 
autonomous concept whose substance has been increasingly expanded based on the EU’s 
Institutions exercise of powers and expansive interpretation of EU law by the CJEU. 
Currently, ‘the scope of EU law’ in relation to the Member States actions includes in 
general three main situations: 1) when Member States implement EU law;L 2) Member 
States derogating, when permitted, from EU law;LI 3) when Member States adopt measures 
touching upon a matter which has already been the subject of a specific substantive rule of 
EU law.LII 
Pre-Lisbon, the protection abroad of EU citizens was stipulated by only two Treaty 
articles: the substantive norm - Art. 20 EC Treaty enshrined the right to protection abroad 
ensured by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States; and  the 
procedural norm – Art. 20 EU Treaty which was a specific application of the principle of 
sincere cooperation between the Member States and EU Institutions in this field. In the 
absence of these Treaty provisions, or express Treaty objective of protection abroad of the 
EU citizens by the Member States which could justify the use of the flexibility clause in this 
area, the scope of EU law as described in the foregoing general situations could not have 
included the area of protection abroad of EU citizens. Consequently, the Member States’ 
actions on consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens would not be covered by the 
scope of EU law and thus the general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality 
will not be applicable to the Member States’ actions in the field of protection abroad of EU 
citizens.  
The innovative element brought by inserting Art. 8c in the EC Treaty sits thus in 
‘creating’ the scope of EU law, in the absence of which the individuals would not have 
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benefited of the application of the general principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality.LIII  
The right to consular and diplomatic protection of the Union’s citizens has so far 
remained underdeveloped in comparison with the other EU citizenship rights and has not 
been the subject of the EU Courts’ jurisprudence. However, the legal content of the Union 
citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection does not necessarily have to remain at 
its current status of a simple expression of the equal treatment principle. The Council, 
depending of the content of the future directives it may adopt,LIV and the EU Courts, 
which may apply their purposive interpretationLV to Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU and to 
the future Council Directives, may lead the way to an evolution of the EU citizen’s right to 
protection abroad similar to that recently experienced by other EU citizenship rights (e.g. 
freedom to move and reside and the right to vote for the European Parliament). 
The current understanding of the right to consular and diplomatic protection as a 
manifestation of the equal treatment principle does not though justify a rejection of 
consular protection by a Member State simply on the basis that it does not confer such 
assistance to its nationals under its national law.LVI Consular and diplomatic protection in 
third countries is a fundamental right of the EU’s citizens (Art. 46 part of Title V - 
Citizen’s rights of the EU Charter.), rejection of this right by the Member States is justified 
only if the conditions provided by Art. 52 of the EU Charter are observed.LVII An outright 
denial of protection by one of the Member States will empty the fundamental right of the 
EU citizen of any meaningful effect, thus raising serious concerns about the respect of the 
essence and proportionality requirement under Art. 52 EU Charter. Consequently, even if 
the founding Treaties frame the right to protection abroad as a principle of equal 
treatment, Art. 46 in conjunction with Art. 52 EU Charter do not legitimise the conduct of 
Member States that question whether to respond or not to EU citizens’ requests for 
protection while in third countries, such a questioning which is tantamount to an outright 
denial of the fundamental right to consular and diplomatic protection. 
Let us now look at how the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality 
might work in the specific situation of evacuating the EU citizens from crisis situations, 
which recently have greatly challenged both the Union and the Member States.LVIII Art. 
23(1) TFEU does not require a different conduct from the Member States in cases of crises 
than in day-to-day situations. In both circumstances, only the EU citizens that do not have 
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an accessible consular or diplomatic representation of their Member State are entitled to 
receive protection from another Member State. In crises, however, the Member States have 
not followed such a strict approach, but they aimed to ensure the evacuation of all EU 
citizens, being guided by the motto of ‘no citizen will be left behind’, irrespective of 
whether they were or not represented in the third country hit by crises.LIX Despite their 
good intentions, the Member States operated on the basis of an ad-hoc type of cooperation, 
and not on a pre-established contingency plan.LX This practice has to be reconsidered in 
light of the EU general principles and Treaty rights, so as to eliminate arbitrariness from 
the application of the fundamental right to protection abroad of the EU citizens. In 
addition to the respect of the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection, the 
Member States will have to think how to ensure the respect of the EU citizen’s right to 
family life when planning the evacuation of the third country nationals who are family 
members of the EU citizen. Even if the right to consular and diplomatic protection is only 
a right of the Union's citizen not extended to non-EU family members, the inclusion of the 
right to family life in Art. 7 of the EU Charter, and the future accession of the EU to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 8 ECHR being of specific concern in these 
circumstances) require the Member States to take all steps possible to ensure that in 
emergency evacuation, the non-EU family members will not be separated from EU 
citizens.LXI  
 
2.3. Does diplomatic protection fall under the scope of  the EU citizen’s 
right to protection abroad? 
 
In the previous section it was shown that the content of the EU citizen’s right 
enshrined in Art. 20 (2)(c) TFEU is the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality. In this section it will be shown that the issue whether the Article confers 
independent rights beyond the equal treatment right is not the only unclear aspect of the 
legal content of this right. The harshest critique visited by both academics (Stein, 2002; 
Vermeer-Künzli, 2006; Vigni, 2011; Closa, 1995) and Member StatesLXII on the FEU Treaty 
provisions on protection abroad of the EU citizen concerns the lack of clarity of the 
material scope of this right. In other words, it is argued that the founding Treaties do not 
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clarify what type of protection the individuals are entitled to request in third countries - 
consular or/and diplomatic protection-, and what is the exact scope of each of these 
mechanisms. It has been pointed out that Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU does not use the settled 
public international law concepts of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic protection’, but a 
new concept which is not an established legal concept under the public international law 
norms – ‘protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States’ and 
consequently should not be understood as encompassing the consular and diplomatic 
protection mechanisms existing under public international law (Vigni, 2011). Once again it 
seems that the EU legal order establishes its own autonomous legal concept, similar to 
concepts already existing under public international law, but unclear in their precise 
meaning.LXIII The present section will tackle the question whether, under the EU model of 
protection of the EU citizens abroad, the latter are entitled to receive both consular and 
diplomatic protection or only one of them, and whether these types of protection should 
be understood as having the same meaning as those already existing under public 
international law.  
A brief retrospective of the Maastricht inter-governmental debate on the citizenship 
provisions might help to understand the wish of the Member States. At the time of drafting 
the Maastricht Treaty, Spain made a proposal for an Article on the protection of the 
unrepresented EU citizens while outside of the Union. The article was drafted in clear 
terms, expressly providing for ‘consular and diplomatic assistance and protection’LXIV of the 
citizens of the European Union from any of the Member States.LXV However, not all of the 
Member States agreed with Spain’s proposal to refer precisely to consular and diplomatic 
protection of unrepresented EU citizens. The compromise they managed to reach was a 
broader concept which permits both interpretations – with/without diplomatic protection. 
This kind of ‘enigmatic’ legislative drafting is followed by the Member States when they do 
not agree on the exact scope of a future Treaty provision. The result is that they leave it 
framed in broad terms that can be subject to different interpretation, which, depending on 
the evolution of the Member States’ view of the topic, can be interpreted in different ways 
leading to different legal consequences.LXVI The Member States maintained this ambiguous 
attitude during the elaboration of the Decision 95/553/EC on the implementation of the 
EU citizen’s right to protection abroad. Several delegations of the Member States opposed 
Arts. 11-18 of the original draft of the ad-hoc group which expressly referred to diplomatic 
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protection (Stein, 2002). Since the aforementioned Decision is an international agreement 
which could have been adopted only by unanimous consent, those Articles and 
consequently diplomatic protection did not made their way into the final Decision. The 
Member States decided instead to focus on the mechanism that was the most requested by 
the EU citizens and at the same raised less problematic legal questions – consular 
protection.LXVII 
In the previous paragraphs we attempted to find out what rights precisely the 
Member States intended to confer on EU citizens in the relevant texts and concluded that 
their conduct during the Treaty negotiations and during the elaboration of the EC Decision 
strongly suggested indecision and divided opinions. However, so far we have looked only 
at the English official version of the Treaties. In Polish, Finish or Czech, the texts read 
differently for Art. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU, since the official versions of these Articles in 
the aforementioned languages use the clear concept of consular and diplomatic protection. 
In case of different language versions of a text of EU law, the ECJ has decided that 
uniform interpretation must be given to the text and hence, ‘in the case of divergence 
between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference 
to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part.’LXVIII In our case, the 
purpose of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU has to be seen in light of the newly introduced Union 
objective of ‘protection of the Union citizens in the world’ (Art. 3(5) TEU). The objective 
seems to refer to a general protection of the Union’s citizens in third countries, without 
distinction or limitations. In the same way, neither Art. 20(2)(c), nor Art. 23(2) TFEU make 
a distinction or exclude diplomatic protection from their scope, even if the Member States 
had multiple occasions during several Treaty amendments to introduce such a limitation. 
This interpretation whereby diplomatic protection is included in the content of the EU 
citizen’s right to protection abroad seems to be supported also by Art. 46 EU Charter, 
which is now part of the EU primary law. As previously mentioned, the wording of Art. 46 
EU Charter is identical with Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU, while Art. 46 EU Charter is 
conclusively entitled ‘right to consular and diplomatic protection’. It can be argued that the 
EU Courts may sustain a similar interpretation of the scope of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU, since in 
cases concerning EU citizenship rights, or fundamental human rights, the Court has usually 
had in mind the effectiveness of these rights, sometimes even to the detriment of the 
Member States’ interests.LXIX  
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
84 
In AyadiLXX and HassanLXXI, the General Court of the EU has recognised an 
obligation on the part of the Member States to exercise diplomatic protection for foreign 
citizens who reside within the Union's territory. If the Court was willing to go as far as 
recognising an obligation for the Member States in regard to third country nationals, it can 
be argued that, it will also do so for the benefit of the EU citizens.  
Despite the temptation to make an analogy between the obligation to provide 
diplomatic protection established in the foregoing cases for the benefit of non-EU citizens 
and the right of the EU citizen to diplomatic protection, we have to recall that the 
foregoing judgments were decided in a specific contextLXXII which weighed heavily in the 
Courts’ decision-making process. These specific and limited circumstances do not suffice 
to make a general statement that the Court will regard diplomatic protection as part of the 
Union citizen’s right to protection abroad. Nevertheless, they may play an influencing role 
on the Court in its decision whether to stick to a limited interpretation of the material 
scope of protection abroad of the EU citizen or decide to make history in the public 
international law field by recognising a right to diplomatic protection to the individual from 
a non-nationality Member State.  
So far we looked at the EU law framework to find out whether the right to 
protection abroad of the Union’s citizens can be interpreted as encompassing also 
diplomatic protection. It has been pointed out that EU law favours such an interpretation. 
However, public international law academics (Dugard, 2006; Vermeer-Künzli, 2006) have 
argued that the EU model of protection abroad cannot be interpreted as encompassing 
diplomatic protection since such an interpretation is unlawful under public international 
law norms for the following reasons: firstly, the nationality condition required under public 
international law is not fulfilled, and secondly, the previous consent of third countries to 
the EU model has not been obtained.LXXIII  
This paper argues that even if the general norm under public international law is 
still one that permits only the State of nationality to exercise diplomatic protection for its 
own nationals, there are recent developments which indicate a shift from this traditional 
approach. Draft Art. 8 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, whereby 
refugees and stateless persons lawfully resident in a country can receive also diplomatic 
protection, signals that the traditional understanding of the nationality as a ius sanguinis or 
ius soli is no longer the sole type of link which can legitimize the exercise of diplomatic 
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protection for an individual. It seems that the ILC suggests that there can be a genuine link 
between an individual and the State on a basis other than that of nationality, as long as the 
relation between the individual and the State is solid. The issue of whether currently there 
is such a solid link between the Union’s citizens and all other Member States as to justify 
the EU model of protection abroad of the Union's citizens is a complex one. Due to 
limited space, it cannot be discussed here.LXXIV  
The main argument of this paper in favor of the legitimacy of the EU model of 
consular and diplomatic protection of the EU citizens is not based on the ‘solid link’ 
argument, but on the fact that the ILC Draft Articles on diplomatic protection establish 
minimum standards under public international law which permit the States to go beyond 
these rules as long as they respect the condition of obtaining the express and unanimous 
consent of all the States involved in the new model (i.e. the State of nationality, the State 
exercising the protection and the receiving third country).LXXV Consequently, from a public 
international law perspective, the problem of the EU model consists not in the fact that 
public international law generally excludes diplomatic protection of the kind envisaged by 
the EU law, as exceptions are possible, but rather whether there is, on the one hand, an 
express unanimous consent of the Member States for the EU model to include diplomatic 
protection, and on the other hand, whether there is the consent of the third countries for 
the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection by non-nationality Member States.  
In regard to the unanimous consent of the Member States, it was pointed out above 
that the Member States have divided opinions on the issue of the legal content of the right, 
and for the moment it cannot be said that they have a unanimous view on whether to 
include or not the diplomatic protection within the scope of the EU citizen’s right to 
protection abroad.LXXVI As to the consent of the third countries in regard to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection by a non-nationality Member States, according to Art. 6 of the 
VCDR there is no need of express consent for the exercise of diplomatic protection, it can 
be inferred also from the absence of opposition by third countries, although, in case of 
absence of a signed agreement, third countries can, at any moment and without any 
explanation, change their previous position and object to this exercise of diplomatic 
protection. In spite of the express Treaty obligation of the Member States to start 
international negotiations with third countriesLXXVII so as to ensure the consent of the latter 
to the EU model of exercise of protection abroad of citizens, the majority of the EU 
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countries have never started such formal negotiations, with only two exceptions.LXXVIII It 
can be argued that so far the lack of opposition from third countries to the exercise of 
diplomatic and consular protection of EU citizens by non-nationality Member States 
signals recognition of the EU citizen’s right as encompassing both consular and diplomatic 
protection. However, the absence of a written binding agreement substantiating the 
consent of non-EU countries to the EU model of protection abroad of EU citizens which 
is atypical from the model of protection abroad of nationals traditionally accepted under 
public international law is prone to question the acceptance by non-EU countries of the 
EU citizen’s right to diplomatic protection and thus also endanger the effectiveness of the 
right.  
One might question why the public international law perspective is relevant, since 
the EU is an autonomous legal order with an established practice of autonomous legal 
concepts whose questionable legitimacy under the public international law norms has not 
impeded their application under the EU legal order.LXXIX The present topic, diplomatic 
protection of unrepresented EU citizens in third countries, is a mechanism that does not 
operate within the EU territory, as the previous EU autonomous concepts, but entirely 
outside the Union’s borders. Consequently, the pact between the EU countries is a res inter 
alios acta for the third countries, which enjoy sovereign powers on whether to prohibit or 
not a procedure carried out entirely within their sovereign territory. In future, if diplomatic 
protection will be recognized under the EU law framework for the benefit of the Union's 
citizens, the formal consent of third countries has to be ensured so as to prevent the 
prospect of discretionary rejection. 
 
2.4. Questioning the direct effect of  the EU citizen’s right to protection 
abroad 
 
In light of the different positions currently taken by the Member States on whether 
the EU citizen has or not a right to protection abroad and on the material scope of this 
right, it is highly possible that situations where the EU citizens will be refused assistance 
will arise in the future. The question that this section plans to assess is whether the EU 
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citizen can invoke his Treaty based right before the national courts in order to find redress 
against such refusals.  
It is settled case law of the EU courts that rights derived from the EU law may be 
invoked directly before the national courts if they satisfy the conditions of clear, precise 
and unconditional wording.LXXX As Bruno de Witte notes, the Court has, over time, 
changed its strict Van Gend en Loos understanding of these conditions so that currently the 
direct effect test boils down to one single condition: ‘is the norm sufficiently operational in 
itself to be applied by a court?’LXXXI 
The main arguments raised by academics (Closa, 1995; Kadelbach, 2003; 
Puissochet, 2003) against the direct effect of the right to consular and diplomatic 
protection are first that the right is not clear in what it confers on the EU citizens (see the 
above mentioned debate on whether diplomatic protection is or not included),LXXXII second 
that the right needs further implementing measures to be adopted by the Member States in 
order to be effective according to the requirement laid down in Art. 23(1) TFEU, and 
third, that the exercise of the right by the Member States depends upon the consent of the 
receiving third country which, for the moment, none of the Member States, with few 
exceptions, has formally acquired.LXXXIII We will continue by addressing in turn each of 
these three critiques. 
Concerning the questioned clarity of the EU citizen’s right to protection abroad, it 
was previously shown that, for the moment, the right is at a status of a specific application 
of prohibition of discrimination based on nationality in the field of consular and diplomatic 
protection of the unrepresented EU citizens. It should be noted that in Reyners,LXXXIV the 
CJEU recognised direct effect to former Art. 52 EEC Treaty on freedom of establishment 
based on the interpretation of this Article as a prohibition of discrimination (Craig, 1992). 
Nowadays it can be argued with certainty that the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality enjoys direct effect.LXXXV 
As to the contention that the right is not unconditional since it requires the 
Member States to adopt implementing measures, it has to be noticed that the Lisbon 
Treaty brought a change in the wording of Art. 23(1) TFEU. Former Art. 20 EC Treaty 
stipulated that ‘the Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves […] required 
to secure this protection.’ while current Art. 23(1) TFEU reads as follows: ‘The Member 
States shall adopt the necessary provisions […] required to secure this protection.’ (emphases 
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added) Art. 23 TFEU continues in paragraph two with an express conferral of legislative 
competence to the Council which can act in the field of consular and diplomatic protection 
of the EU citizens by way of adopting directives. There are two important changes in the 
wording of the right: first is the replacement of ‘establish rules’ with ‘adopt provisions’ and 
second, the word which might have indicated the purely inter-governmental character of 
the field, ‘among themselves’, was eliminated. As noted by another author (Saliceti, 2011), 
the change of wording may indicate that the measures under reference are those that the 
Member States have to adopt so as to implement the Council directives, since the 
expression ‘adopt provisions’ is commonly used in the field of implementation of directives 
by the Member States.LXXXVI On the other hand, the previous expression ‘establish rules’ 
conveyed the idea of new norms to be adopted for the purpose of detailing the content of 
the Union citizen’s right. Whether this is or not the intention of the Member States, the 
CJEU has constantly ruled that the need for further implementing measures to be adopted 
by the Member States is not per se capable of denying direct effect to a Treaty based 
provision. There are numerous examples pointing in this direction, most of them to be 
found in the field of fundamental freedoms,LXXXVII however the most relevant example for 
the present topic is the EU citizen’s right to reside and move which the Court has 
recognised as directly effectiveLXXXVIII, despite the conditional language of the Treaty 
provision.  
Former Art. 18(1) EC Treaty was firstly conditioned by limits which the Member 
States could impose and secondly by measures which the Member States themselves could 
adopt ‘to give effect to the right’. The latter condition is similar to the one enshrined in Art. 
23(1) TFEU. Contrary to the Member States, the Court of Justice of the EU, in the 
Baumbast judgment, held that the need of further implementing measures by the Member 
States does not prejudice the direct effect character of the right to reside and move, as the 
margin of discretion left to the Member States is subject to strict judicial review by the 
national and EU courts. Consequently, even if rejecting the interpretation of the new 
wording of Art. 23(1) TFEU as a reiteration of the Member States’ duty to adopt national 
measures implementing the relevant EU law, in light of the Court’s reasoning in Baumbast, 
the direct effect of the right to consular and diplomatic protection in national judicatures 
still cannot be rejected because the limitations that the Member States can adopt under the 
Treaty are subject to the full jurisdiction of the EU and the national courts.LXXXIX  
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In the foregoing paragraphs, the Reyners and Defrenne cases were invoked as 
examples of cases where the direct effect was recognised by the CJEU to unclear and 
legally incomplete Treaty Articles.XC The reason why the CJEU, despite expressly 
recognising the conditionality of these Articles, held in favour of direct effect was to ensure 
the objective of these Articles when the Member States failed to fulfil their obligations to 
adopt implementing legislation within the provided transitional period. In light of this 
reasoning, the Member States’ persistent failure to start international obligations with non-
EU countries for the last 18 years, despite the initial time limit provided in Art. 8c of the 
Maastricht Treaty,XCI and the clear obligation mentioned in Art. 23(1) TFEU, might 
influence the Court’s decision in favour of recognising direct effect to the EU citizen’s 
right to consular and diplomatic protection. 
3. What role for the Union in the protection of  the EU citizens abroad – 
a unique model of  protection of  individuals abroad 
 
‘The EU remains the only organisation that can call on a full panoply of 
instruments and resources [to] complement the traditional foreign policy tools of its 
member states.’XCII 
 
The above statement made by Solana one month before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in regard to the role of the EU as an international actor perfectly reflects the 
status quo of the relation between the Union and the Member States in the area of consular 
and diplomatic protection of the EU citizens. Currently, the EU’s role in the field of 
protection abroad of EU citizens is to complement the Member States, when the latter so 
requestXCIII, in their efforts to ensure protection abroad of the EU citizens.XCIV. For the 
moment the EU plays only a supporting role for the Member States but, as it will be shown 
in this section, it has the potential to develop into something more revolutionary. For the 
moment this merely ‘supporting’ role played by the EU already represents a unique role in 
the arena of international organisationsXCV as there is no other international organisation 
enjoying a similar state like function. The supporting role conferred by the Lisbon Treaty 
to the EU has definitely not been an overnight conquest, but the culmination of a long 
evolution and fervent debate between the Member States and between the Commission 
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and the Council.XCVI It remains to be seen whether this sort of master - apprentice relation 
between the Member States and the EU will evolve in the future into an equal sharing of 
tasks relation. The creation of the EEAS, the increased number of training courses for the 
EEAS personnel including also the specific task of the protection of EU citizensXCVII, the 
newly attributed legislative competence to the Council in the field of consular and 
diplomatic protection of EU citizens and the EU’s expansionist approach to its external 
competences indicate that maybe the EU’s role in protection abroad of the EU citizens will 
not stagnate at a mere supporting role but has the potential to evolve into something more 
grandiose. 
When the Maastricht Treaty introduced for the first time a Union citizen’s right to 
protection outside the Union’s borders, the only role envisaged for the Union in this regard 
was limited to one sentence in the EU Treaty, whereby the consular and diplomatic 
representations of the Member States and the Community delegations were obliged to 
cooperate so as ‘to contribute to the implementation’ of the EU citizen’s right to 
protection in third countries (Former Art. 20(2) TEU). In contrast with other EU citizen’s 
rights, the drafters of the Treaty did not endow the Council with legislative powers to 
ensure that the Union citizen’s right would be effectively applied and developed. As in 
other sensitive foreign policy areas, the EU model of consular and diplomatic protection of 
the EU citizens was kept out of the reach of the Union’s legislative procedures and left to 
the control of the Member States’ executives. The only instruments that the Union could 
have adopted to implement the EU citizen’s right were political acts, such : CFSP measures 
adopted by unanimous consent,XCVIII though, in practice, they have never been adopted, or 
non-binding Council GuidelinesXCIX adopted in Council’s specific Working Group 
(COCON)C which have been popular with the Member States due to their non-
constraining effects. The latter remained the masters of the field due to their exclusive 
competence to adopt acts implementing the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic 
protection (see former Art. 20 EC Treaty). And they did so, by way of using a hybrid type 
of acts - Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
adopted within the Council, which so far have been the only legally binding acts adopted in 
this field. This type of Decisions was not designed to affect the rights of the individuals, 
but they were usually adopted for making political statements, or, even if producing 
binding legal effects, they were limited to the Member States with no direct impact on the 
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rights and obligation of individuals.CI Therefore, in light of their limited legal effects, the 
limited judicial guarantees which they offered to individuals due to the Decision’s hybrid 
natureCII did not create problems for the protection of the fundamental human rights of 
EU citizens. The two Decisions adopted in the field of protection abroad of EU citizens 
are, though, exceptions from this rule as they directly affect the EU citizens’ right to 
consular and diplomatic protection by restricting the material scope of the fundamental 
right without conferring on EU citizens legal remedies to complain at the EU level.CIII The 
main effective judicial remedy which the EU legal order conferred on the individuals is the 
direct action of annulment, which in the case of the Decisions on consular and diplomatic 
protection of the EU citizens is not available to the injured EU citizens.CIV 
So far when the Community did not have the competence to act, but action was 
necessary in order to obtain a Community or, in exceptional circumstances even a Union 
objective closely linked with a Community objective,CV the Member States decided to use 
the flexibility clause so as to justify the adoption of Community measures. Former Art. 308 
EC Treaty has been used by the Member States as a legal basis for the adoption of a 
Community Decision aiming to extend a Community Mechanism also to consular 
assistance provided to EU citizens in urgent need of help in third countries (see Council 
Decision 2007/779/EC). Arguably, the same Article could have been usedCVI, if 
unanimously agreed by the Member States, for the purpose of adopting Community 
measures on the protection abroad of EU citizens, instead of sui-generis measures which do 
not confer the same judicial guarantees on the individuals as do Community measures. The 
regulation of the protection abroad of EU citizens by way of Community measures was 
seen by some of the Member States as a too dangerous step for their sovereignty, since a 
traditional prerogative of the State (Vattel, 1758) would have been given to the EU. The 
Member States which had a long-standing tradition of wide consular and diplomatic 
representation felt most the danger of delegating competence to the Union in this field.CVII 
Since Art. 308 EC Treaty required unanimous consent, the persistent opposition of certain 
Member States did not allow the use of the flexibility clause for the purpose of establishing 
a uniform standard of protection abroad of EU citizens which could have been achieved 
only by way of Community measures.  
The Lisbon Treaty has brought a salient change to the legal framework of consular 
and diplomatic protection by abandoning the previous logic of inter-governmental sui-
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generis decision making, and instead involving the EU with its legislative procedure and the 
newly created EEAS in a field historically dominated by States. In view of achieving its 
newly inserted objective of protecting EU citizens in the world (Art. 3(5) TEU), the 
Council has been endowed with express legislative power to adopt Directives ‘establishing 
the coordination and cooperation measures necessary to facilitate’ the aforementioned 
protection (Art. 23(2) TFEU). After consulting the European Parliament, the Council acts 
by qualified majority (Art. 16(3) TEU). The involvement of the European Parliament and 
the replacement of unanimous decision-making with qualified majority voting limit the 
long defended sovereignty of the Member States. On the other hand, it has to be noticed 
that Art. 23(2) TFEU maintained part of the inter-governmental language, as the directives 
the Council is entitled to adopt are limited to ‘cooperation and coordination’ measures, 
recalling the pre-Lisbon framework of cooperation and coordination among the Member 
States that had previously governed the field. The ‘coordination and cooperation’ language 
of Art. 23(2) TFEU gives us an indication that the directive to be adopted might not be 
used for harmonising the national law and practice on the legal nature, force, material and 
personal scope of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens: the Council might be 
entitled only to establish a common model for operational actions in cases of assisting the 
EU citizens in distress. The ambit of the directive under Art. 23(2) TFEU is similar to the 
ambit of the sui generis measures that the Member States could have adopted under the 
previous pillar structure. The difference that comes with the Lisbon Treaty is however 
significant in terms of judicial guarantees, since the change of legal nature of the measures 
that regulate the field of protection abroad of the EU citizens brings with it increased 
judicial guarantees for the individuals both at the Union and national level.  
Additional consequences for the sovereignty of the Member States in this this field 
may result from the fact that they are now sharing their external competence with the 
Union (Arts. 2(2), 4(2) TFEU). In light of the fact that the Member States have not started 
negotiations with third countries for the purpose of obtaining the latter’s consent to the 
EU model of exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens, the 
Commission has proposed to include such a consent clause in mixed agreements that will 
be concluded/amended with third countries. According to a Commission Communication 
of March 2011, ‘the negotiations are on-going’, but the Commission omitted to mention in 
the Communication which kind of negotiating framework will be chosen: the Open Skies 
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method (Cremona, 2011) whereby the Member States continue to negotiate and conclude 
international agreements but under the strict supervision of the Commission, or delegate 
power to the Union to conduct the negotiations. 
The newly created European External Service (EEAS) has also been endowed with 
competence to act for the protection of the Union citizens, via the Union delegations in 
third countries (Art. 5(10) Council Decision on EEAS and Art. 221 TFEU). The EEAS 
role is for the moment only that of supporting the Member States’ representations in third 
countries, but has the potential to evolve according to Art. 13(2) of the EEAS Council 
Decision:  
 
‘The High Representative shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 2011. That report 
shall, in particular, cover the implementation of Article 5(3) and (10) and Article 9.’ 
 
The Report which will be drafted on the EEAS activity may reveal that, in the field 
of consular and diplomatic protection of the EU citizens abroad, there will be a need to 
adopt further actions to respond to problems that have occurred in practice. If the EEAS 
role in this area was insignificant and not open to further development then there would 
have been no need to include this subject matter in the Report on the EEAS' activities.CVIII 
Consequently, it may be that in the future, depending on the facts of the Report, the EEAS 
might acquire a more prominent role in the protection abroad of EU citizens with further 
consequent loose of the long defended sovereignty for the Member States. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has discussed one of the modalities to ensure protection of the EU 
citizens in the world, namely consular and diplomatic protection of unrepresented Union 
citizens. The mechanism was presented and evaluated as a right of the EU citizen.CIX The 
right to consular and diplomatic protection of the Union's citizens, which was introduced 
with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, has so far remained under-developed in comparison 
with the other rights of the EU citizens.  
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The argument of this paper is that, after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU citizen has a 
fundamental right to consular and diplomatic protection in non-EU countries which he can 
request from any of the Member States that is represented in loco, when his home Member 
States does not have an accessible consular or diplomatic representation. The holder of the 
obligation to protection is not the Member State of nationality, but any of the Member 
States that has a consular or diplomatic representation in the place from the third country 
where the citizen is located. The term ‘in the place’ has to be differentiated from ‘in the 
third country’ since it confers the right on the EU citizen to ask for protection from any of 
the Member States that has a consular or diplomatic representation in a place nearer to 
where he is located instead of having to travel hundreds of kilometres to reach the consular 
or diplomatic representation of his own Member State within the same third country. The 
right can be invoked directly by the individual before the domestic courts of the Member 
States when he considers himself to have been injured by acts of the consular or diplomatic 
agents. If certain Member States do not provide national legal remedies for their own 
citizens to complain against such acts, Art. 19(1) TEU now requires the Member States to 
make available such legal remedies, at least, for non-national EU citizens.  
It has been mentioned that, despite the recently concluded work of the ILC, public 
international law norms do not recognise the individual a right to consular and diplomatic 
protection, but stipulates rather that the State is still the one to enjoy a right to exercise 
protection abroad for the citizen. With the express provision of a fundamental right to 
consular and diplomatic protection abroad in the EU Charter (Art. 46), the EU develops an 
autonomous legal concept in public international law by departing from the long 
established status of consular and diplomatic protection as a right of the State, and 
updating it to the status of a fundamental right of the individual. However, in the case of 
the EU law the right is not recognised to the individual in his relation to his State of 
nationality. It must be kept in mind that, under the EU legal order, the holder of the right 
is the EU citizen who does not have an accessible consular representation of its own 
Member State or another State representing it on a permanent basis. 
The recent revolutions in the Mediterranean region and Middle East have shown 
the importance of the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection and that 
consular assistance poses a growing challenge to the Member States and the Union. Not 
even the Member States benefiting of the widest external representation network can cope 
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alone with these catastrophes. These events have proved that only if both the EU and the 
Member States cooperate on a constant basis, will it be possible to effectively evacuate EU 
citizens from areas in distress. If, in the situations of collective evacuation, the civil 
protection mechanismCX plays an important role and ensures what seems to be an effective 
modus vivendi between the Union’s institutional setting and the Member States, in cases of 
individual consular protection, there still is much work to be done in order to ensure that 
the existing discrepancies between the 27 national regulatory frameworks on consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens do not deprive the EU citizen of his now fundamental 
right to protection abroad. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
                                                 
* PhD candidate at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. The present paper is based on a 
previous EUI Working paper, see M Moraru, Protection of EU Citizens in the World: A Legal Assessment of 
the EU Citizen’s Right to Protection Abroad in Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External 
Action after the Lisbon Treaty J Larik & M Moraru (eds), EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 107-129. 
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which caused a great number of deaths and injuries to the population. For instance, the democratic uprising 
in spring 2011 in the Southern Neighbourhood, the earthquake and the tsunami that hit Haiti in January 
2010, the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud of 2010, acts of local or international terrorism (Sharm el-Sheik 2005, 
11 September 2001 Attacks on World Trade Centre in New York), military conflicts (Lebanon conflict of 
summer 2006, the Georgian conflict of August 2008). 
II According to a 2007 survey there is a high percentage of Union citizens that may find themselves in this 
situation, since only in Beijing, Moscow and Washington all 27 Member States have at least one embassy 
(Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Effective consular protection in third countries: 
the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009, COM (2007) 767 of 5 December 2007). In 
regard to the recent international crisis: in Libya only 8 Member States were represented, while in Bahrain 
only 4, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Consular 
protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, doc. COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011). 
III After the Lisbon amendment, there is a noteworthy turn of phrase in the key provisions on Union 
citizenship. Art. 9 TEU (placed in the very first Title of the TEU on Common fundamental provisions on the 
EU) and Art. 20 TFEU (the specific Treaty Article on citizenship) stipulates that the citizenship of the Union 
shall be ‘additional to’ instead of ‘complementary to’ the national citizenship. According to Shaw and de 
Waele, the difference in terminology is not a mere cosmetic change, but signals that the Union citizenship 
should now be seen as a self-standing, independent status from national citizenship, see more in J Shaw, ‘The 
Treaty of Lisbon and Citizenship’, The Federal Trust European Policy Brief, June 2008; and H de Waele, 
‘European Union Citizenship: Revisiting its Meaning, Place and Potential’ (2010) 12 European Journal of 
Migration and Law 319-336. 
IV This pronouncement of Union citizenship which ‘is destined to be the fundamental status’ of the nationals 
of the EU countries has been repeated in a long line of case-law. See, for instance, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk 
[2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31; Case C-224/98 D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191, para. 28; 
Case C-103/08 Gottwald, Judgment of 1 October 2009, nyr, para. 23; Case C-544/07 Rüffler, Judgment of 23 
April 2009, nyr, para. 62; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000, para. 43; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, 
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Judgment of 8 March 2011, para. 41. In the last two cases there has been a change of terminology, the 
European Court of Justice has no longer described the Union citizenship in terms of a future achievement (‘is 
destined to be’), but already as a present result (‘is intended to’) which the citizens of the Member States can 
thus currently benefit of. 
V Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Consular protection for 
EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011). 
VIAccording to a 2007 survey, there are around 7 million of Union citizens travelling in a third country where 
their home Member State is not represented. See Action Plan 2007-2009 and related Impact Assessment, 
European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the EU Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Document COM (2007) 767 final of 5 December 2007 and 
Document SEC (2007) 1600 of 5 December 2007. 
VIIAccording to the European Commission 2010 Report on Union citizenship ‘more than 30 million EU 
citizens live permanently in a third country, but only in three countries (United States, China and Russia) are 
all 27 Member States represented’. See European Commission, EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the 
obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, doc. COM (2010) 603 of 27 October 2010, p. 9. 
VIII According to a comparative research, all of the Member States have had to close to a bigger or lesser 
extent certain of their consular or diplomatic representations abroad. See 
www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf 
IX According to the declaration of F Frattini, Director of the DG Justice in 2007, 17% of the interviewed 
Union citizens believed that that they could seek protection from the EU’s Commission delegations. See 
Public hearing: Diplomatic and consular protection (Centre Borschette) Brussels of 29 May 2007. 
X Public international law recognises a right to exercise diplomatic protection to an international organisation 
only in regard to its agents, generally described as ‘functional protection’. A mechanism which the 
International Law Commission (ILC) has described as a different mechanism than the diplomatic and 
consular protection of nationals which only States can exercise. See Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
with commentaries, text adopted by the ILC at its fifty-eighth session, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10, 2006 (A/61/10). 
XI Former Art. 8c TEC became after the Amsterdam amendment Art. 20 TEC and after the Lisbon 
amendment, Art. 23(1) TFEU. In addition, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights stipulates the same right 
in Art. 46. 
XII Eurobarometer No. 188 of July 2006 and Flash Eurobarometer No. 213 of February 2008. On the same 
line, see also the more recent Flash Eurobarometer no. 294 'EU citizenship' of March 2010. 
XIII This is confirmed by the Commission’s Report to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2007-2010 (doc. 
COM (2010) 602 of 27 October 2010), Section 2.7. 
XIV Despite the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on codification of the law on diplomatic 
protection finished in 2006, the Vatellian legal fiction whereby diplomatic protection is a right of the State of 
nationality and not of the individual, has been maintained by the ILC Draft Articles on diplomatic protection. 
See Arts. 1 and 2 of the Draft Articles on the Diplomatic Protection. Text adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its fifty-eighth session, (A/61/10). Available online at: 
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf  
XV More details on the international law perspective on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals and 
whether the European construction of consular and diplomatic protection is in conformity with public 
international law norms, see P Vigni ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International law’ in 
J Larik and M Moraru (eds.) Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon 
Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10 91-107; as well as P Vigni, ‘Diplomatic and consular protection: 
Misleading Combination or Creative Solution?’, EUI Law Working Paper 2010/11. 
XVI See Art. 3(5) TEU, Arts. 23(2), 221 TFEU and Art. 5(10) of Council Decision establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 11665/1/10 REV 1 Brussels, 20 July 
2010. 
XVII Including the latest amendment by the Lisbon Treaty, which has kept unchanged the material scope of 
the right of the EU citizen to protection abroad. 
XVIII Between 2007- 2009 approximately 600 unrepresented Union citizens were provided consular protection 
under Art. 20 (2)(c) TFEU. See Section 3 of Chapter three of the CARE Final Report. 
XIX Art. 23 (1) TFEU reads as follows: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in 
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which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State.’ 
Paragraph two of the same article confers legislative competence to the Council, however, the directives the 
Council is entitled to adopt aim only at facilitating the protection under this provision, ‘[…] establishing the 
coordination and cooperation measures necessary to facilitate such protection.’ Thus harmonisation seems to 
be excluded from the ambit of the Council competence. Based on this interpretation of the Union’s 
legislative competence, the Union will not have the power to provide in the future directive, without the 
unanimous consent of the Member States, the right of the EU citizen to repatriation, since certain of the 
Member States do not provide internally this right. Measures that can be included in the directive are based 
on cooperation and coordination among the Member States domestic procedures rather than on the 
harmonization of their national legislation and practices. 
XX For instance: different legal status and effects of the consular and diplomatic protection of citizens (certain 
Member States recognise a fundamental right to their nationals, others only a right, while others have an 
approach whereby consular and diplomatic protection is a matter of policy under the executive’s control); 
consular and diplomatic protection has different material and personal scope depending on the specific 
approach adopted by the Member States; certain of the Member States still have in force international 
agreements concluded with other Member States before their accession to the EU, whose compatibility with 
the relevant EU law is questionable. For more details, see the CARE Report, section 7 of Chapter 3. 
XXI The limited legal remedies available under the current EU law are the cause of the hybrid legal nature of 
the Decisions on consular protection (Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 96/409/CFSP), which, on the one 
hand, are international agreements and not EU acts, because they are not concluded by the EU institutions 
but only within the institutional framework of the EU Council, while, on the other hand, despite their public 
international law nature, they also form an integral part of EU law due to their legal basis – Art. 23(1) TFEU. 
Despite being part of the EU law, the legal nature of international agreements of these Decisions restricts the 
available EU legal remedies to infringements procedures. The possibility of actions of annulment brought by 
individuals and preliminary references addressed by national courts is debatable. On the legal status, effects 
and judicial remedies against Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
concluded within the Council, in general, see RH Lauwaars, ‘Institutional Structure’ (Chapter IV) in PJG 
Kapteyn, AM McDonnell, KJM Moterlmans, CWA Timmermans (eds), The Law of the European Union and the 
European Communities, fourth edition (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008) 221; and B de 
Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial and Parallel International 
Agreements’ in B de Witte, D Hanf and E Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU law (Antwerpen: 
Intersentia 2001) 261-62. 
XXII For a full description of the discrepancies existing between the Member States on consular and 
diplomatic protection of nationals, see Chapter seven of CARE Report, available online at 
http://www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf 
XXIII After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council has legislative power to adopt by qualified 
majority voting directives for the purpose of facilitating the protection abroad of the EU citizens (Art. 23(2) 
TFEU). The Council has thus the power to adopt EU measures harmonising to a certain extent the domestic 
frameworks as long as there is no other appropriate measure that could ensure facilitating protection abroad 
of the EU citizens. 
XXIV The situation was more convoluted in the pre-Lisbon era, due to a more vague language used in the 
relevant Treaty provisions. 
XXV There are certain academic opinions which portrayed former Art. 20 TEC as an illustration of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a requirement for joint action between the Member States 
rather than as an individual right like the EU citizen’s right to move and reside within the EU. See S 
Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’, Jean Monnet Working Paper, 2003, 30 and Siofra O’Leary, EU Citizenship – The 
Options for Reform, IPPR, 1996, 63. 
XXVI For e.g., Ireland and UK Ministries of Foreign Affairs. However, UK has argued different opinions. In 
mid-2005, during hearings before the ECJ, the UK acting as a defendant in a case brought before the Court 
by Spain, argued that consular and diplomatic protection is a right of the individual and not a policy (Case C-
145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I-17917, para. 54). During the same year, as a response to the Commission 
Green Paper, the UK argued that the same Treaty based provision did not provide for a’ right’ to the Union 
citizens (!). 
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XXVII See for the different opinions of the MEPs. European Parliament – Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, Resolution of 11 December 2007 P6_TA(2007)0592, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/schedaEU.php?eulex=EUEPreport&lang=6 . 
XXVIII See, for example, de Smith, Judicial Review, fifth edition, 1995, at 574-5, citing Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, 
388, per Lord Scarman. For an application of the doctrine of legitimate expectations to the specific case of 
diplomatic protection of citizens, see R (on the application of Abbasi and another) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs and another [2002] EWCA Civ 1598; and R (on the application of Al-Rawi and others) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, both cases are available in the 
CARE Database (http://www.careproject.eu/database/browse_euc.php# ). 
XXIX For instance, UK and Ireland. See the UK position: ‘the United Kingdom will not engage in publicity 
campaigns to inform EU citizens of Art. 23 TFEU until its definition and meaning has been legally clarified. 
The language of ‘consular and diplomatic protection’ and ‘entitlement’ hold a stronger guarantee than is 
actually available to EU citizens and could create a potentially confusing state of affairs for EU citizens.’ 
Statement made by Jim Murphy, Minister of Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, European 
Standing Committee, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Protection’, session 2007-08, 23 June 2008, at col. 5, available 
in the CARE Database. So far, this position has not changed, according to the Report on the UK regulatory 
framework on consular protection to be found in the CARE Report. 
XXX Until 1st December 2009, the EU Charter had only an interpretative role in the application of EU law. 
See more on this in B de Witte, ‘The Use of the ECHR and Convention Case Law by the European Court of 
Justice’ in P Popelier, Catherine van de Heyning and P van Nuffel (eds) Human Rights Protection in the European 
Legal Order: the Interaction between the European and the National Courts, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011, 17-35. 
XXXI It is important to distinguish between the EU citizen and the unrepresented EU citizen as holder of the 
right. The Treaties and the EU Charter do not confer a right to consular and diplomatic protection on all EU 
citizens, but only to a restricted category, namely, as expressly mentioned by the Treaties, to the 
‘unrepresented EU citizens’. The notion of ‘unrepresented’ as a condition that a Union citizen has to fulfil in 
order to enjoy the right to consular protection is exhaustively defined in Art. 1 of Decision 95/553/EC: 
‘Every citizen of the European Union is entitled to the consular protection of any Member State's diplomatic 
or consular representation if, in the place in which he is located, his own Member State or another State 
representing it on a permanent basis has no: - accessible permanent representation, or - accessible Honorary 
Consul competent for such matters.’  
XXXII Art. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU and 35 TEU. 
XXXIII More details on the content and legal nature and effects of Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 
96/409/CFSP can be found in the CARE Report. 
XXXIV The COCON committee has adopted in 15 years of its existence an impressive number of conclusions 
and guidelines in the field of consular protection, which however maintain a very broad language, sometimes 
simply limiting to reiterate the relevant Treaty provisions: see Guidelines approved by the Interim PSC on 6 
October 2000, Cooperation between Missions of Member States and Commission Delegations in Third 
Countries and to International Organisations, 12094/00; Consular Guidelines on the protection of EU 
citizens in third countries adopted by the COCON and endorsed by the PSC 15613/10, of 5.11 2010; 
Guidelines on Protection of EU citizens in the event of a crisis in a Third Country adopted by the COCON 
on 26 June 2006 – 10109/2/06 REV 2; Lead State Concept in Consular Crises, Conclusions adopted by 
COCON, 10715/07, 12.07.2006; ‘Common Practices in Consular Assistance’ and ‘Crisis Coordination’ 
adopted by the COCON, 10698/10, 9.06.2010; Guidelines for further implementing a number of provisions 
under Decision 95/553/EC adopted by COCON, 11113/08, 24.06.2008. The initial work of the COCON 
was not disclosed to the public. 
XXXV Green Paper - Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries 
(COM/2006/712 final), 28/11/2006; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Effective 
consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - 
Communication from the Commission, 05/12/2007; Accompanying document to the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee - Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union - 
Action Plan 2007-2009 - Summary of the Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1601) - Commission staff working 
document, 05/12/2007; Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular 
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protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact 
Assessment (SEC/2007/1600) - Commission staff working document, 05/12/2007; European Commission, 
EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights – 27/10/2010; Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee under Article 25 TFEU On progress towards effective EU Citizenship 2007-2010 – 27/10/2010. 
XXXVI These issues are addressed in a PhD thesis currently undertaken at the EUI by the author. 
XXXVII Art. 8c Maastricht Treaty made express the obligation for the EU countries to start, within a short 
deadline (before 31 December 1993), negotiations with third countries in order to ensure effective application of 
the right. This deadline was deleted from the subsequent Treaty provisions. The present EU Treaties dedicate 
two separate provisions to this right: Arts. 20(2)(c) TFEU and 23 TFEU. There is only one difference 
between the wordings of Art. 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU: if Art 20(2)(c) TFEU provides that consular and 
diplomatic authorities of the Member States will confer protection, Art. 23(1) TFEU provides that national 
consular or diplomatic authorities will confer protection. This paper argues that the use of ‘or’ is rather 
intended to clarify the situation when a Member State has both diplomatic and consular representations in a 
third country. In this case, the Union citizen should seek protection only from one of these authorities 
representing the Member State, and not take advantage of help from both of representations. However, in 
light of the perfect match of the rest of the wording of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU with Art. 23(1) TFEU, the change 
of ‘and’ with ‘or’ is regrettable and should have been avoided by the Treaty drafters. 
XXXVIII Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, Judgment of 12 May 2011, nyr. 
XXXIX On the basis of Art. 22 TFEU, citizens of the Member States resident in other Member States have the 
right to vote in European Parliament’s elections under the same conditions as nationals. 
XL Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger v. College vanburgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag (Aruba) [2006] ECR I-
8055. 
XLI Case C-135/08 Rottmann, judgment of 2 March 2010, nyp; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 
2011, nyp. 
XLII The landmark cases of the ECJ in the field of the EU citizenship have so far created either economic or 
social rights for the Union citizens within the borders of the internal market. For economic rights see the 
pronouncements of the ECJ in: Case C-138/02 Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-
2703; Case C-258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275; Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and 
Oliveri [2004] ECR I-5257; Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667. For social rights, see the 
pronouncements of the Court of Justice in Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613; Case 
C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193; Case [ECJ] C-
413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] 
ECR I-8507; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195; Case C-57/96 Meints [1997] ECR I-6689. 
XLIII Case T-372/02 Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2003] ECR II-438; Case C-327/02 Panayotova [2004] 
ECR 1-11055; Case C-139/08 Kqiku [2009] ECR I--2887; C-219/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR 1-9213; 
Case C-228/06 Soysal [2009] ECR 1-1031; Case C-244/04 Commission of the European Communities v Federal 
Republic of Germany [2006] ECR I-885; Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie 
ASBL (MRAX) v Belgium [2002] ECR I-6591; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Marcel Malik [2001] ECR I- 6557. 
XLIV Case C-203/07 P Greece v Commission [2008] ECR I-0000. 
XLV See Case C-473/04 Plumex v Young Sports NV [2006] ECR I-1579 – the Union law that was interpreted in 
this case was the Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member 
States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (OJ 2000 L 160, p. 37). 
XLVI This duty arose however only as a result of an express contractual obligation on the part of the Union, 
Case T-572/93 Odigitria AAE v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [1995] 
ECR 11-2025. 
XLVII To be noticed that the provision of the general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality is 
located within the chapter on Citizenship only since the Lisbon amendment. In the EC Treaty, it was located 
in a different part (Part One on Principles) separated from Part two on Citizenship. 
XLVIII Op AG Sharpston in Case 427/06 Bartsch, para. 69. See further T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU 
Law (2nd ed., 2006), 36 to 42; and J. Temple Lang, ‘The Sphere in which Member States are Obliged to 
Comply with the General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Rights Principles’, Legal Issues of 
European Integration 1991, 23 to 35; S Prechal, S de vries & H van Eijken, ‘The Principle of Attributed power 
and the Scope fo EU Law’ in L Besselink, F Pennings, S Prechal (eds.) The eclipse of the Legality Principle in the 
European Union, Kluwer Law International, 2011, 216. 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
100 
                                                                                                                                               
XLIX It is settled case law of the CJEU that the general principles of EU law apply to the Member States 
actions only when they act within the scope of EU law: Case 149/77 Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365, paras. 27 
and 30, and Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629, para. 15, Case C-442/00 Caballero [2002] ECR I-
11915, paras 30 and 32, Case C-13/05 [2006] ECR I-6467, Case C-144/04 [2005] ECR I-9981 para. 75; Op 
AG Sharpston in Case 427/06 Bartsch [2008] ECR I-7245 para. 66. 
L Such as Directives, Decisions, operationalization of Regulations, C - 345/06 Heinrich, [2009] ECR I-1659 
interpretation of national legislation in light of what used to be Framework Decisions (see Angelidaki, 
Pupino). Additionally, see, for example, Case 230/78 Eridania [1979] ECR 2749, para. 31; Case 77/81 
Zuckerfabrik Franken [1982] ECR 681, paras 22 to 28; Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85 Klensch [1986] ECR 
3477, paras 10 and 11; Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, paras 17 to 22; and Joined Cases C-20/00 and 
C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood [2003] ECR I-7411, paras 88 to 93. 
LI Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paras. 41 to 45; and Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-
3689, para. 24. 
LII See, for example, Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, paras 48 to 53 (potential impediment to intra-
Community trade); instances of Member States acting as trustees of the Union’s interests, see inter alia Case 
804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, paras 23 to 30 (Member States acting as trustees of the 
Community in an area of exclusive Community competence) and Case C 246/07 Commission v Sweden 
(PFOS) judgment of 20 April 2010, nyr; Joined Cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 and C-47/96 Molenheide 
and Others [1997] ECR I-7281, paras. 45 to 48 (measures adopted by a Member State in the exercise of its 
competences relating to VAT).; Case C-402/09 Tatu, judgment of 7 April 2011 not yet reported,(Member 
States adopting pollution tax for second-hand imported cars). 
LIII As happened with the other Treaty based rights of the EU citizen which developed from a mere 
application of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality into self-standing rights which the EU 
citizens can invoke solely based on their nationality (Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 2011, 
para. 41). 
LIV Based on Art. 23(2) TFEU. To be noticed that this Article does not require the Council to adopt 
implementing legislation, but it only gives it this possibility. 
LV The purpose of the Treaty Articles, especially those on Union citizen’s rights and fundamental freedoms 
has plaid a significant role in the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of these Articles, whether in cases 
assessing direct effect, or breach of these rights and freedoms. See more in B de Witte, ‘Chapter 12 – Direct 
Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in Craig and de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). 
LVI As certain Member States have argued, see, for example, the position of the Member States having an 
approach of the consular and diplomatic protection of nationals as a matter of the executive’s policy in the 
CARE Final Report, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf  
LVII According to Art. 52(1) of the EU Charter, limitations and restrictions of the Charter’s fundamental 
rights are possible as long as the following conditions are fulfilled: the limitation must be provided by law; 
respect the essence of the fundamental rights; respects the principle of proportionality; it is necessary for the 
purpose of genuinely meeting objectives of general interest as recognised by the Union or there is a need to 
protect rights and freedoms of others. 
LVIII See, inter alia, the recent democratic revolutions in Egypt, Libya, the tsunami that affected Japan. 
LIX According to the information gather by the author during interviews with Commission and Member 
States representatives in the period of March – July 2011. 
LX One author argues that the Member States will respect the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality only if an equal number of places is given to each of the Member States in the transport means 
made available by another Member State (A Ianniello-Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: 
Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular and Diplomatic Services’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 91, 97). 
This paper, on the other hand, argues that Art. 23 TFEU would not require the aforementioned method of 
division of places, as the Article entitles only the unrepresented EU citizens to equal treatment. According to 
Art. 1 of the Decision 95/553/EC, unrepresented Union citizens are those that do not have an accessible 
consular or diplomatic mission of their State in the third country where they are located. Thus, in practice, a 
strict application of the Treaty Article would require a division of places by the number of the unrepresented 
Member States plus one (the Member State providing the transport means). However, in practice, the 
Member States are not that formalistic, as proved by the recent evacuation procedure of the EU citizens from 
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Egypt and Libya. 
LXI For the moment, the Member States have not yet recognised a right to protection abroad of the non-EU 
family member joining the EU citizen, not even in the limited circumstances of emergency evacuation. The 
situation is handled on a case by case basis. See more on this in M Moraru and S Faro, ‘La Questione 
dell’Effettivita del Diritto dei Cittadini Europei alla Protezione Diplomatica e Consolare nei Paesi Terzi. I 
Risultati del Progetto CARE’, Riv. Ital. Dir. Pubbl. Comunitario, forthcoming issue (3/4), 2011 and Section 4.1.1 
of Chapter three of the CARE Report. 
LXII See the national Reports on France, Ireland, Poland, UK in the CARE Report, available at 
www.careproject.eu/database/browse_eu.php . 
LXIII For instance, see the EU specific legal definition of ‘goods’, ‘worker’, ‘primacy’, ‘subsidiarity’, 
‘proportionality’, ‘alien’, ‘national security’, ‘court and tribunal’, ‘genuine link’ – in EU citizenship case law the 
meaning of ‘genuine link’ is different in comparison to the public international law concept of ‘genuine link’. 
The following examples show that the EU Courts have not limited their interpretation to mere transposition 
of the international law concepts, but adapted them to the EU legal order specificity. 
LXIV It can be noticed that the Spanish proposal referred to both ‘protection’ and ‘assistance’ since under 
Spanish national law the two concepts are legally different. The Spanish legal literature distinguishes between 
protection, which involves formal complaints before public authorities, while assistance refers rather to 
provision of food, clothes, and medicines. See E Vilarino Pintos, Curso de Derecho Diplomatico y Consular. Parte 
general y textos codificadores (Tecnos: Madrid 1987) 102-103; A Maresca, Las relaciones consulares (Piernas:Madrid 
1974) 215-219. 
LXV See Documentation de la RIE, col 18 1991, 333-338 and 405-409. 
LXVI A similar example of divided opinions between the Member States leading to a broad definition of a legal 
concept is the well known broad, encompassing all, definition of the CFSP, see R Gosalbo Bono, 'Some 
Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order' (2006) 34 Common Market Law Review 358–9. 
LXVII The Commission seems to have the same interpretation, diplomatic protection is not per se excluded 
from the legal content of the Union citizen’s right, but for the moment, attention is given to the most 
problematic aspect of the right – consular protection for Union citizens found in distress in third countries. 
See Accompanying document to the Commission Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact Assessment, doc. SEC 
(2007) 1600 of 5 December 2007 and the European Commission’s EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling 
the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, doc. COM (2010) 603 of 27 October 2010. 
LXVIII  Case C-341/01 PlatoPlastik Robert Frank [2004] ECR I-4883, para. 64; Case C 340-08 M and others, 
(Fourth Chamber) judgement of 29 April 2010, nyr, para. 44. In the latter case there was discrepancy between 
on one hand, the different official language version of the EU law at issue (Council Regulation no 881/2002) 
and, on the other hand, between the official translation of the relevant EU law and the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1390 implemented by the foregoing Council Regulation. Since it could not take a 
decision solely based on literary interpretation, the ECJ interpreted the provision on the basis of the aim of 
both the Regulation and Resolution. 
LXIX See for example, C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000; Case 
C-34/09 Zambrano, judgment of 8 March 2011; and the already famous Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P Kadi [2008] ECR I-6351. 
LXX Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-2139, para. 149 
LXXI Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-52, para. 119. 
LXXII There was no effective judicial remedy available for the injured individuals at either the national or 
international level. In regard to consular and diplomatic protection of the EU citizens in non-EU countries, 
certain of the Member States have domestic legal remedies available, as for those that do not, they are now 
required under Art. 19(1) TEU. It remains to be seen how the ECJ will interpret Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU 
as well as Art. 46 EU Charter: in the Member States’ or the EU citizen’s benefit? 
LXXIII According to Art. 8 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and Art. 6 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Protection (VCDR), the receiving third country has discretionary power to 
oppose to the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection by another State than the State of nationality, as 
long as it has not formally consented to this type of protection of individuals. 
LXXIV To be noticed though that the Lisbon Treaty has brought a proliferation of references to ‘peoples of 
Europe’, ‘Union peoples’ which signals a strong desire to continue the creation of a sense of belonging 
between the citizens of the Member States and the Union, and not necessarily between the citizens of the 
Member States and the other Member States: preamble 13, TEU - Arts. 1(2), 3(1), 3(5), 9(1), 3(2), 10(4), 
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13(1), 14(2), 35(3); TFEU – Arts.15(3), 20(1), 21(1), 22, 23, 24, 170(1), 227(1), 228(1). 
LXXV Case Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy)[1989] ICJ Reports 1989, para. 50 
of the judgment; Advisory Opinion - Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN, ICJ Reports 
1949, p. 11: ‘In the second place, even in inter-State relations, there are important exceptions to the rule, for 
there are cases in which protection may be exercised by a State on behalf of persons not having its 
nationality.’ 
LXXVI The EU is bound to respect public international law (Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael 
Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp [1992] ECR I-6019 para. 9). By way of consequence, it may be argued that it is 
bound to respect also the requirement of the three consents needed for a legitimate exercise of protection 
abroad of the EU citizens by other Member States than the State of nationality. However, the requirement of 
respecting public international law norms did not impede the CJEU from favouring EU instead of public 
international law norms in the Kadi case. It remains to be seen how the CJEU will interpret the requirement 
of unanimous consent under public international law in relation to the exercise of consular and diplomatic 
protection of EU citizens in non-EU countries. 
LXXVII The obligation was first included in Art. 8c Maastricht Treaty and remained in all subsequent versions 
of the Article including in the present Art. 23(1) TFEU. 
LXXVIII There are two exceptions: Italy signed several bilateral agreements after the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty which include provisions protecting Union citizens working and/or living in third countries 
- namely the Conventions with Ukraine in 2003 (Art. 62), Republic of Moldova in 2000 (Art. 61), Georgia in 
2002 (Art. 60), Great People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Socialist in 1998 (Art. 2) and Russian Federation in 
2001 (Art. 37); the second exception is Portugal, namely the Consular Convention between Portugal and the 
Russian Federation (concluded in 2001). These agreements can be found online in the CARE database. 
LXXIX See the practice of disconnection clauses. For an extensive discussion on the regime of disconnection 
clauses in EU law see M Cremona, ‘Disconnection Clauses in EC Law and Practice’ in C Hillion and P 
Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited - The EU and its Member States in the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2010). 
LXXX C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. TC Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, seventh 
edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) 110. 
LXXXI The justiciability test as the author calls it. See de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the 
Legal Order’ 331. 
LXXXII In addition to this argument, certain Member States argue that the Treaty based Article needs further 
clarification whether it confers consular assistance and/or protection as in certain national legal orders the 
two legal concepts are distinct: Germany, Ireland, Romania, Spain, UK. See more on this topic in CARE 
Report, Chapter three, Section. 4.1.1. 
LXXXIII Art. 23(1) TFEU second indent provides: ‘Member States shall […] start the international negotiations 
required to secure this protection.’, recognising the public international law requirements: Art. 8 of the VCCR 
and Art. 6 of the VCDR. 
LXXXIV Case C-2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 652, para. 30: ‘After the expiry of the transitional period the 
directives provided for by the chapter on the right of establishment have become superfluous with regard to 
implementing the rule on nationality, since this is henceforth sanctioned by the Treaty itself with direct effect.’ (emphasis added) 
See also Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA [1976] ECR 445. 
LXXXV For a recent case on direct effect of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, see Case 
C-164/07 Wood [2008] ECR I-4143. 
LXXXVI See for instance Art. 291(1) TFEU: ‘Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary 
to implement legally binding Union acts.’ 
LXXXVII For instance, Case C-13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 463. Hilson notes that the recognition of direct effect 
to the fundamental freedoms by the European Court of Justice surprised, as ‘none of them sit particularly 
happily with the requirements as to clarity, precision and unconditionality.’ See C Hilson, ‘What's in a right? 
The relationship between Community, fundamental and citizenship rights in EU law’ (2004) 29 European Law 
Review 636, 640. 
LXXXVIII Case C-431/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091. 
LXXXIX After the Lisbon amendment, the general rule is that the EU courts have general jurisdiction to review 
the application of the EU Treaties, thus including Arts. 20 and 23 TFEU, unless expressly excluded as is the 
case of the CFSP provisions (Art. 24 TEU). 
XC Reyners – former Art. 52 EC Treaty and Defrenne – former Art. 119 EC Treaty. 
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XCI Art. 8C of the EC Treaty reads as follows: ‘Before the 31 December 1993 the Member States shall establish 
the necessary rules among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this 
protection.’ (emphasis added) 
XCII Statement made by Javier Solana, ‘EU Makes Its Mark on the World Stage’, The Guardian, 11 October 
2009. 
XCIII The area is not categorised among the TFEU list of competences, however, Art. 5(10) of the Council 
Decision establishing the EEAS is suggestive of the Union role in the area of consular and diplomatic 
protection, as well as Art. 35(3) TEU. 
XCIV So far EU Institutions that have plaid a role in consular and diplomatic protection of the Union citizens 
are: the Union Presidency, SITCEN, the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and now also the EEAS (Art. 5(10) of Council Decision 
2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
XCV The only situation recognised under public international law when an international organisation can 
exercise diplomatic protection is when it exercises functional protection, namely when the injury is suffered 
by an agent of an international organisation. In the Reparation case, the ICJ limited the functional protection 
only to injuries arising from a breach of an obligation designed to help an agent in performing his duties (ICJ, 
Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1949, ‘Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations’, 
1949, ICJ Reports, 182). 
XCVI See the comments made during the public debate following the Commission Green Paper on the 
different views of the Commission, Council (especially of certain Member States) available at 
www.careproject.eu/database/browse_eu.php . 
XCVII See Josep M. Lloveras Soler, The New EU Diplomacy: Learning to Add Value, EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2011/05. 
XCVIII From all possible types of CFSP measures, a Joint Action would have probably been the most suited 
measure due to its specific operational character. In addition, CFSP Decisions could have also served the 
purpose of facilitating the protection abroad of EU citizens. 
XCIX See inter alia, Consular Guidelines on the protection of EU citizens in third countries adopted by the 
COCON and endorsed by the PSC 15613/10, of 5 November 2010. 
C The COCON is made up of representatives of the Member States’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs, usually 
working in the consular and diplomatic affairs unit. 
CI Decisions of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States were and are usually adopted 
pursuant to Art. 253 TFEU (ex-Art. 223 TEC), Art. 341 TFEU (ex-Art. 289 TEC). 
CII Decisions of Representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council are international agreements 
concluded by the executives of the Member States and not by the Council, thus they are not EU acts. 
However they form an integral part of the EU legal order. See H R Lauwaars, Chapter four - Institutional 
Structure, in Kapteyn, Mortelmans, Timmermans  (eds.) The Law of the European Union and the European 
Communities, fourth edition revisited 2008, 219-221. 
CIII For instance, the possibility of the Union citizens to bring a direct action of annulment against the 
Decision 95/553/EC before the General Court of Justice is questionable, since the Decision is not a Union 
act. 
CIV Actions of annulment are available only against EU acts, Decisions of the Representatives of the 
Government of the Member States do not fall under this category. See Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] 
ECR para. 42; Joined Cases C 181/91 and C 248/91 Parliament v Council and Commission (‘Bangladesh’) [1993] 
ECR I 3685, paras. 12-14; Opinion Kokott of 26 March 2009 in Case C 13/07 Commission v Council, para. 40; 
Case C- 370/07 Commission v Council, judgment of 01/10/2009, para. 42. 
CV See the smart sanctions cases, where the inextricable link between the Union objective and the functioning 
of the internal market allowed the use of former Art. 308 EC Treaty for adopting a Community measures 
pursuing a Union objective. See, inter alia, Case T-306/01 Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, para. 164; Case T-
315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-03649. 
CVI The strict positive and negative conditions for the exercise of the Community general competence were 
cumulatively fulfilled: absence of a Treaty provision conferring competence to the Community, necessity, 
subsidiary and the existence of a Community objective. The Council had the possibility to act by way of 
adopting Community measures under former Art. 308 EC Treaty. However, the Member States unanimously 
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agreed only to actions by way of Decisions of the Representatives of the Member States adopted within the 
Council. 
CVII See in this regard, the National Report of the UK in the CARE Report. 
CVIII More on this in the CARE Report, Section 7 of Chapter 3. 
CIX Consular and diplomatic protection as an external dimension of the Union citizenship is only one aspect 
of the protection abroad of the EU citizens. Consular protection can be conferred to the EU citizens in third 
countries hit by disasters also by ESDP missions. Interestingly, the first Decision adopted on the basis of 
former Art. 17 TEU concerned the evacuation of EU nationals whenever they are in danger in third 
countries. It was adopted as a sui-generis Decision that was not published in the Official Journal. Doc. 
8386/96, Decision de Conseil du 27 juin 1996, relative aux operations d’evacuations de ressortisants des Etats 
membres lorsque leur sécurite est en danger dans un pays tiers – see more in RA Wessel, The European Union's 
foreign and security policy: a legal institutional perspective (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 133. 
CX Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community Mechanism to 
facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance OJ L 297, p.7. See also, Art. 2(10) and recital 18 
of the preamble of Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007 which extended the Civil 
Protection Mechanism also to situation of consular assistance of the Union citizens in third countries. 
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Abstract 
 
This essay discusses the dubious premises of ‘repressive liberalism’ underlying the 
policies of cultural ‘integration’ that have been adopted by a number of otherwise liberal 
democracies around the world. The author uses his own first-hand experience of 
naturalisation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the pioneering jurisdiction with regards 
to the introduction of ‘cultural integration’, in order to expose the counterproductive 
nature of the ‘integration’ approach to the absorption of non-citizens. The essay claims that 
there is no such thing as a ‘nation-specific’ culture to be tested and that the creation and 
consolidation of EU citizenship changed the whole framework of reference within which 
any Member State nationality operates and should be discussed. The argument is that, 
particularly in the EU context, culture and language testing before naturalisation is built on 
false assumptions and does not serve any identifiable goal that would go beyond the 
perpetuation of prejudice. Since testing stigmatises a large number of Europeans and 
potentially undermines social cohesion in the Member States, it should be abolished. 
 
Key-words:  
 
 EU Law, Citizenship, European Citizenship, nationality, naturalisation, culture, 
integration, social cohesion, prejudice, testing. 
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It has always been easier, it will always be easier, to think of 
someone as a non-citizen than to decide that he is a non-person. 
Alexander BickelI 
 
Le propre n’est pas nécessairement le bien. Il est déjà choquant de 
dire my country right or wrong. La même formule, appliquée 
à ce que chacun appelle «sa culture», produit des effets tout aussi 
pervers. 
Rémi BragueII 
 
 
 
Introduction and the structure of  the argument 
 
This essay discusses the dubious premises of ‘repressive liberalism’III underlying the 
policy of cultural ‘integration’ adopted by a number of otherwise liberal democracies 
around the world.IV The focus is on the situation in the European Union (EU). I am using 
my own first-hand experience of naturalisation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the 
pioneering jurisdiction with regards to the introduction of ‘cultural integration’, marked by 
‘politics divided from society’.V This will hopefully provide a useful perspective for those 
readers who have never changed nationalities themselves. 
This essay exposes the counterproductive nature of the mistaken ‘integration’ 
approach to the absorption of non-citizens embraced by a growing number of Member 
States of the Union. VI It claims that there is no such thing as a ‘nation specific’ culture to 
be tested and that the creation and consolidation of EU citizenship changed the whole 
framework of reference within which any Member State nationality operates and should be 
discussed. The argument is very simple: culture and language testing before naturalisation is 
built on false assumptions and does not serve any identifiable goal that would go beyond 
the perpetuation of prejudice, particularly in the EU context. As such, since testing 
stigmatises a large number of Europeans and potentially undermines social cohesion in the 
Member States, it should be abolished.  
The essay is structured as follows. After a brief outline of the main problematic 
aspects of the shift towards the policy of ‘cultural testing’ in Europe and of its apparent 
clash with the rationale of EU integration, including the continuing articulation of the 
concept of EU citizenship (I.), the essay turns to a concise account of the author’s 
naturalisation experience (II.). Building on the first two sections, the myth of the necessary 
‘integration’ of the ‘new-comers’VII into the majority society propagated by a number of 
(still) liberal democracies is exposed and analysed. This myth is commonly employed by 
states to justify the exclusion of citizenship applicants perceived in the popular culture as 
the ‘other’. A special emphasis is put on the problematic nature of the recent 
developments, when seen in the context of the continuing proceduralisation of the notion 
of nationality in the liberal democratic states during the last half a century. Having lost its 
substantive cultural essence, the contemporary legal vision of nationality disallows states 
from developing profoundly illiberal monocultures by punishing difference. The 
universality of modern culture reinforced by the ideal of liberal tolerance ensures that states 
introducing cultural tests, even with the best intentions, simply have nothing to test – my 
first thesis (III.). The essay continues by focusing on the clash between the essence of EU 
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citizenship, on the one hand, and that of Member States’ nationalities on the other, firmly 
placing the debate within the legal-political context of European integration and 
demonstrating that within that context, any culture and language test by the Member States 
is per se far more dubious than in any other country in the world – my second thesis (IV.).  
The mentioned developments damage the harmonious development of the 
societies of the EU Member States in a number of important ways, including the 
propagation of mythical national exceptionalism through the state-mandated exclusive idea 
of culture and, probably more importantly, by making it clear to the applicants for 
naturalisation that no matter where they might come from, their own ‘non-culture’ is not 
good enough for the states where they reside.VIII Once the layer of EU citizenship is added, 
the urgency to deal with the problems outlined becomes even more acute.IX  
These problems not only make the lives of a huge number of people more 
miserable than they would otherwise be. They also threaten to affect the social cohesion of 
our societies, where a general shift to the purely doctrinal vision of what a society is seems 
to have taken a toll on common sense, simplifying reality to a dangerous degree. 
 
 
I. Outline of  the problem 
 
The articulation of the status of EU citizenship,X amplifying more general global trends,XI 
deeply affected the very essence of the Member States’ nationalities in a number of 
important ways.XII While EU citizenship provides all Member State nationals with a 
number of Union-wide rights which no Member State alone could grant, the status of EU 
citizenship, although of ius tractum natureXIII (being derived from the nationalities nationality 
of the Member States),XIV often finds itself in a contrarian relationship with such 
nationalities. The main logic behind the nationalities of the Member States – as numerous 
naturalisation practices aimed at incorporating ‘newcomers’ clearly demonstrate – is that of 
settling the nationals within the confines of the states.XV The main logic of EU citizenship, 
on the contrary, consists in liberating citizens from the negative effects of the ‘container 
theory of society’XVI that states (and sometimes regions) impose,XVII since the main EU 
citizenship right is to leave one’s Member State of nationalityXVIII and to settle elsewhere in 
the Union. EU citizenship thus reinforces the democratic nature of the Union reflected in 
the EU Treaty by providing for voting with one’s feet:XIX EU citizens can always move 
away and choose a Member State which would suit best their ideals of liberty and the good 
life.XX 
This obvious clash between the logical vectors of ‘to stay’ and ‘to go’ might be 
downplayed, but it will have to be addressed seriously in the immediate future. Given the 
positive potential of the legal status of EU citizenship to broaden citizens’ horizon of 
opportunitiesXXI and the recent citizenship case law reaffirming the importance of this 
status,XXII the reconciliation of the two vectors can only occur through a rethinking and 
reframing of the Member States’ nationalities, unless the whole construct of the internal 
market and EU citizenship is to be scrapped, with all the disastrous consequences that 
makes this highly unlikely.  
The situation of newly naturalised Member State nationals is a perfect illustration of 
the logical disharmony between the two legal orders in the EU, affecting the same 
individuals simultaneously. This duality of statuses which governs the life of every single 
EU citizen exemplifies the archaic logic behind naturalisation, which is never questioned by 
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politicians and is only rarely seriously criticised by scholars.XXIII The illuminating critical 
accounts provided by KostakopoulouXXIV and CarensXXV are particularly useful in 
employing simple facts to challenge the counterproductive views entrenched within the 
political mainstream, which in essence focus on the quasi-totalitarian embrace of a mythical 
monoculture, corresponding to each bounded community, to each nation. 
Such an idea of the world shapes a duality, which consists in the tension between a 
presumed order ‘inside’ and anarchy ‘outside’,XXVI automatically dismissing any ‘outside’ 
culture as inferior to that of the majority culture ‘inside’ the state, mistakenly embracing the 
presumption of monocultural citizenship,XXVII which never existed in reality,XXVIII however 
hard the states tried to impose it from within the confines of their ‘imagined 
communities’.XXIX Viewed from this perspective, the European ‘Costituzione senza popolo’XXX 
is not an exception in representing a polity without a nation, but a reflection of the state of 
affairs where the state-imposed homogenisation is absent.XXXI Indeed, ‘nowhere is a 
common identity sufficient to give rise to new forms of governance. Identities overlap and 
compete with one another’.XXXII Moreover, to take the state-related official identity as the 
most important one per se would be verging on the absurd. 
While Member States present language and ‘integration’ tests preceding 
naturalisation as necessary and useful, this article takes exception with such a view, 
demonstrating that the contrary is true. First of all, the liberal ideology of tolerance coupled 
with common sense permits argument against such practices. Indeed, those who are willing 
to naturalise are in the absolute majority of cases long-term residents of a polity. It would 
appear to be exceptionally arrogant of any ‘container society’ – of any state – to assume 
that the culture and language(s) of these people are inherently inferior to those the state 
happens to sponsor. So much inferior, in fact, as to lead to a ‘legitimate’ denial of their very 
membership of society. 
Asking those who functioned in a society for years to pass any form of 
naturalisation test simply underlines their ‘otherness’ and exposes a presumption against 
the acceptance of such people as equals, unless they pass through the state-sponsored 
‘purification’ process. In short, it comes down to the denial of social facts:XXXIII those who 
never bother to naturalise may stay, but will always be looked down upon by a state that 
presumes their cultural inferiority. The latter will mandate their exclusion from the majority 
society composed of ‘correct’ citizens,XXXIV whose representatives in the legislature would 
preach faithfulness to the ‘real’ (i.e. state-sponsored) culture, usually viewed as a frozen set 
of conventions, rather than a set of dynamic interactions of different, mutually enriching 
influences.XXXV 
In fact, when speaking of culture in such a context, it is impossible but to focus on 
the idea of control, since, as pointed out by Adorno, ‘whoever speaks of culture speaks of 
administration as well, whether this is his intention or not’.XXXVI Once the state intervenes, 
the very essence of what one commonly understands as culture is instantly transformed: 
‘the law can play an instrumental role in “organizing culture”’,XXXVII leading to the 
formation and promotion of Leitkultur – the version of ‘culture’ which is officially endorsed 
and promoted by the state. 
The path of the liberal democratic state during the last half a century is, broadly-
speaking, also a path away from such interventions and towards tolerance and pluralism, as 
exemplified by the degree to which states have embraced human rights and non-
discrimination commitments. However, as the recent rise in the adoption of naturalisation 
‘culture tests’ reveals, this does not prevent majorities from haling the exceptionalism of 
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local ‘cultures’, thereby employing narratives (as well as laws, of course) against those who 
‘do not belong’. 
An acceptance by the majority should not deter scholars from criticising this state 
of affairs. However, the understanding that majorities are more often wrong than right 
predates PubliusXXXVIII and democracy is only a success in that it ‘does not demand much 
of people and […] can function with a minimal human being’.XXXIX Moreover, democracy is 
just the means, as Weiler reminded us, not a value in itself.XL Consequently, ‘a democracy 
of vile persons will be vile’.XLI One can sigh with relief: at least there is nothing wrong with 
democracy in Europe. 
In the context of the EU all the aforementioned considerations are amplified by the 
functioning of the concept of EU citizenship. This status is conferred on any individual 
who acquires the nationality of a Member State and is essentially antithetical to the narrow-
minded nationalist concerns which drive naturalisation politics. EU citizenship, by its mere 
existence, thus renders dubious all the illiberal ‘integration’ efforts put in place by national 
legislatures. These national policies cannot escape from being assessed in the context of the 
Union as a whole. Once the level of magnitude has changed – especially once viewed from 
the wider perspective of the EU – all state-mandated cultures become ‘minority cultures’XLII 
in some sense, which results in the instant taming of their mythical claims.XLIII According to 
Kymlicka, ‘the world-historical task of the EU is to tame and diffuse liberal 
nationhood’,XLIV which corresponds to the consolidation of democracy.XLV Non-
recognition of this important contribution of the EU would clearly amount to ‘moral 
blindness’.XLVI  
 
 
II. On a personal note: becoming Dutch 
 
When going through the process of naturalisation in the Netherlands, like any other 
citizenship applicant, I was asked to prove that I had legally resided in the Kingdom for a 
number of years,XLVII that my income was sufficient and also that I was well enough versed 
in the local language and culture.XLVIII The elaborate testing system in place in the 
NetherlandsXLIX is tuned to ensure the ‘integration’ of newly naturalised citizens into the 
society. The law demands that an ‘official’ test of (official) culture be passed.L Thus 
numerous years spent in the country teaching law at an (Imperial) University – in my case – 
were not viewed as a proof of successful ‘integration’.  
The consequences of such an approach are truly paradoxical. ‘Integration’ becomes 
a bureaucratic exercise entirely ignoring the reality of life, as my actual functioning in 
society did not count. Having spent five or more years in the country, anyone necessarily 
has a network of friends and daily routines, be it a law professor, a prostitute, or a pro-
bono fitness instructor. Passing an integration test in such a context merely means getting a 
seal of state approval for your life, which the state randomly distributes among taxpayers: 
today a professor of Dutch law is more successful than a catholic priest preaching to Latin 
Americans – tomorrow a porn-actor starring with Dutch divas is preferred by the 
Kingdom to a poet writing in Tagalog with the majority of friends coming from Luzon. 
The assumption that a state, when dealing with law-abiding, financially self-sufficient 
taxpayers, can officially brand some lives as deficient is certainly worrisome. Once such an 
assumption is questioned, no possible justification for any such tests can be found, no 
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matter how such tests are managed, what kind of questions they ask and what their stated 
goals are.  
The Dutch inburgeringstoets sends a message which is clear: possessing humanity is 
not sufficient to be embraced by the Dutch state even after years spent in the Kingdom. 
Like a great number of other European countries, the Dutch state views the society it is in 
charge of as highly specific and different from any other on the planet. This starting 
assumption justifies the need to test the ‘knowledge’ of this specificity amongst those 
willing to naturalise or acquire permanent residence, i.e. those who have been part of this 
very society for many years. Listening to the municipal employee, I began to wonder how I 
had been able to survive so many years in a society so unique. Do they really see Godard’s 
films differently? Do they read Dostoyevsky differently? Clearly, they do not. Consequently 
– and coupled with the analysis contained in the following two parts of this essay – any 
culture test is inherently a hypocritical bureaucratic exercise based on an unjust 
presumption that in being ‘foreign’ some residents are not quite good enough to be 
recognised as full members of their community. This presumption not only stigmatises 
those deemed not good enough, it also ignores a simple and overwhelmingly important 
fact: those willing to naturalise are already part of the community, whether the state is 
willing to recognise this or not. Simply put, culture and language testing is used by states to 
ignore a reality they are for some reason uncomfortable with.  
The Dutch state is not better nor worse than any other in this respect. To prove my 
worthiness to vote against the likes of Wilders and, most importantly, not to be looked 
down upon as someone who is ‘not good enough’ in a country where I have been paying 
taxes for my entire working life, I registered for the test. The content of it was (quite 
expectedly) truly strange, to say the least. It included questions such as ‘your neighbour 
died. What should you do?’ with the following suggested answers: ‘1. Nothing; 2. I send a 
condolences card; 3. I go help the widow’.LI As any specialist in Dutch culture knows, only 
one of these answers is correct. Consider another example: ‘Mrs. de Jong says “I will go and 
eat now”’ (Ik ga nu eten). Suggested reactions: ‘1. You are invited to join Mrs. de Jong; 2. 
Mrs. de Jong does not feel like speaking with you any more and wishes to go home; 3. Mrs. 
de Jong will probably invite you to eat with her later’.LII And lastly: ‘Fines above a certain 
amount disqualify you from the possibility of becoming Dutch’ with the following 
suggested reactions: ‘1. Thank God I only have a parking fine; 2. I did not know about this 
rule; 3. I never drink when I am driving’.LIII  
Upon completing the test – for which, incidentally, example copies are not available 
anywhere on the basis that preparation is considered impossible since ‘the proper attitude 
… cannot be learnt by heart’,LIV – the feeling of optimism which should normally 
accompany the decision to become a fully-fledged member of the society where one has 
been living for a very long time, was entirely gone.LV I clearly remember how puzzled I was. 
Is this Dutch culture? For me Dutch culture included references to the Union of Utrecht, 
to the ‘Golden Age’LVI with its tulipmania,LVII to the art of Rembrandt van Rijn and Vincent 
van Gogh, to Piet Mondriaan, to groundbreaking architecture and design, the Amsterdamse 
School,LVIII De StijlLIX etc. Above all though, it included references to the famed liberalism 
and tolerance entrenched in Dutch society, and yet, as the very existence of this absurd test 
abundantly testified, an aspect of Dutch culture that is nowhere in evidence. The language 
which I learnt to read ‘Rituelen’,LX seemed desecrated. However, I was very happy the 
questions were not related to geography or historical facts – a position generally in line 
with the liberal ideology: citizens themselves are to decide whether to quit smoking, read 
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books or love the motherland. Moreover, although it is abundantly clear that knowing the 
distance between Utrecht and Leeuwarden is unlikely to make you a better member of the 
community in which you have already spent many years, the test I faced was by far more 
absurd than any fact-based test would have been, since, unlike a test based on facts, it 
simply made no sense. 
By introducing the test, the Kingdom killed two strange birds with one stone. It 
made it clear that besides being in contempt of my own culture and humanity, all that I 
considered important about Dutch culture and all that made me apply for naturalisation – 
that I was tired of being a ‘foreigner’ – actually did not count. Necessarily so, since it is 
your actual membership of the national community, your life with the other Dutch people 
in the same cities and villages, buying the same German bread, Iranian hummus and 
Flemish fries at the market, which creates the connection between a person and all the 
others around her, not your librarian skills or reading speed. Stranger things were 
important for the Dutch state, however. What counted was a handful of irritating clichés 
like ‘our trains are yellow’ and ‘our land is flat’, as well as an ability to fill in forms correctly 
(to which several questions in the culture test were dedicated). It takes passing this ‘secret’ 
test to realise that, in fact, the imburgeringstoets does not test any knowledge of anything and 
is not related to any culture whatsoever, however widely construed. Quite clearly, the test’s 
real purpose is the self-justification of the myth of the exceptionalism of the local ‘culture’ 
of the Kingdom. The account of mythologies provided by Barthes is instrumental in this 
regard: myths are not important for the story they tell, but for what they do, since ‘in a 
mythical system causality is artificial, false; but it creeps, so to speak, through the back door 
of Nature’.LXI Thus what counts in the context of the culture tests is not the rubbish 
content of these exercises, but the line they draw between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which is, 
however, entirely arbitrary. 
My personal story is not exceptional. Neither is it all too country-specific. 
Increasingly many liberal democracies in the world are introducing tests to check how 
accustomed citizens-to-be are with their ‘culture’ and society.LXII This worrisome practice 
of attempting the annihilation of the ‘other’ by imposing on her the status of ‘one of us’, 
which Weiler abhorredLXIII and Kymlicka found suspicious,LXIV now seems to be accepted 
as a norm of daily life, generating a wave of scholarly criticism, a body of literature to 
which this essay aspires to contribute.LXV Indeed, ‘integration’ is a very interesting way of 
dealing with the ‘other’. In the words of Weiler such ‘come be one of us’ strategy functions 
in the following way. 
 
It is noble since it involves, of course, elimination of prejudice, of the notion that there are 
boundaries that cannot be eradicated. But the ‘be one of us’, however well intentioned, is 
often an invitation to the alien to be one of us by being us. Vis-à-vis the alien it risks robbing 
him of his identity. Vis-à-vis oneself, it may be a simple manifestation of both arrogance and 
the belief in my superiority as well as my tolerance. If I cannot tolerate the alien, one way of 
resolving the dilemma is to make him like me, no longer an alien. […] It is a form of dangerous 
internal and external intolerance.LXVI 
 
Luckily, the tests promoted by a number of states are not and cannot possibly be 
‘effective’. No matter what the stated goals of such tests are, they cannot possibly be 
reached, since the underlying assumption behind the tests is that of the cultural 
exceptionalism of the local society coupled with a belief that the state is entitled to brand 
some non-criminal lives as deficient and unworthy of official inclusion based on the local 
mythologies and prejudices. Despite the frequent complacency on the part of those passing 
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the test (having no other choice), states simply cannot impose any ‘nation-specific culture’ 
on the new citizens, neither can they invent it. Furthermore, requiring knowledge of a local 
language does not make one forget the other five, let alone the lullabies,LXVII since the 
private realm, our biological existence, is bound to be separated from the sphere of the 
political, to which citizenship is confined and where the tests take place: we are not in 
‘1984’.LXVIII 
The strongest point of culture is its universality, its appeal to the whole of 
humanity, which unavoidably plays against any messianic feelings in the legislatures 
introducing ‘culture’ tests. Indeed, the content of the tests exemplifies the impoverished 
character of the myths of national exceptionalism. The duo of globalisation and liberalism 
has done its job. While classical myths are rich, colourful and intriguing, the myths of 
cultural exceptionalism adopted by the liberal democracies can only be dull and deeply 
embarrassing. If the Dutch example I provided does not seem convincing enough, any 
other citizenship test would do the job.LXIX 
 
 
III. State-mandated étalons of  culture  
 
My first thesis is that liberal democracies have simply lost the luxury being able to 
invent themselves as nations in a substantive vein.  
Post WW II developments leading to the rise of international migration – as well as 
international marriages producing children directly disproving the dogma of unitary 
identities and exclusive nationhoodLXX – coupled with the global rise of human rights and 
liberalism,LXXI have rendered it impossible for states to continue shaping their nations.LXXII 
States effectively lost any legal possibility to imagine themselves as rooted in homogeneous 
monocultural societies, unable to ask of their own nationals and of the growing numbers of 
new-comers anything more than mere respect for the liberal ideology: ‘societies that lack or 
suppress […] other affiliations, allowing only allegiance to the nation-state, are rightly 
condemned as totalitarian’.LXXIII 
Nationality as such has been reinvented in a procedural vein, becoming merely a 
‘Kopplungsbegriff’LXXIV connecting a state and a person. Proceduralisation of the idea of 
nationality means that lacking certain mythical characteristics of a ‘worthy citizen’ cannot 
cause either deprivation of nationality nor block access to naturalisation, as ‘“abstract 
character” of state membership […] is decoupled from rights and identity’.LXXV The 
citizenship test I had to pass was so embarrassing not only because its patriotic drafters 
were unwise.LXXVI Quite on the contrary in fact, they knew the limits of what they could 
legally do all too well. Once state membership has become abstract and there is an 
obligation to introduce a nation-specific ‘culture’ test for those willing to naturalise, the test 
is bound to be at least as abstract as the belonging itself, i.e. a waste of time – unless one is 
blinded by madness, of course.  
Contemporary liberal democracies are bound to accept social realities, which 
necessarily entails acknowledging the differences between citizens, as well as welcoming as 
citizens the residents who do not think, act or look like the majority. As a consequence, 
when they refer to ‘being one of us’, their ‘particularlism’ is necessarily bound to stop at the 
restatement of liberal values: there is no more such a thing, legally speaking, as differences 
between ‘Britishness’, ‘Frenchness’, ‘Danishness’ etc.LXXVII Today, ‘the national 
particularisms which immigrants and ethnic minorities are asked to accept across European 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
115 
states, are but local versions of the universalistic idiom of liberal democracy’.LXXVIII This 
makes it exceedingly difficult for liberal democracies to justify the outdated logic of 
‘naturalisation’ to which they historically expose the ‘new-comers’.  
Faithful to the inertia of the modern times of nation-formation and in spite of the 
general shift away from assuming the responsibility for nation-forming, states have not 
stopped using the quasi-messianic rhetoric of national ‘specificity’, of which ‘culture’ and 
language testing are clear illustrations. Interestingly, as Weiler has compellingly 
demonstrated, the same also applies to the very idea of national constitutional specificity, 
which the Member States of the EU often embark on ‘protecting’ (rhetorically at 
least).LXXIX In the current context there is a need for critical reassessment of 
constitutionalism, an idea building – whether we want it or not – on the assumptions of 
monocultural nationalism.LXXX 
Whatever the mythical cultural exceptionalism of liberal democracies today might 
mean, in addition to the questions about a mevrouw de Jong, it is clear that it is powerless 
before the task of the generation and preservation of social cohesion. Actually, it is actively 
destroying such cohesion. Neither the embarrassing questionnaires about local ‘culture’, 
nor the tests of proficiency in the local language are able either to replace, or to provide 
added value to the simple socialisation of the ‘new’ members of a society. Indeed, instead 
of promoting socialisation, they merely play a role of ‘mobilisation bias’LXXXI – a well-
known conclusion of social scientists which is hardly new. Agreeing with Kostakopoulou, 
‘a sense of belonging to community develops with inclusion in society and politics, rather 
than as a result of citizenship ceremonies and language proficiency tests’.LXXXII There is 
nothing scary about a natural evolution in society, where people eat what they want, pray 
when they want and choose a language suitable, as far as they can judge, for the occasion. 
Given that states are bound to exercise self-restraint in nation-building, it becomes 
apparent that ‘the paradigm of societies organised within the framework of the nation-state 
inevitably loses contact with reality’.LXXXIII With the rise of human rights ideology and the 
proceduralisation of nationality, the array of exclusive entitlements which nationality could 
bring weakens, as the deprivation of rights on the grounds of not being a citizen becomes 
more difficult to explain and justify.LXXXIV Consequently, a number of key social and some 
political rights previously associated with the idea of ‘belonging to a nation’, came to be 
connected with residence only,LXXXV watering down the citizen-foreigner dichotomies.LXXXVI 
As a result of the developments described, national borders are genuinely irrelevant 
for increasing numbers of people in planning their lives. This makes it impossible, 
wholeheartedly to embrace the fictions taught to our great-grand fathers by the public 
school systems of the day in the expression of a reality masterfully exposed by Renan: 
‘l’oubli, et […] l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une 
nation’.LXXXVII School curricular research in the liberal democracies in Europe demonstrates 
that the idea of national glory – the cornerstone of the school programs of the past – is 
being supplanted.LXXXVIII ‘British national pride’, like any other similar institution, is in 
decline.LXXXIX States are trying hard to come up with their ‘own’ cultureXC but there is no 
such thing, beyond tolerance – and tolerance can be embraced, but not owned. 
 
 
IV. EU citizenship/Member State nationalities: Diverging vectors 
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My second thesis is that, when viewed through the lens of EU integration, language 
and ‘culture’ tests seem even less justified, running counter the very idea of European 
integration, let alone that of EU citizenship. 
The EU adds to the transformative potential of liberalism, human rights, and 
migration in general. Precisely because EU citizenship is a contingent and complementary 
status, the power of the Member States, who remain in charge of nationalities,XCI is severely 
weakened. This is because while each one of them taken separately can have an illusion that 
it controls access to EU citizenship, taken together they do not, as long as the nationality 
acquisition regimes are not harmonised, at least to some extent. Huge disparities between 
the citizenship laws of all the Member StatesXCII lead to the multiplication of the routes to 
the acquisition of the same status of European citizenship. In failing to regulate the issue of 
access to EU citizenship effectively, the Member States opted for the illusion of control 
rather than the resolution of outstanding problems, which include most importantly, the 
need to design an effective immigration policy for the Union, while ensuring that the rights 
of EU citizens and third-country nationals are protected. 
In a borderless Union the current approach means that more than twenty-seven 
ways of acquiring the same status applicable in all the Member States are in existence.XCIII 
Informed third-country nationals are free to choose the Member State where access to 
nationality is framed in the most permissive terms,XCIV in order to move to their ‘dream 
Member State’ later in their capacity as EU citizens. Obviously, when comparing the 
number of rights associated with EU citizenship with that associated with the nationality of 
a particular Member State, it becomes clear that at present ‘for third-country nationals 
residing in the EU it is becoming increasingly irrelevant in which Member State to 
naturalise’.XCV The main status they are likely to benefit from, in any event, will be EU 
citizenship, ‘a fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’,XCVI not the particular 
Member State’s nationality per se.XCVII 
Consequently, the Member States are unable to make a coherent claim to be able to 
control the access of non-nationals to their territories.XCVIII No matter how they frame their 
citizenship laws, the mere existence of the internal market has already destroyed any direct 
logical connection between the territory of a particular Member State and the ‘people’ of 
that Member State. The conceptual contradiction between the nationality policies of the 
Member States and the main EU citizenship rights is clear. While the Member States grant 
nationality to those connected with their territory or populace, assuming that the nationals 
would keep such connections, EU citizenship follows an opposing rationale, aiming at 
encouraging people to move, to benefit from the opportunities that the internal market has 
to offer and to think beyond their Member States. Consequently, third-country nationals 
naturalising in a particular Member State can do this for two very different, if not opposing 
reasons – both of them perfectly legitimate: either to stay in the Member State or to leave 
(immediately), benefiting from the main right of EU citizenship.XCIX 
Currently, the Member States seem to assume that the latter choice is not an 
option, since all the naturalisation policies are built on the assumption that a new citizen 
will stay in the Member State, which provides justification for the linguistic, cultural and 
other tests the newcomers are asked to pass before EU citizenship is conferred on them. 
Once the EU dimension is taken into account, however, the illusory world in which the 
Member States are still living crumbles in a second: why would you ask of an applicant for 
naturalisation to be proficient in Latvian, a language which virtually no-one speaks in the 
EU (and the world), if it is known that the main right that naturalisation confers is to leave 
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Latvia and to benefit from EU citizenship rights in a wider Europe where hardly anything 
‘Latvian’ will help? This is so obvious and, at the same time, so stubbornly ignored by the 
Member States that the situation can hardly be characterised in optimistic terms. However, 
given the lasting impact of European integration on the nationalities of the Member States, 
it is unavoidable that change will come. Pronounced in a slightly different context, these 
words of AG Poiares Maduro certainly apply to the awkward situation of those persons 
who, when naturalising in the EU, are exposed to ‘culture’ and language tests: 
 
Citizenship of the Union must encourage Member States to no longer conceive of the 
legitimate link of integration only within the narrow bonds of the national community, but 
also within the wider context of the society of peoples of the Union.C 
 
Viewed from the other side, any Latvian policy of language and ‘culture’ promotion 
targeting uniquely third-country nationals is by definition futile, since Latvia is just a tiny 
spot on the map of the EU, where borders do not exist for EU citizens. The latter can rely 
on EU law to come to Latvia and settle there. Given that any discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, either direct or indirect, is squarely prohibited by Article 18 TFEU,CI the 
application to EU citizens of any kind of tests in any circumstances is legally impossible.CII 
And if a Belizean naturalised on the island of Curaçao by virtue of passing an exam of the 
knowledge of Papiamento,CIII or an Inuit from Greenland can settle in Latvia without any 
tests, how can the preservation of cultural specificity be used as an argument for asking a 
Moldovan to pass them? Is Papiamento less ‘dangerous’ for the survival of Latvian culture 
than Romanian written in Cyrillic script? Obviously, the same observations apply to any of 
the Member States of the Union in a situation where, as Somek put it, ‘the [EU] does no 
longer yield’.CIV  
Even though European citizenship does not directly question the dubious nature of 
the claims of the nation-specific cultures, it clearly flushes out the inconsistency of the 
policy of ‘culture’ and language testing by the Member States. Even if a specific testable 
culture existed – which is not the case, as the previous two sections of this essay have 
demonstrated – and even if the knowledge of particular state-selected languages were 
indispensable for successful functioning in a society – which is equally untrue – the claim 
for pre-naturalisation tests still makes no sense, as it ignores all those who do not intend to 
naturalise and simply live in a territory of the given Member State,CV especially all those EU 
citizens coming from other Member States who are given virtually all the rights associated 
with the nationality anyway, no naturalisation required.CVI  
Should one be alarmed by this state of affairs? Most certainly not: the examples 
provided simply point to the fact, once again, that the assertions of messianic cultural 
exceptionalism by the Member States are routed in prejudice, rather any legitimate 
concerns. On the issue of language, one can spend days in Luxembourg without hearing 
Luxembourgian. We are likely to hear less of it in the near future, just as we will hear less 
Dutch in the streets of Amsterdam, or less Latvian in the streets of Riga. Is this a valid 
reason to make a handful of third country nationals naturalising in the Grand Duchy to 
pass a language exam? Of course not, since, firstly, knowing a language does not necessarily 
mean using it. Secondly, should the new Luxembourgians opt to benefit from their free 
movement right and leave the country, they will not have anyone to speak to (too bad they 
were pushed to learn the language they will never need). Lastly, given that language 
requirements do not apply to non-naturalising third country nationals and EU citizens 
already settled in Luxembourg, their imposition clearly cannot have anything to do with 
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Luxembourgian society, of which the latter two groups form an all too important part. 
Rather, it is about the distorted self-image of the state, which opts to intrude into the lives 
of the most vulnerable among the populace with its unjust demands. How else can this be 
characterised if not as ‘apartheid européen’?CVII  
Putting ‘culture’ and language testing into EU context demonstrates with clarity 
how arbitrary, random and nonsensical these policies are. All in all, the picture of inclusion 
and exclusion as applied to different entitlements in the EU is such that, agreeing with 
Aziz, it ‘fails to adequately account for the status quo in the Union and the spheres of 
belonging which, to some extent, make a mockery of vertically defined hierarchical 
interpretations of citizenship’.CVIII Much needs to be changed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whatever liberal democracies think about the stand-off between a culture of 
humanity and their ‘own culture’, when connecting the state-approved possession of the 
latter with the newly-reinvented notion of citizenship, to which the ‘culture’ and 
‘integration’ tests testify, it is inevitable that the obvious is bound to prevail. The return to 
the logic of modern states actively shaping their nations and annihilating the ‘other’ within 
their borders is highly unlikely. Moreover, in their present form, the tests do not actually 
test anything even closely related to culture, despite trying to reassert citizenship against the 
personhood of those taking them. This is wrong and can lead to increasing tensions in the 
societies making this mistake, just as any other arbitrary divide unjustifiable on its face 
would. Bosniak is right when she submits that ‘the very idea of personhood in liberal-
egalitarian thought is ethically expansive … [this idea] contains the normative and 
rhetorical resources to challenge every context in which it is situated – including the 
national constitutional context itself’.CIX The battle for self-serving myths fought by all the 
‘integrationist’ states against those of their inhabitants who remain willing to be accepted is 
thus lost, just as it started.CX 
Invention of cultural exceptionalism through ‘culture’ testing of permanent 
residents should stop as soon as possible. The idea that every liberal democracy in the EU 
is in possession of its own unique culture which must be imposed on a random sample of 
the new-comers is the first problem I promised to outline. The second problem concerns 
the chronic blindness of the Member States unwilling to see the effects of European 
citizenship and the successful functioning of the internal market on their societies. In 
reframing naturalisation policies, attention should be paid to the fact that the Member 
States no longer represent closed container societies and that the vectors of EU citizenship 
and of their nationalities are diametrically opposed. Asking someone to learn Slovenian to 
become an EU citizen can thus be counterproductive, a mistake. This is a fact that the 
Member States need to have the courage to admit. Lastly, it is greatly troubling that the 
Member States – in a somewhat old-fashioned quasi-totalitarian drive – do not feel the 
need to respect the private realm of those willing to naturalise: language and culture should 
be left to every individual human being to choose and to practice. By demonising those 
who have not yet answered the questionnaire about mevrouw de Jong’s preferences, social 
cohesion is undermined and numerous lives derailed. While pointing all this out is to 
restate the obvious, it is most unfortunate that these issues are not seriously discussed in 
the Union today. It is easy to predict, however, that in the medium term future 
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naturalisation procedures in the EU will be radically different from what we now have – 
taking reality into account in framing the policy is bound to happen sooner or later. That 
the naturalisation procedures are to become more open and less restrictive seems to be an 
inevitable consequence of the creation of the Union, where borders are non-existent and 
the federal-level statusCXI has already taken the lead.CXII 
Returning to my personal story, all the nuisances of the process notwithstanding, I 
am very happy to have become an EU citizen. Although the literature seems to be 
unanimous on the fact that the EU cannot generate any emotional appeal,CXIII I am one of 
the few for whom the contrary is true: it is EU citizenship, not the Dutch nationality that 
matters most to me. That I was bound to receive EU citizenship via the Dutch Kingdom is 
just a minor element of my story – other Member States happen to be just as short-sighted 
in putting widely-held prejudices into their naturalisation laws. Having dedicated several 
years of my academic enquiries to the analysis of the regulation of the accession of states to 
the EU,CXIV I am particularly happy to have acceded to the Union personally. I thus 
wholeheartedly thank my Queen, a British subjectCXV in whose name I became an EU 
citizen. 
In the practice of day-to-day life, however, tests change little – it is still a great 
pleasure to hear ‘welkom thuis’ in the plane landing from New York or Singapore – the 
same feeling as the one I experienced every time before the Dutch state set me the test 
which gave me my first serious doubts about my homeland – the Netherlands. 
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